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“Of course, what works is more than an empirical question. It involves the politics of 
evidence” (Denzin and Giardina, 2009 p. 19). 
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Abstract 
 
 
This empirical study evaluates the outcomes of community managed rural groundwater sources 
in mid-west Uganda based on the fundamentals of the Community Based Management (CBM) 
model: the neo-liberal consensus of user payment to cover recurrent maintenance costs of a 
water system and, the grassroots ideal of community control and ‘bottom-up’ development.  
The thesis demonstrates why the two wings of the CBM model form an unholy alliance amidst 
the messy reality of rural environments. It shows how user payment tends to corrupt and prevent 
collective action, how it destabilises community relations and, adversely, encourages free-
riding.  
The study goes beyond criticising CBM and studies an alternative rural water management 
model – CBM-lite’ – piloted by a water and sanitation NGO in Uganda. CBM-lite alters the 
organisational and governance arrangements of the CBM model but remains within the 
institutional CBM framework. While the innovation builds upon local agreement about the 
problem of non-payment and inactivity of Water User Committees and uses practitioner 
recommendations for improving sustainable rural water management, the illuminative case 
illustrates why – in a user pays era – community control may need to be removed from rural 
water management arrangements. 
The thesis shows, however, a rural water sector intransigent to change due to disagreement 
about the root causes of handpump non-functionality and consequent solutions towards 
sustainability. It demonstrates that known risks of the CBM model may be preferable to 
potential harm to ideology, policy coherence, organisational reputation and social and cultural 
norms. The study reveals a discomfort with user payment and, CBM, ironically, as a vehicle to 
avoid the user pays principle. To remove the deadlock in the rural water sector, a research 
agenda is proposed to investigate alternative approaches for reliable access to water in rural 
areas.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Rural Water Management in Sub-Saharan 
Africa at a Crossroads? 
 
 
This doctoral thesis discusses the impact of the Community Based Management (CBM) 
approach on realising long-term and reliable access to water in rural Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
The belief that rural water sources are best managed according to the Community Based 
Management (CBM) model is the dominant paradigm across SSA since the 1990s (Mugumya, 
2013; Roe et al., 2009). The CBM model was introduced to overcome the failings of the state 
that had largely ignored rural areas and had failed to maintain rural water infrastructure that had 
already been constructed (Fritz and Menocal, 2006; Harvey and Reed, 2006; Le Gouais and 
Wach, 2013; Moriarty et al., 2013; Miller, 1980; Parry-Jones et al., 2001). To overcome the 
lack of service provision in rural areas and to ensure sustainable access to water in developing 
countries, the top-down approach of the state was replaced with a high level of confidence in 
participatory and ‘bottom-up’ approaches that promised to empower communities to control 
the management of their rural water systems. In the CBM model, communities demand a water 
source, decide the technology, contribute towards the construction, voluntarily manage the 
water source and pay for its upkeep (Briscoe and Ferranti, 1988). The assumption that the 
combination of community demand, upfront contributions and participatory approaches result 
in a willingness to pay and collective action is, however, increasingly contested in academic 
and practitioner literature (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Cleaver 1999; 2001; 2002; 2012; Naiga 
et al., 2015).  
The key purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that the CBM model is an amalgam of 
conflicting ideologies from left-wing grassroots developmentalists and right-wing neo-liberals 
that ignore the messy reality of rural environments (van den Broek and Brown, 2015). Both 
ideologies advocate community control, the former in the absence of trust in African politicians 
and government agencies (Page, 2003) and the private sector (Shiva, 2002), the latter in order 
to cut state deficits by promoting the commodification of water, thereby ensuring the 
community covers Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs (Blaikie, 2006). The CBM model 
is a paradigm of its era (1990s) when there was faith in so-called Third Way politics and policy 
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programmes that promised win–win outcomes (Mohan, 2002). Because support comes from 
both ends of the political spectrum, the CBM model has proved very dominant and to date the 
prevailing view of donor agencies, policy makers and academics in the rural water circle is 
‘‘that communities can and should take full responsibility for their [water] systems” 
(Whittington et al., 2009 p. 714). 
At any one time, however, one out of three handpumps is non-functional across SSA (Baumann, 
2006; Oxford/RFL, 2014; RWSN, 2010). Statistics for non-functionality of handpumps are no 
better than they were in the state-led era (Evans, 1992) – maintenance has been, and continues 
to be, the stumbling block. To combat the lack of collective maintenance of community 
handpumps, some authors suggest self-supply from rain water harvesting and shallow wells 
(Smits and Sutton, 2012; Sutton, 2010) or recommend the extension of piped water connections 
common in peri-urban and urban areas to rural communities (Hall et al., 2014). Nevertheless, 
the handpump technology is likely to remain the dominant technology in developing countries 
as they are relatively cheap and easy to maintain (Carter et al., 2010; Parry-Jones et al., 2001). 
The magnitude of the challenge is evident when in 2020 it is estimated that 57% of the rural 
global population will be dependent on communally-managed water points (Joint Monitoring 
Programme, 2011), further exacerbated by growing populations and the often detrimental 
impact of climate change (Oates et al., 2014; Schlosser et al., 2014). The aim of this thesis is 
therefore to contribute to the growing geography of water literature and the rural water 
sustainability debate by critically evaluating the challenges of the Community Based 
Management (CBM) model and alternative approaches for sustainable rural water 
management. 
The evaluation of the CBM approach for rural water sources in SSA comes at an opportune 
moment. The topic of water security is high on the international agenda. With the declaration 
of the United Nations human right to water in 2010 as its goal, and having met the 2015 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) target of halving the proportion of people without 
access to an improved water source, the sixth post-2015 Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
aims to achieve universal and sustainable access to water. To date, it is estimated that 663 
million people worldwide have no access to clean drinking water (Joint Monitoring Programme, 
2015) of which the majority resides in rural SSA (Sadoff et al., 2015). Meanwhile, ‘slippage’ 
(Franceys et al., 2016) of rural water infrastructure – where the pace of construction cannot 
keep up with the failure of previously constructed water sources – is impeding the challenge of 
meeting the ambitious sixth SDG goal (Sadoff et al., 2015). To achieve universal and 
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sustainable access to clean water, a number of actors across the academic, non-profit and profit 
spectrum are increasingly calling to ‘innovate’1 rural water service delivery. 
A crucial bottleneck, however, is ambiguity about the interpretation of ‘innovation’ in the rural 
water sector, as theoretical Chapter 6 will highlight. This is partly the result of sector-wide 
disagreement about the root causes of handpump non-functionality. According to a large-scale 
UK aid, NERC, ESRC funded project ‘Unlocking the Potential of Groundwater for the Poor’ 
(UPGro) the primary reason for the failure of rural water schemes is the low yield of 
groundwater, poor water quality and mechanical failure (see also Carter and Ross 2016). 
Another body of literature, which this thesis subscribes to, argues that the dearth of Operation 
and Maintenance (O&M) finance is the key explanation (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Fonseca et 
al., 2013; Jones, 2011;2013; Kalulu et al., 2012; Peter and Nkambule, 2012, IRC/Triple-S, 
2012; Le Gouais and Wach, 2013)  in conjunction with an inactive WUC to organise community 
meetings, collect user funds, carry out O&M tasks, organise handpump repairs and maintain 
proper hygiene and sanitation practices near the water source (Carter et al., 2010; Mugumya, 
2013; Naiga et al., 2015). Amid such differences of opinion, there is little common ground over 
a possible way forward. Even where there is a shared problem analysis – dearth of O&M funds 
and inactivity of WUCs – that literature itself has a multitude of diverging recommendations, 
ranging from the use of mobile phone technologies (Koehler et al., 2015; Thomson et al., 2012) 
to capacity building efforts (Carter and Kidega, 2013; Mandara et al., 2013; Marks and Davis, 
2012) and more external post-construction support (Baumann and Furey, 2013; Lockwood and 
Smits, 2011; Moriarty et al., 2013; Whittington et al., 2009), which represent only minor 
alterations to mainstream CBM (van den Broek and Brown, 2015). Nevertheless, a number of 
practitioners and academics are keen to adapt rural water management arrangements to local 
practices and circumstances (Booth, 2012; Jones, 2015), but little is known whether such 
innovations address lack of user funds and issues of O&M.   
Thus, when Jane Nabunnya Mulumba, the Country Director of the Sustainable Services at Scale 
(Triple-S) initiative 2  in Uganda commented that: “… if effectively sensitised, community 
members exhibit willingness to take up the responsibility of managing their sources. They 
appreciate the benefits that accrue from well-managed and maintained sources” (Nabunnya et 
                                                          
1 Alternative strategies for improving rural water service delivery was a key topic during the 7 th Rural Water 
Supply Network (RWSN) forum on 28 November – 2 December 2016 in Côte D’ivoire.  
 
2 The Triple-S (Sustainable Services at Scale) initiative is a six year programme that aims to improve access to 
rural water services in developing countries. The initiative is hosted by IRC WASH. 
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al., 2012 p.5), she adopted the persistent perception that the CBM model can be effectively 
enforced with the ‘right set of tools’, conditions and capacity building efforts. It is important to 
note that this thesis does not pass judgments on the merits of capacity building and 
technological innovations, but seeks to clarify why there has been little appetite to innovate the 
rules and incentives that guide the management of handpumps given the mounting empirical 
evidence that the CBM model has failed to secure long-term access to rural water sources 
(Kamruzzaman et al., 2013; Koestler, 2009).  
 
 
1.1 Origin of the work 
 
This thesis is a critical examination of the outcomes of the CBM model on handpump 
functionality in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), using mid-west Uganda as a case study. My interest 
in studying the outcomes of the CBM model and to investigate a potential effective substitute 
is rooted in my working experiences in the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector in 
northern and mid-west Uganda from 2011-2014. The thesis draws upon action research when I 
was the Programme Manager of a local Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) ‘The Water 
Trust’ (TWT) from June 2012 until January 2014. In this period, I took the lead in developing 
(working closely with TWT staff members and local government officials) an alternative rural 
water management model, referred to as CBM-lite. In the CBM-lite model, handpump 
downtime is anticipated to be reduced by replacing the voluntary Water User Committees 
(WUCs) in the CBM model with an incentivised Water Operator to strengthen the user pays 
principle (Carter et al., 1999; Harvey, 2007; Lockwood and Le Gouais, 2011; Moriarty et al., 
2013; Quin et al., 2011), and through an insurance style micro-finance product that ensures 
funds are available for expedient repairs (Fonseca et al., 2013; Foster et al., 2015; Zeug, 2011). 
The innovation refines organisation and governance arrangements of the CBM model (which 
will be explained in detail in Chapter 6), but as the rules of operation and enforcement of 
sanctions are communally arranged, remains within the existing institutional framework of 
CBM. As the model could potentially prove an inexpensive and practical solution for rural 
water sustainability, TWT introduced the CBM-lite model in four pilot villages in Kiryandongo 
district from August 2013.  
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In October 2013, working remotely from Uganda, I started my research project at the 
Department of Geography at the University of Portsmouth where I was able to rigorously study 
the outcomes of the CBM model and the proceedings of the CBM-lite pilot. The fieldwork took 
place in mid-west Uganda in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts. Figure 1.1. depicts the 
research area and the locations of the studied villages. The fieldwork was partly undertaken in 
my dual role as the TWT Programme Manager and PhD researcher in the period between 
October 2013 and January 2014. Hereafter, the fieldwork was undertaken on four separate visits 
between June 2104 and November 2015. Due to the various research trips over time, the thesis 
has been the result of an iterative research strategy wherein research results were complemented 
with an extensive review of the literature on local resources management and institutional 
change. During this research process, I gradually realised that the quest for sustainability was a 
complex and daunting endeavour.  
 
 
1.2 From Water Management Arrangement to Water 
Management Practice 
 
A main part of this thesis investigates how formal rules guiding user payment and community 
control influence actual management practices. Both CBM and CBM-lite are grounded in 
‘mainstream institutionalism’ (Cleaver, 2012), that claims ‘institutions’ – understood as ‘the 
rules of the game’ (North, 1991 p. 98) – can be effectively designed to improve resource 
management outcomes. In this school of thought, formal rules engineer transparency and trust, 
guide human behaviour, enable monitoring of resource use, provide an incentive for good 
behaviour and sanction misconduct (North, 1990; Bromley, 1992; Tang, 1992; Lam, 1998; 
Ostrom, 1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). As a water 
practitioner I was inspired by the assumption that the right set of conditions, rules and incentives 
could endorse storage of funds, willingness to pay (Foster et al., 2015) and a commitment to 
manage the water system (WaterAid, 2011). However, the rational-choice principle within 
mainstream institutionalism wherein selfish, cooperative and altruistic behaviour may coexist 
(Ostrom, 1998) was insufficient to explain the often unexpected and uneven outcomes of rural 
water management arrangements in the case study area. As a local government official wittily 
commented in a conversation about community management: “[w]hen we each have two bottles 
of beer, would the outcome of our venture be the same? I could become jolly and you could 
become moody” (24th of October, 2014).  
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Figure 1.1 
Map of the Research Area 
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In order to better understand why communities struggle to fulfil formal rural water management 
arrangements that promote user payment and community management this thesis draws upon 
an extensive review of the literature that indicates an increasing criticism against participatory 
approaches and institutional design as a panacea for good developmental outcomes. This thesis 
therefore builds on the insights of this ‘critical institutional’ scholarship (Cleaver, 2012) to 
understand how community management works in practice and why its outcomes do not always 
yield the desired policy results of user payment and collective action. Critical institutionalism 
points at the complexity of institutions – understood as the formal and informal rules, norms 
and social arrangements present in a certain social context or, in the form of an organisation 
(Cleaver, 2012; Jones, 2015) – that shape natural resource management outcomes. Frances 
Cleaver’s (2002; 2012) concept of ‘institutional bricolage’, that draws on the work of Giddens 
(1984), Long (2001) and Douglas (1987), helps to explain the interaction between actors and 
institutions. Here, institutions both constrain and enable human agency, and are in turn reshaped 
by human actors (Cleaver, 2012). It argues institutions are consciously and unconsciously 
shaped by everyday social practices, historical events, informal and formal rules, politics, 
powerful actors such as local leaders and elites and authoritative resources involving 
worldviews and strongly held believes about proper human behaviour (Cleaver, 2001; 2012; 
Mosse, 1997; Mehta et al., 2001; Lund, 2006). Noteworthy, this scholarship debunks the 
promise of mainstream institutionalists that formal community management arrangements lead 
to fair and ‘good’ developmental outcomes for all actors involved (Cleaver, 2012).  
This thesis provides a ‘thick’ case study description that critically reflects on the outcomes of 
formal rural water management arrangements in mid-west Uganda. The thesis moves, however, 
beyond criticising the CBM model by analysing alternative rural water management models 
and, by introducing and critically examening the outcomes of the ‘CBM-lite model’ – an 
alternative rural water management model – that has been polited by TWT in Kiryandongo 
district. The thesis uses the CBM-lite model as a lens to reflect on the risk perceptions of key 
actors in rural water services provisioning to better understand the attempts of contemporary 
rural water management innovations that aim to improve reliable access to water but only 
marginally deviate from the CBM model. The role of risk perceptions in the handpump 
sustainability debate have been largely under acknowledged in the rural water literature. As this 
thesis will show in the empirical Chapters 7 and 8, a rigorous understanding of people’s risk 
perceptions and their strongly held values may provide a powerful tool for understanding why 
present-day rural water management innovations remain entrenched within the fundamentals 
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of the CBM model, despite increasing criticism of its promise to elicit reliable and long-term 
access to water.  
Overall, this thesis makes a contribution to the discipline of human geography by unravelling 
how internationally influenced CBM policy takes shape in the study area and how local forces 
impact on water resource management outcomes. Working from an inter-disciplinary field, the 
thesis brings insights from anthropological theories and approaches into the geography of water 
literature. While this thesis lies outside the domain of cultural anthropology, my practitioner 
background, in conjunction with my earlier anthropology training, enabled deepened 
understanding on the local social context and how the power of place shapes behaviour and 
drives local dynamics. The original desire at the starting point of this study, to understand why 
people in the study area could not effectively manage their water systems, and, importantly, to 
improve rural water management outcomes, is interwoven with the focus of human geography 
research on human well-being. The practitioner lens in this thesis, moves the analysis beyond 
understanding current practices and patterns towards exploring alternative approaches for 
achieving sustainable water management practices. Findings are therefore interpreted through 
what is termed by Brown (2008): a ‘weakly constructivist positionality’. This means that social 
reality is being approached as unconsciously and consciously co-constructed by individuals that 
interact and give meaning to their world, but that policy arrangements can be modified to 
improve the outcomes of natural resource management practices. As a result, the thesis’ 
recommendations comprehend a practical angle, aiming to improve rural water management 
outcomes and, as such, human wellbeing.  
 
 
1.3 Community Based Management in Uganda and  
Research Objectives 
 
Similar to other sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, economic and public reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s guided the implementation of the CBM model in Uganda. While Community 
Based Management (CBM) was already introduced in Uganda in 1986 by UNICEF (Mugumya, 
2013), it was only in 1999 that the CBM framework was formalised in the Ugandan water 
policy. The CBM model is implemented in rural areas that comprises villages and rural growth 
centres, affecting 82% of the Ugandan population and involving 28.4 million people (World 
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Bank, 2016). The focus of this study is on rural villages that have less than 2,000 people and 
rely on drinking water from community managed water sources such as deep and shallow wells 
fitted with a handpump and protected springs. 
According to figures of the Ugandan Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) (2016), 67% 
of the rural population has access to clean water, 86% of the rural water systems are functional 
and 77% of the WUCs are active. These figures are, however, contested. To illustrate, in 2011 
the reported functionality rate was much lower and estimated at 53,3% (MWE, 2011). 
Subsequent annual reports of the MWE did not factor in the handpumps that were down for 
more than five years (MWE, 2015) and studies in Uganda have questioned the reliability of the 
monitoring data from the MWE (Koestler et al., 2010).  
To critically evaluate the challenges of the Community Based Management (CBM) model 
and alternative approaches for sustainable rural water management, it is important to 
unravel and define the concept of ‘sustainability’. The meaning and application of the term 
sustainability in the rural water sector is complex, confusing and contested, as fully described 
in theoretical Chapter 2. This thesis explores whether the outcomes of the CBM model are 
consistent with its aims to achieve user payment and community control. Therefore, the thesis 
approaches sustainability in terms of finance and management (Wong, 2006) because they are 
two key elements in the CBM model to ensure a handpump “continues to work over time” 
(Abrams et al., 1998 p. 4). The financial sustainability of the handpumps is measured through 
investigating the available funds for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) at each water source. 
The study uses the WASHcost benchmarks (Burr and Fonseca, 2013) to verify whether 
communities have sufficient funds to undertake minor and major repairs. The level of 
management or, ‘water control’ from an organisational perspective (Mollinga, 2003), is related 
to the fulfilment of the management body to execute their formal CBM responsibilities, such 
as collecting water user fees, organising community meetings, carrying out O&M tasks, 
organising handpump repairs and maintaining proper hygiene and sanitation practices near the 
water source (Carter et al., 2010; Mugumya, 2013; Naiga et al., 2015; WaterAid, 2011).  Hence, 
to unravel the overall research aim as stated above, this thesis includes the following four 
research objectives:  
 
1. To examine the underlying ideologies and theoretical underpinnings of the CBM 
model; 
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2. To evaluate the outcomes of 100 community based managed water sources in mid-
west Uganda. 
 
3. To analyse the risk perceptions of community members and, local and national 
NGO staffs and government officials about the introduction of an alternative rural 
water management model – referred to as CBM-lite. 
 
4. To evaluate the outcomes of the CBM-lite model in four pilot villages in mid-west 
Uganda. 
 
 
1.4  Study Limitations  
 
The main focus of the doctoral research – to systematically and empirically evaluate how user 
payment and community control (the fundamentals of the CBM) play out in the case study area 
– restricted the scope of the study and accounts for a number of possible limitations in this 
work. First, the study (both theoretical and empirical) remains predominantly centred on the 
local resource level. Hence, valuable contributors on public service delivery and institutional 
change such as Booth (2012) within the political economy spectrum or, Andrews (2012) and 
Andrews et al (2013) taking a public policy angle, are not addressed in this study. Second, this 
body of work does not adopt a social justice lens, prevalent in critical realist and pragmatic 
studies that i.e. question the impact of enforcing user payment on a pro-poor agenda (Charmaz, 
2016; Chowns, 2014; Denzin, 2015; Mertens, 2009; Morgan, 2014) or unravel gender relations 
or women’s rights in processes of accessing water resources (Agarwal, 1997; Boelens and 
Zwarteveen, 2003; Delgado and Zwarteveen, 2007). 
Further, acknowledging the influence of the social context on thought and, thus, behaviour, as 
highlighted by critical institutionalists, the thesis aims to unravel people’s thought on what is 
deemed risky in changing contemporary modes of rural water management and why. Risk is a 
cross disciplinary research area and can be explored from a range of different domains such as  
psychology, economics, mathematics or anthropology. The thesis’s exploration on risk 
perceptions is limited to the anthropological discipline that has a longstanding research focus 
on risk. While insights from anthropology generate a profound understanding and analysis of 
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risk (Douglas 1966, 1970; Van Gennep, 2010) , this thesis only makes an initial step in showing 
the significance of risk perceptions for policy and decision-making in the rural water sector and 
is limited to a shallow immersion into the concept of risk and risk perceptions. For example, 
from the multi-facetted oeuvre of Mary Douglas, the thesis only touches upon Cultural Theory 
to show how groups of actors can have shared or competing interests, value systems and 
preferences and how people may choose “… to deal with their social problems in one way or 
another” (1982, p. 200). 
From a methodological perspective, the data collection concerning actor’s risk perceptions was 
limited to surveys, interviews and a public meeting.  Due to practical research limitations (such 
as time and resources), a fuller picture on symbolic connections between the structural ordering 
in Cultural Theory and people’s beliefs, worldviews, and corresponding cognitive biases could 
have emerged with ethnographic research that produces a rigorous understanding of people’s 
background and actions. Other methodological shortcomings and limitations are discussed in 
Chapter 4.   
Related to risk perceptions, is the subject of cosmology that aims to explain how misfortune 
could be explained (instead of avoided as prevalent in most Western societies). The study 
findings show the significance of cosmological worldviews on shaping rural water management 
outcomes, as is briefly outlined in Chapter 3.6, but because the study on cosmology was not 
taken as a starting point of this research, the study does not draw on the wealth of insights from 
authors such as Douglas (1967; 1970),  Moore and Sanders (2001), Sanders (2003) and, Evans-
Pritchard (1937) about its impact on social relations, processes and practices in the African 
context. Future enquiry about the impact of cosmological worldviews on rural water 
management practices may provide a significant contribution to both human geography and 
anthropology and the literature on water resources management.  
 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This doctoral thesis encompasses a topic-based structure (Ketabi and Rahavard, 2013) wherein 
research objectives 2-4 are analysed and discussed in separate empirical chapters.  
The foundation for addressing the first research objective is conceptual Chapter 2 that reviews 
the underlying ideologies and conceptual underpinnings of the CBM model. The chapter thus 
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forms the backbone of the entire work. It attends to three fundamental areas for understanding 
contemporary rural water management arrangements. First, it describes the origins of the CBM 
model and it provides a critical review of its main concepts. Second, it  reflects on the different 
meanings of ‘sustainability’ in the delivery of rural water services and, third, it discusses the 
main recommendations in the literature to improve reliable access to water in rural areas. 
Chapter 3, describes the research context and the case study area of Masindi and Kiryandongo 
districts in mid-west Uganda. The chapter opens with a social, political and historical 
background on Uganda and describes the patterns of rural water services provision from pre-
colonial times till date. It provides an overview of today’s rural water policies in Uganda and 
discusses the bottlenecks of effective rural water service delivery in the Ugandan context 
despite its strong sector policy and institutional framework.   
In Chapter 4, a detailed overview is provided of the research methodology and methods. It 
describes that this study is the result of three separate research designs: action research, cross-
sectional study and a critical case study. The chapter critically reflects on the author’s 
positionality and role during the research process and, the potential sources of error and bias. 
The chapter describes how the outcomes of the rural water management arrangements were 
evaluated in the thesis.  
Chapter 5, addresses the second research objective and evaluates the outcomes of 100 
community manged rural water sources in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts. The chapter 
describes the process of accessing water and in particular the processes of payment and the 
execution of formal Water User Committee (WUC) roles and responsibilities in the post-
construction phase. In this chapter how user payment impacts on community dynamics and the 
overall maintenance of the rural water infrastructure is explored. The chapter shows that user 
payment corrupts voluntary collective action and is disruptive for social community relations. 
It discusses whether the recommendations in the literature, reviewed in Chapter 2, are sufficient 
to improve water user collections and the maintenance of rural water systems.  
In Chapter 6, the main question is why the CBM model has proven so resilient to change, 
despite its proven poor performance across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). To put this proposition 
to the test, the chapter analyses the level of innovation of two contemporary alternative rural 
water management models: the Smart Handpump project by the University of Oxford and the 
Sub-county Water Supply and Sanitation Boards by IRC/triple-S and the Ugandan Ministry of 
Water and Environment. The chapter discusses their level of innovation on the basis of Karen 
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Bakker’s (2007) resource management categories that divides water management arrangements 
into three levels: institutional, organisational and governance. A key focus of the chapter is the 
CBM-lite model that was developed while the author was the Programme Manager of The 
Water Trust. The analysis in the chapter demonstrates that the CBM-lite model reconfigures 
the organisational and governance arrangements of the CBM model, representing therefore a 
potential controversial model for actors in the rural water sector. The chapter unpacks the 
potential reasons for the lack of rural water management reform and places thereby special 
emphasis on the role of risk perceptions in the persistence to the status quo. It introduces the 
relational theory of risk developed by Boholm and Corvellec (2011) as a conceptual model to 
understand how and why something may be perceived as a risk. 
Chapter 7 describes the implementation process of the CBM-lite model and the initial 
observations of the CBM-lite model in the pilot villages. The chapter addresses the third 
research objective and analyses actors’ risk perceptions about the introduction of the CBM-lite 
model through a relational reading of risk (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011) which provides a lens 
for understanding why there has been little effort at the rural water sector level to move away 
from the CBM model.  
Chapter 8 addresses the final research objective 4 and examines the outcomes of the CBM-lite 
model. The chapter provides a critical case study of the outcomes of the CBM-lite model 
derived from four separate field work periods between June 2014 and November 2015. The 
chapter evaluates whether the CBM-lite model is better equipped to enforce user payment and 
community control than the CBM model.  
Concluding Chapter 9 synthesises the outcomes of the research objectives and answers the 
overall aim of the thesis. It highlights two key findings: 1) the failure to successfully reconcile 
the user pays principle and community control and, 2) an inertia in the rural water sector and 
reluctance to move away from the CBM model amongst actors at all levels in the rural water 
sector. The chapter summarises the thesis’ main contribution to academic and practitioner 
knowledge. It concludes that non-functionality of rural water infrastructure is related to the 
CBM model. That CBM assumptions may not agree with local realities and that 
recommendations that fall within the CBM model – including initiatives that promote processes 
of institutional bricolage – will struggle to incite community control and endorse sufficient 
funds for O&M. The thesis has contributed to academic and practitioner knowledge by 
demonstrating a rural water sector resistant to change due to aversion to risk, conflicting 
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diagnose of problems and solutions. Counterintuitively, the CBM model is used as a means to 
avoid the user pays principle. Because the instititutional framework of the CBM model, 
promoting user payment and community control, runs counter to what community members 
and various WASH actors value, the thesis concludes that in a ‘user pays era’, community 
control will likely maintain the risk of handpump failure. The chapter discusses the policy 
implications of the study and stresses thereby the ‘wicked’ nature of handpump non-
functionality and this implication on potential future approaches to improving reliable access 
to water in rural SSA. Finally, the chapter proposes a future research agenda. 
 
Chapter 2 now starts with a background and critical review on the CBM model. 
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Chapter 2 
The Entrenchment of the Community 
Based Management Model and the Quest 
for Sustainability 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The preceding chapter explained the main problem addressed in this book: an estimated one 
third of the handpumps in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are non-functional. Despite an increasing 
amount of research that relate handpump failure to the system of rules and incentives that guide 
the management of handpumps (Jones, 2011; Van Koppen et al., 2012; Barnes et al., 2014), the 
belief that rural water sources are best managed according to the CBM model is the dominant 
paradigm across sub-Saharan Africa. This chapter therefore addresses the first research 
objective and aims to understand the underlying ideologies and theoretical underpinnings 
of the CBM model3.  
To examine the first research objective, this chapter introduces three interrelated themes that 
shape contemporary rural water management debate in SSA countries. First, Section 2.2 
outlines the CBM framework and the processes that resulted in the widespread acceptance of 
the idea that local communities in developing countries are best fit to manage their own water 
sources. Section 2.3 highlights the key theoretical underpinnings of the CBM model and the 
chapter critically discusses the main concepts of the framework in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. By 
elaborating on the aspects of ‘community’, participatory processes, social capital and the ‘self-
regulating community’, this thesis chooses a path that highlights the insights of critical 
institutional scholarship to understand the outcomes of community managed rural water 
sources.
                                                          
3 This chapter is partly based upon:  
van den Broek, M.A., and Brown, J., 2015. Blueprint for breakdown? Community Based Management of rural 
groundwater in Uganda. Geoforum 67, 51-63. (Published) 
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Second, Section 2.6 critically analysis the meanings of ‘sustainable’ rural water services, how 
sustainability is framed and the (dis)array of explanations in academic and practitioner literature 
about the causes of handpump failure. This section defines the meaning of ‘sustainable rural 
water services’, how sustainability is approached in this thesis and in the rural water literature 
and then differentiates between multiple factors that influence the sustainability of rural water 
services. Following this analysis, the third debate in Section 2.7 distils three bundles of 
recommendations made in practitioner and academic literature that are assumed to increase 
handpump sustainability and solve handpump failure. The chapter closes with a set of 
concluding remarks in Section 2.8 that summarise the key problems addressed in this thesis: 
the entrenchment of the CBM model in rural water policy and practice and the disagreement 
about the root causes of handpump failure and consequent solutions towards sustainability.  
 
 
 Community Based Management of Rural Water Sources 
 
The Community Based Management (CBM) model consists of two stages. The first stage is the 
Demand Responsive Approach (DRA) (Sara & Katz, 1997). This approach encourages 
communities to demand a service, decide the technology, contribute towards the construction 
(generally five percent of the construction costs) and form an institution to manage the water 
source (Breslin, 2003; Franceys et al., 2016). The implementing bodies are expected to follow 
specific participatory steps to ensure the beneficiaries are actively involved in the water project. 
Table 2.1 from Kleemeier (2000), provides an overview of these steps in the implementation 
phase of rural water projects and describes their assumed effect on sustainability.  
The second stage is the post-construction phase whereby a local water organisation – the Water 
User Committee (WUC) – is responsible for the Operation & Maintenance (O&M) of the water 
source. In this stage, WUC members are required to invest their time to keep the system 
running. Table 4.7 in the methodology Chapter 4.11, provides a detailed overview of the 
activities a WUC is expected to carry out (Lockwood, 2004).  Policy wise, the water users are 
expected to pay for system upgrades, rehabilitation and expansion expenditures as well as for 
recurrent O&M costs (Burr and Fonseca, 2013).  However, in reality these costs are rarely met 
(Harvey, 2008).  
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Together, these two stages (the DRA approach and the post-construction phase) are expected 
to lead to a sustainable rural water service. The participatory approaches endorsed by the 
implementer from the outset, whereby communities take decisions and are involved in the 
implementation process, are anticipated to result in ‘empowerment’. Alsop et al. (2006) define 
empowerment as: “[t]he process of enhancing an individual’s or group’s capacity to make 
purposive choices into desired actions and outcomes” (p. 1). The ‘empowered’ community is 
expected to elect a WUC who takes control over the water system. In this process, the 
combination of participation and empowerment is expected to have led to ‘feelings of 
ownership’ that ensure the community is willing to pay and prepared to volunteer their time to 
keep the water system running (Doe and Khan, 2004).   
 
 
Table 2.1 
Standard Features of Participatoty Rural Water Supply Projects and Their Assumed Effects on 
Sustainability (From Kleemeier (2000 p. 932)). 
 
Project feature Assumed effect on sustainability 
Meetings to explain project before it 
begins, community has right to refuse it 
-Provide communities with adequate information on O&M costs and 
responsibilities  they will choose  supplies which they are willing 
and able to maintain, or refuse project altogether 
Contract signed specifying 
community’s and project’s 
responsibilities 
-Communities will handle O&M responsibilities if clearly defined 
and understood from beginning 
User committee formed with design and 
construction responsibilities 
-Strengthen organisational skills needed to manage supplies through 
e.g., supervising self-help labour 
-Incorporate local preferences and knowledge in choice of 
technology, design, and construction  users maintain supplies 
because meet their felt needs and in line with their ability and 
willingness to pay for O&M. 
-Community acts as watchdog to control construction quality 
well-constructed scheme requisite for sustainability. 
-Develop sense of community ownership users maintain supplies 
because they are theirs. 
-Communities learn about technology and supplies knowledge 
assists in performing O&M tasks 
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Same committee or new one assumes 
O&M responsibilities 
-Local organisations have better potential to assess and collect user 
fees, and supervise routine O&M activities, than do central 
government or local institutions 
Community upfront cash collection (to 
contribute to capital costs, establish 
O&M fund, or both) 
-Screen out communities which lack felt need, unwilling, or unable 
to maintain supplies/service level 
-Develop sense of community ownership users maintain supplies 
because theirs 
-Strengthen organisational skills needed to manage supplies 
-Users will pay for O&M if made clear from the beginning that 
improved water services cost money 
Community provides free labour and 
other materials 
-Screen out communities which lack felt need, unwilling, or unable 
to maintain supplies/service level 
-Develop sense of community ownership users maintain supplies 
because theirs 
-Communities learn about technology and supplies knowledge 
assists in performing O&M tasks 
Management and book-keeping training 
provided to committee members; 
management procedures established 
-Strengthen organisational skills needed to manage supplies 
-Locally adapted tariffs, collection procedures, etc. work better than 
standardized procedures imposed from outside 
Technical training and tools provided to 
local repair persons 
-Trained users will carry out maintenance and repairs quickly 
because live closest to problem, and because other users inform and 
pressure them 
Hand-over ceremony -Communities will handle O&M responsibilities if clearly defined 
and understood from beginning 
A staff of community mobilisers to carry 
out above activities 
-Realising community depends on having an agency and field staff 
responsive to the users as clients 
Simple technologies (VLOM 
handpumps, gravity schemes, protected 
springs, etc.) 
-Make it feasible for communities to participate in all phases of 
project, including performing and financing maintenance 
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2.2.1 The Origin of the Community Based Management Model 
 
The Community Based Management (CBM) model was rolled out in Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries sans evidence in the 1980s (Miller, 1980). The devotion of the international 
community to CBM can be explained in two different ways. The first explanation refers to the 
increasing evidence that the centralised state had failed to provide reliable social services to its 
citizenry (as I will outline more in-depth below). More gloomy is the second explanation that 
argues CBM is actually strongly connected to the neoliberal consensus (McCarthy, 2009) and 
the result of mutually reinforcing processes between global politics and a ‘positivistic’ science 
community headed by Elinor Ostrom and her associates (Forsyth, 2003). This scholarship, also 
referred to as “orthodox science”, assumed political neutrality and objectivity and aimed to 
generate universal rules or laws to endorse sustainable natural resource use (Forsyth, 2003). 
Elinor Ostrom (1990) and her colleagues demonstrated through carefully selected case studies 
in various contexts, “that when certain conditions are met, groups of people are capable of 
sustainably managing their common resources” (Wilson et al., 2013 p.22, original text in 
italics). These studies were situated in a context where governments in developing countries 
were tasked to steer their expenditures away from social services. The CBM model may 
therefore be seen as a “science-policy” due to the mutual enforcement of science and policy, 
instead of their neat separation and as a “coproduction” because of the simultaneous production 
of knowledge and the CBM policy (Forsyth, 2003 p. 135; Jasanoff et al., 1995; Hess, 1997). 
 
 
2.2.2 Financial Crisis 
 
The CBM model was introduced in the midst of a financial crisis that was prompted by the oil 
shocks in the 1970s4 (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). Since independence in the 1950s-60s, African 
states had lent large sums of money from commercial banks in the global North, regardless of 
their capacity to account for the money received. Due to the oil crisis, interest rates soared and 
from 1975 to 1982 interest payments rose to 400 percent (Moyo, 2009). Governments in 
developing countries faced enormous fiscal constraints in repaying their debts. In 1990, the 
African continent was indebted with USD 230 billion, representing three times the continent’s 
export earnings (Danso, 1990 p.5). Pursuing a neo-liberal agenda, the World Bank (WB) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) required the governments to adopt the Structural 
                                                          
4 For more information about the background of the oil crisis, see: Darmstadter (2013).  
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Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in return for financial support (Makoba, 2011). In the 1980s, 
the SAPs reduced the role of the state in the economy and service delivery. As part of the 
reforms, states were advised to decentralise their government structures and share their 
administrative and fiscal responsibilities with lower levels of government (Mizrahi,2004; 
Grindle, 2007). Key to these reforms were the expectations of increased efficiency and 
effectiveness of service delivery to local populations (Ribot, 2002). Context Chapter 3 will 
provide a comprehensive description of the decentralisation processes in Uganda. Despite the 
intentions of the SAPs to improve service delivery and economic growth, Makoba (2011 p.10) 
notes that “the policies imposed by the World Bank and IMF contributed to a steep decline in 
Africa’s economy during the 1980s – to the extent that this era soon became known as ‘the lost 
decade’”.  
 
 
2.2.3 Criticism of the State-Led Paradigm 
 
In the 1980s, scholars and practitioners increasingly expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
ability of the state to deliver social services to rural populations (Chambers, 1983).  After the 
colonial period, most newly created African states had copied the state-led development 
paradigm as enforced in Europe whereby societal issues were resolved through a technical 
solution by a state agency (Young, 2004).  As Woolcock and Pritchett (2004 p. 193, italics in 
original text) write: “[t]hat is, “need as the problem, supply as the solution, civil service as the 
instrument” became the standard organizational algorithm for solving public services 
concerns.” Although some African countries experienced economic growth and successfully 
expanded their education and healthcare services (Fritz and Menocal, 2006; Nugent, 2004; van 
de Walle, 2001), the centralised development paradigm lost its legitimacy and was perceived 
to have failed in its endeavour to bring economic and social development (Mayntz, 1993; 
Bardhan, 2002).  
Of particular note was the uneven public service delivery between urban and rural areas and 
underprovision in the latter. For example, in the 1980s, only 22% of the rural population in 
Africa had access to an improved water source in comparison with 66% of the urban population 
(WHO, 1992). The uneven service provision was related to the often-corrupt state apparatus 
and underlying ineffective rules and regulation (Woolcock and Pritchett, 2004). Historical 
studies by Burton and Jennings (2007), Hope (1997) and Mulinge and Lesetedi (1998) highlight 
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the inheritance of corrupt behaviour and state capture by the newly independent states from 
their colonial predecessors. Public services in the state-led era were often corrupt and a bribe 
prior to their delivery was not unusual (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998). State benefits usually 
ended up in the pockets of a few elites and policies implemented by the state often served the 
needs of particular groups (Hellman et al., 2000; Khan, 2005). The so called ‘state capture’ was 
the result of the personalisation of power through the presidency and the political elite (Mulinge 
and Lesetedi, 1998) and loyalty to the state was replaced with loyalty to an individual, tribe or 
well-connected people (Hope 1997). As Mulinge and Lesetedi (1998, p.23) write: “[t]his 
created and oiled the channels for peddling influence and authority and the abuse of public 
office for private and personal gain.” The drive to self-enrichment of small elite groups 
strengthened their resolve to maintain power and to engage in conflicts, both within their 
country (as in northern Uganda) and outside country borders (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). 
In addition, many of the public services, like rural water services, were not well maintained 
during the state-led paradigm. Key factors for the poor performance of rural water systems were 
a result of the top-down implementation approach typical to the state-led era whereby 
community preferences were ignored, inappropriate technology was used and there was 
insufficient attention paid to financial management, operation and maintenance and cost 
recovery (MacRae and Whittington, 1988).  
 
 
2.2.4 International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 
 
Community management and participatory approaches were propelled during the International 
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation (IDWSS) decade (1980-1990) – launched at the World 
Water Conference in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in 1977 (Hodges and Curtis, 2001). The IDWSS 
decade was the first collaborative effort of politicians and decision makers from all over the 
world to increase global water and sanitation coverage (Institute of Medicine, 2009). The 
decade marked the ‘NGO revolution’ as the SAPs had put major emphasis on NGOs to deliver 
social services (Charlton and May, 1995; Makoba, 2011; Prince and Marsland, 2013; Rusca 
and Schwartz, 2012) and bilateral and multilateral aid was increasingly channelled to these 
organisations. As a consequence, the number of NGOs rose tremendously; from 1,600 in 1980 
to between 3,000-5,000 in 1993 (Prince and Marsland, 2013). 
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During the IDWSS decade, the Village Level Operation and Maintenance (VLOM) system was 
developed, which was the forerunner of the CBM model. This model advocated the use of 
appropriate handpumps to enable simple maintenance and in-country manufacture and involved 
a community maintenance system to increase sustainability (Lockwood, 2004). Prolonged 
maintenance of the handpumps were based on three assumptions: 1) beneficiaries are able and 
willing to pay, 2) governments are able and willing to provide external support and, 3) 
communal handpumps serve community needs (Collin, 1999).  However, in a literature review 
on the VLOM approach by Collin (1999), these assumptions are critically scrutinised (refer to 
Table 2.2). In this report, Collin concludes (p.16): 
“…there is little evidence that communities are able or willing, on their own, to support 
handpump programmes in the long-term. If handpumps are to be used, therefore, reliance on 
VLOM alone should be avoided. It may be more appropriate to develop the concept of shared 
responsibility for maintenance under a two or three-tier system with local caretakers 
responsible for simple tasks and more skilled district-based teams, supported by government 
institutions, dealing with the more complex problems.” 
Parry-Jones et al (2001, p.13), however, suggest that the CBM model of today overcomes the 
challenges of the VLOM model because “…, there is a much greater awareness of the need to 
consider roles and responsibilities and build institutional capacity at all levels.” In particular, 
they highlight the lessons learned about the crucial role of the local government to support 
communities in maintaining their social services. They argue that with ‘capacity building’ 
under-resourced local governments can be supported to progress in their new role as facilitator. 
 
 
Table 2.2  
Assumptions and Outcomes of the VLOM Model (From Collin (1999 p. 9-15)) 
 
1. The user community will be able and willing to maintain communal handpumps. 
Experience shows that this may not be the case for reasons such as the refusal of communities to take 
ownership of their pump, a lack of basic technical skills and poor project design and maintenance. 
2. Government will be able to provide an enabling environment to support VLOM. 
There is little evidence of governments facilitating VLOM effectively on their own once the external support 
agency hands over support of it to them. 
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3. Communal handpumps will be able to meet most rural water supply needs. 
As the VLOM concept gained currency, many projects opted for communal handpumps on the assumption 
that this was the best option for the community, although in practice, many communities have proved unable 
or unwilling to support communal handpumps. Other options preferred by the community may be more 
sustainable. 
 
 
2.2.5 Dublin Principles 
 
In 1992, the call for bottom-up approaches in rural water delivery and neo-liberal reforms, both 
shaping the CBM model, were officially embodied in the Dublin principles, as outlined in Table 
2.3. Most significant was the reference of water as an economic good rather than a public good 
(Bakker, 2007). In rural areas, payment (upfront contribution towards water source construction 
and recurrent user payments) was perceived to enable the long-term sustainability of the rural 
water system and limit inefficient resource use (Naiga, et al. 2015). 
 
 
Table 2.3 
Dublin Principles (ICWE, 1992) 
 
1) Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment; 
2) Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, 
planners and policy-makers at all levels; 
3) Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; 
4) Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognised as an economic good. 
 
 
Not all states agreed with the Dublin principles. Reasons for resistance were concerns that water 
has social, cultural and religious values (Hodges and Curtis, 2001) and governments expected 
political costs with introducing water pricing (Quin et al. 2011). In particular, the recognition 
of water as an economic good that legitimised privatisation of water systems in urban areas, has 
provoked fierce global debate. Opponents of water privatisation such as Bakker (2007; 2013b), 
Finger and Allouche (2002) Johnstone and Wood (2003), Laurie and Marvin (1999) and 
Swyngedouw (2005) point at the inability to view water as part of a market system (as i.e. land), 
the difficulty to identify the hydrological cycle and, the fact that water is a human right. These 
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scholars have passionately refuted the idea that profit-making by the private sector is essential 
to ensure sustainable and efficient resource use as claimed by the neo-liberal consensus. Instead, 
they view the state as responsible for fulfilling the development mantra of ‘water for all’. 
Equally, Woolcock and Pritchett (2004, p.192) observe that: 
“…, most agree that the (perhaps very) long-run goal is to ensure that the provision of key 
services such as clean water, education, sanitation, policing, safety/sanitary regulation, roads, 
and public health is assured by effective, rules-based, meritocratic, and politically accountable 
public agencies –– that is, something resembling Weberian bureaucracies.” 
So far, privatisation of rural water services in rural areas has not been a real option. Even if 
private companies would not pander to the habit of “cherry-picking” (Bakker, 2008 p.245) the 
wealthy areas and leaving the poorer areas unserved as observed in urban areas (Bakker, 2007; 
2008; 2013b; Budds and McGranahan, 2003; Swyngedouw, 2006), privatisation of rural water 
services is difficult, due to poor road networks that make private investments more expensive 
and water prices more costly and potentially unaffordable to rural populations who are usually 
characterised with a low purchasing power (Koestler et al., 2010; Danert et al., 2009). Although 
the legacy of state failure and the detrimental effects of water privatisation on urban poor are 
still strong, contributing to the strong support for the CBM model, there is an increasing desire 
towards private sector involvement or Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in rural water 
management in some segments of the rural water sector as I will further outline in Chapter 6.2. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.3 discusses the underlying theories of the CBM 
model and Section 2.4 critically explores the concepts used within the CBM model through a 
close examination of the individual branches (grassroots and neo-liberal) that sum up the CBM 
model.  
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 The Evolvement of the Collective Action Debate and the 
Theoretical Foundations of the CBM Model 
 
Ostrom (1990; 1998; 2000; 2005) and consortia as Agrawal (2003); Araral (2009); Ascher 
(1995); Bardhan (2002); Bromley (1992); Cox et al (2010); Dayton-Johnson (2000); Lam 
(1998); McCay and Acheson (1989); McKean (1982); Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994); 
Peters (1994); Schlager (1994); Tang (1992); and Wade (1994) known for their work on 
‘Common Pool Resources’ (CPRs), have been influential in the acknowledgement of CBM as 
a developmental and conservation effort and in the acceptance that government regulation (the 
“Leviathan state”) is not the only way the solve commons problems. Ostrom (2005 p.23-24) 
describes CPRs as: “Common Pool Resources yield benefits where beneficiaries are hard to 
exclude but each person’s use of a resource system subtracts units of that resource from a finite 
total amount available for harvesting.” 
Despite the rival nature and the difficulty to exclude outsiders from CPRs such as fisheries, 
irrigation systems, forests and water resources, the commons school provided numerous case 
studies demonstrating that communities were able to sustainably manage CPRs through 
collective action, commonly explained as: “the action taken by a group (either directly or on its 
behalf through an organisation) in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interests” (Marshall, 
1998 p. 86-87). Grounded in game theory5, commons scholars demonstrated that collective 
action was a rational option that yields desirable results to all. If people know the ‘rules of the 
game’ (i.e. the number of players, the choices they have, the possible outcomes of their actions, 
how decisions are made), they argued that communities could overcome ‘collective action 
problems’ whereby people prioritise their individual interest above that of the group. The 
commons scholars opposed the ‘tragedy of the commons’ discourse of Hardin (1968) and others 
such as Gordon (1954); Demsetz (1967) and Mancur Olson’s (1965) theory of groups and the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma6. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Through lab experiments, commons scholars analysed people’s strategies for dealing with competitive 
situations, where the outcome of individual actions are dependent on the actions of the group (Amadae, 2015).  
 
6 The prisoner’s dilemma is situated in game theory, that shows why (in its simplest form) two rational 
individuals would not cooperate although cooperation may be in their best interest (Amadae, 2015).   
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2.2.6 Tragedy of the Commons 
 
According to Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’ framework (and other closely related 
concepts as the logic of collective action by Olson and the prisoner’s dilemma), Common Pool 
Resources (CPRs) are prone to over-harvesting and destruction. Hardin (1968) illustrated this 
thinking famously with a common ground open for animals. At this common ground, each 
rational individual is motivated to add more livestock to increase his personal wealth while 
compromising sustainable use of the pasture and the common good. Hardin (1968, p. 1244) 
writes: 
“[t]herein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” 
Also Olson (1965) pointed at the free-riders problem in CPRs due to the difficulty with 
excluding users from the resource. His viewpoint entailed that: “[w]henever one person cannot 
be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to 
the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts of others” (in Ostrom, 1990 p, 6). The first 
generation collective action theories argued that the outcomes of commons management were 
not per definition ‘rational’ when viewed from the perspective of the collective. 
These first generation collective action scholars, viewed coercion, that was mutually agreed 
upon, through either state regulation or privatisation, as the only option to avoid a catastrophe 
(Wade, 1987). However, this strategy of coercion may cause two major problems as De Young 
and Kaplan (1988) describe. First, the elimination of choice may result in resistance and the 
desire to oppose dictated rules and choose conflicting alternatives, a phenomenon termed as 
‘psychological reactance’ (Brehm, 1966; Wicklund, 1974). Second, democratic governments 
are simply unable to make quick decision and act without compromise. Although some scholars 
have argued for authoritarian states as the only solution to avoid the tragedy of the commons 
(Heilbroner, 1975; Ophuls, 1977), De Young and Kaplan (1988, p. 274) duly note that “the 
perception that “mutual coercion mutually agreed upon” leads to a grim future. 
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 Grassroots Branch: Sustainable Resource Use Through 
Collective Action and the Design of the ‘Right’ Institutions 
 
More optimistic is the claim by Ostrom (1990) that collective self-destruction of CPRs is 
preventable through people’s rational behaviour (that is either learnt or strategic) to act 
collectively and by carefully designing institutions that govern appropriate behaviour. The 
combination of collective action and effectively developed institutions are expected to result in 
“productive outcomes in situations where temptations to free-ride and shirk are ever present” 
(Ostrom 1990, p.29). CPR theory draws therefore on New institutional Economics (NiE) by 
Douglas North (1981; 1990; 1992), that view institutions as the ‘rules of the game’, and claim 
they reduce uncertainty and propel collective action. As North (1981, p. 201-202) writes: 
“institutions are a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioural norms 
designed to constrain the behaviour of individuals”. 
Institutions in CPR theory are formal and functional. The rules and the design of resource 
management can be crafted and factors such as transparency, accountability and monitoring are 
expected to result in collective action and believed to enhance productive, equitable and 
sustainable CPR management. Ostrom (1990) developed eight design principles that would 
allow the successful use of CPRs (refer to Table 2.4). The grassroots arm of the CBM model 
heavily draws upon these theories of collective action and CPR theory and is positive about the 
notions of community, participation, social capital and self-regulating water institutions, 
supported by empirical studies as Chitonge (2011) in Zambia, Fielmua (2011) in Ghana and, 
Madrigal et al. (2011) in Costa Rica. 
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Table 2.4 
Ostrom’s Design Principles (1990, p. 90).  
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries  
Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as 
must the boundary of the CPR itself.  
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions  
Appropriation rules restricting time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local 
conditions and to provision rules requiring labour, material, and/or money.  
3. Collective-choice arrangements  
Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.  
4. Monitoring  
Monitors, who actively, audit CPR conditions and appropriator behaviour, are accountable to the appropriators 
or are the appropriators.   
5. Graduate sanctions  
Appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the 
seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, 
or by both.  
6. Conflict-resolution mechanisms  
Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among 
appropriators or between appropriators and officials.  
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organise  
The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental 
authorities.  
 
For CPRs that are parts of larger systems:  
8. Nested enterprises  
Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities, are organised 
in multiple layers of nested enterprises.   
 
 
 
2.2.7 Idealisation of Community 
 
In development projects, the term ‘community’ is commonly defined by its administrative 
boundaries, common interests and distinct social structures (Blaikie, 2006).  For example, a 
practitioner handbook on ‘managing natural resources for development in Africa’ writes: 
“[a] community is defined as a group of people bounded by geographical links, such as a 
village, settlement or district, politics or natural boundaries but also include those brought 
together by lifestyle, culture, religion, hobby and interest” (Wasonga et al., 2010 p.167).   
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Such notions of a ‘community’, however, have been criticised as “simplistic” (Metha et al., 
2001 p.4) while romanticizing the community, because they ignore the messy reality that no 
rural community is the same due to culture, religion, history and population and that differences 
also exist within communities caused by wealth, gender, ethnicity or religion (Lockwood, 
2004). Communities are often far from being harmonious and the term conceals differences in 
power relations and “biases in interests and needs” (Guijt and Shah, 1998 cited in Cooke and 
Kothari, 2001 p.6). According to Cleaver (2012 p.9) these power inequalities must be 
acknowledged to understand “[w]hy designed institutions turn out in unexpected ways”. In 
addition, although rural areas are often typified by their disadvantageous and remote position 
from markets and services, poor transportations and road networks, rural areas are changing 
due to increased employment, communications, wealth and individualism (World Bank, 2010). 
Hence, Cleaver (1999 p. 603) declares ‘community’ a “myth”. Such ‘myths’ may be persistent 
because “…they are seen by many to be fair and accurate, and because they may uphold visions 
of how the world should be” (Forsyth, 2003 p.51). This explanation of ‘myths’ may also apply 
to the underlying theoretical foundations of the CBM framework wherein collective action 
through the development and application of a set of rules paint a rosy picture of people’s ability 
to cooperate for the common good.  
 
 
2.2.8 The Imposition of Participation and the Optimism for Social 
Capital 
 
The use of participatory approaches throughout the project cycle is expected to strengthen the 
capacity of communities to manage their water source and to result in collective action (Mansuri 
and Rao, 2013). Mantzavinos (2001 p. 119) for example argues that “… agents are able to 
learn and thus to adopt an evolutionary perspective when accounting for the emergence of 
norms” (italics in original text). In a similar vein, Ostrom (2005 p.22) places hope in the 
capacity of people to learn certain kinds of social norms that may enable the reciprocation of 
good behaviour and the punishment of defection. Further, authors such as Barnes et al. (2014), 
Doe and Khan (2004) and Tigabu et al. (2013) all claim a positive relationship between 
participation during the planning and construction phase and the sustainability of rural water 
points.  
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A significant body of work, however, has shown that community members often lose interest 
to be voluntarily responsible for the management of the water system, even if involved in the 
design and implementation phase (Carter et al., 1999; Harvey, 2007; Lockwood and Smits, 
2011; Quin et al., 2011). If we accept that communities are “the site of both solidarity and 
conflict, shifting alliances, power and social structures” (Cleaver, 1999 p. 604) and do not 
adhere to their homogenous and harmonious image set out in community development 
approaches, then their willingness to participate cannot be taken for granted (Golooba-Mutebi, 
2005 p. 954). The decision to participate may be a rational choice or unconscious choice 
embedded in social norms (Cleaver, 2001) and willingness to participate is dependent on age, 
gender, class and individual choice (Holmes and Scoones, 2000). Furthermore, Cooke and 
Kothari (2001) challenge the belief that participation is an indisputable good, as participatory 
processes often tend to benefit the elite and the more powerful (Hildyard, 2001; van Koppen et 
al., 2012).  Hence, it is probably unrealistic to expect a representation of all water users in the 
design, implementation and post-construction phases of water schemes. 
Participatory processes in rural water projects are perceived to increase the level of social 
capital or social cohesion (both terms are often interchangeably used). Ostrom (1990) argues 
that face-to-face communication enables the development of shared norms, decreases 
transaction costs and enhances collective action.  This view relates to the theory of 
communicative action of Habermas (1984) where it is argued that discussion and reason can 
lead to consensus (subject to certain conditions) and mutual commitment to enforce and upheld 
the locally agreed rules on resource use. Much of the literature on CBM relates a community’s 
“stock” of social capital (Putnam, 1993; 1995) to its ability to act collectively and as such, 
sustainably manage a water source (Bisung and Elliott, 2014; Bisung et al., 2014; Krishna and 
Uphoff, 2002). Putnam (1993 p.38) refers to social capital as “ features of social organisation, 
such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual 
benefit”. Attributes such as interpersonal trust, norms of reciprocity and mutual aid are expected 
to bind the group together and gauge the level of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995; 
2000). Social capital is invariably viewed as a positive community characteristic that facilitates 
sustainable rural water management. Yet, sceptics such as Harriss (2002) emphasise that the 
literature has overrated the positive side of social capital and has ignored issues of power and 
politics that are interwoven in this social phenomenon. Indeed, Field (2003), Portes and Landolt  
(1996), and Portes (2000; 1998) warn that social capital or social cohesion can also constrain, 
rather than enable developmental outcomes. Field (2003) notes that close social groups can 
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sustain and reproduce inequality and anti-social behaviour. Close social ties may serve as a 
safety net but may also command conformity, prevent innovation and exclude outsiders.  
 
 
2.2.9 The Self-Regulating Institution 
 
The establishment of the ‘self-regulating’ institution is central to the CBM model (Mosse, 2006) 
and is strongly influenced by Ostrom’s (1990) design principles. The local water institution is 
a physical representation of a community’s collective action through the development and 
execution of  formal rules (Ostrom, 1990). However, a significant research community has 
critiqued the effectiveness of crafting institutions (Blaikie, 2006; Mosse, 2006; Mehta et al., 
1999; Chowns, 2014; Cleaver 1999; 2001; 2012; Sandström, 2008; Sehring, 2009; Merrey and 
Cook, 2012; de Koning, 2011; 2014).  
Criticism is levelled towards the extensive lists of (pre)conditions drafted by mainstream 
institutionalists to secure sustainable local resource management (see for example Roe et al., 
2000; Agrawal, 2001 and Barnes et al., 2014).  Commons scholars have recognised that “[m]any 
attributes of a community are also likely to affect the success of a local resource governance 
unit, including the size of the group affected, the homogeneity or heterogeneity of interests, the 
patterns of migration into or out of a community, and the discount rate used by individuals in 
ongoing situations” (Nagendra and Ostrom, 2007 p.581). To illustrate, there are the design 
principles of Ostrom (1990) as shown in Table 2.4, the list of 50 attributes by Roe et al. (2000) 
and the 33 criteria by Agrawal (2001) based on a synthesis from empirical work by Baland and 
Platteau (1996), Ostrom (1990), Wade (1988) and other commons scholars. Refer to Appendix 
2.1 for an overview of the criteria by Agrawal (2001).  
Blaikie (2006 p.1949) wryly notes that these lists of criteria for sustainable resource use: 
“…[l]eaves policy makers with the task of finding a needle in a haystack, where the haystack 
itself has far from clear outlines. They will have to look for an existing community with its 
natural resources which fulfil an dauntingly large number of criteria.” While the design of the 
‘right’ institutions and the enforcement of rules to enable cooperation lies at the heart of CPR 
theory, scholars have noted that such formal rules seldom agree with local practices that value 
harmony and disapprove confrontational behaviour (Cleaver, 2012; 1999; Jones, 2011). 
Cleaver (2012 p. 13) argues that: “[i]nstitutions managing natural resources are only rarely 
explicitly designed for such purposes and that their multi-functionalism renders them 
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ambiguous, dynamic and only partially amenable to deliberate crafting”. She differentiates 
between two schools of thought: ‘mainstream institutionalism’ that argues institutions can be 
effectively designed as the commons school suggests and ‘critical institutionalism’ that draws 
attention to the (mis)perceptions within CPR theory. Refer to Table 2.5 from Cleaver (2012) 
for an overview of the key features shaping these two discourses. 
Cleaver (2012, p.14) emphasises that multiple institutions may be involved in accessing natural 
resources (thereby extending the use of the term ‘institution’ from ‘rules and norms’ in CPR 
theory to, ‘rules, norms and arrangements, which can exist or be represented in the form of 
organisations’7). These institutional arrangements can be both formal (such as WUCs) and 
informal; established through kin and social networks and relationships, and norms and 
practices embedded in everyday life, influenced by historical and political processes (Cleaver, 
2012; Mehta et al., 1999).  
The process of institutional change is therefore not as straightforward and linear as in 
mainstream institutional theory. Cleaver (2012) asserts that institutional change is messy, 
unpredictable, context-specific and dynamic, shaped by the interrelationship between bricoleurs 
(change agents) and local history and politics. Building on the term ‘bricolage’ from Levi-
Strauss (2004) and Mary Douglas (1987) she uses the term ‘institutional bricolage’ to explain 
the formation and functioning of institutions. For Cleaver (2012, p.45), institutional bricolage 
is “a process in which people consciously and non-consciously draw on existing social formulae 
(styles of thinking, models of cause and effect, social norms and sanctioned social roles and 
relationships) to patch or piece together institutions in response to changing situations”.  
In this dynamic process, old arrangements are reworked and new ones invented. Such reworked 
institutional arrangements are often multi-purpose, such as a women savings group that also 
collects water user fees (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015; Cleaver, 2002). Everyone can be a 
‘bricoleur’, yet adapted institutional arrangements need to be perceived as legitimate and 
imbued with authority to safeguard their endurance and are constrained by the limits of people’s 
resources and social circumstances (Cleaver and de Koning, 2015; Cleaver, 2012).   
                                                          
7 Douglass North (1990) deliberately differentiated between institutions and organisations to avoid confusion and 
complexity of measuring the concepts.  
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Table 2.5 
Key Features of Institutional Thinking (from Cleaver, 2012 p. 16) 
Features School of thought 
Mainstream Institutionalism 
School of thought 
Critical Institutionalism 
 
Nature of institutions Formal/Public institutions in 
nested layers with horizontal and 
vertical linkages. 
Blurring of boundaries and of 
scales, blending of institutional 
logics and forms (e.g. 
formal/informal). 
 
Formation of institutions Institutions formed through 
crafting; design principles 
characterise robust institutions 
Institutions pieced together 
through practice, improvisation, 
adaptation of previous 
arrangements. 
Nature of decision-making Decision-making and negotiations 
mainly conducted in public fora. 
Decision-making and negotiations 
embedded in everyday life, shaped 
by history and politics. 
 
Models of agency ‘Bounded rationality’ models of 
agency as strategic and purposeful 
–individuals as resource 
appropriators. 
Agency as relational, exercised 
consciously and non-consciously – 
individuals with complex social 
identities and emotions. 
 
Factors shaping human behaviour 
in institutions 
Information, incentives, rules, 
sanctions and repeated 
interactions. 
Social structures and power 
dynamics, relationships, norms, 
individual creativity. 
 
Outcomes Institutions can be crafted to 
produce efficient resource 
management outcomes. 
Institutions evolve to ‘social fit’: 
functioning may result in access to 
or exclusion from resources.  
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Hence, to understand institutional dynamics at either local or national levels described in the 
empirical Chapters 5, 7 and 8, I draw upon the understanding of critical institutionalism that 
recognises the role of power relations and the ‘elite’ in processes of institutional change or 
resistance. According to Welsh (1979 in Wegerich, 2001 p.1) “elites participate in, or influence 
the making of decisions that allocate resources within and among social units”. Due to the 
influential role of elites in decision-making, their support is usually crucial when a new project 
or reform is introduced by external actors and according to Colvin et al. (2014) their 
involvement is a fundamental prerequisite for an innovation to endure. Feeny (1988) asserts 
that the support of powerful agents depends on the political and economic costs of the reform. 
In the case of negative effects, elites may become a powerful source of resistance to change and 
can delay or informally change an innovation process. Equally, Das Gupta (2001) observed that 
local elites may not accept changes that diminish their power position and tend to obstruct those 
that try to improve their social and economic situation. 
Because people’s behaviour is predominantly the result of ‘unreflexive practice’ whereby social 
norms, principles and knowledges are taken-for-granted, power imbalances may be sustained 
(Caine, 2013). This perception of ‘path-dependency’ and the notion that behaviour is “not 
simply a matter of individual choice” (Cleaver 2012 p.118), draws upon Bourdieu’s (1989; 
1990) concept of ‘habitus’. In this view, individuals and groups hold deeply ingrained set of 
habits that guide attitudes, values, perceptions, and dispositions and behaviours. The habitus is 
a product of the external environment involving social and political structures and historical 
events (Bourdieu, 1986). The maintenance of power imbalances, or elite capture, is also evident 
in rural water projects (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010; Hapaala et al.,2016; van Koppen et al.,2012; 
Rusca et al., 2015; Rusca and Schwartz, 2014). Section 2.6 discusses the phenomenon of elite 
capture in the context of initiatives aiming to realise sustainable access to water.  
Nevertheless, human beings are not solely subjected to the social structures in their 
environment, and just as powerful individuals, everyone may act purposively (Cleaver, 2012). 
Emotions such as anger, fear and disgust may thereby play a crucial role. For instance, people 
may comply to avoid the distress of conflict or may resist due to feelings of anger (Cleaver and 
De Koning, 2015). Page (2005) elegantly demonstrates the power of emotions in a study on 
water reforms in Cameroon. He describes a group of women that were furious about state 
interference in local water management arrangements. They organised protest marches and 
ultimately prevented the involvement of the state in local water affairs.  In addition, Fehr and 
Gächter (2002 p.137) demonstrate the important role of emotions in rule enforcement and 
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conclude “that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind 
altruistic punishment”. 
 
 
2.2.10 The Pertinence of Blue-Print Thinking 
 
Although many scholars have levelled critique at the uniform solutions and ‘blueprint thinking’ 
characteristic to the CBM framework (Blaikie, 2006; Cleaver, 2012; Woolcock and Pritchett, 
2003; Wong, 2006), many of the insights from CPR theory remain pertinent in current day 
development initiatives because actors as NGOs or state agencies operate “… within structures 
defined by environmental discourses or storylines” (Forsyth, 2003 p. 272, see also Hänninen, 
2014; Irshad, 2013; Mehta et al., 1999). North (1992 p.6) asserts that when “… organisations 
owe their existence to the institutional matrix, they will be an ongoing interest group to assure 
the perpetuation of that institutional frame structure – thus assuring path dependence”. This 
may imply that development agencies feel threatened about criticism directed at mainstream 
institutionalism as bottom-up and community based approaches comprise their DNA.  
Further, critical institutional scholarship does not offer ‘practical’ alternative approaches nor 
does it provide any handouts and clear-cut answers about how local water resources can be 
sustainably managed. Even though Cleaver (2012) advocates for a complete overhaul to address 
the shortcomings within mainstream institutionalism, she as of yet has not provided directions 
how development actors can arrange this. Moreover, she does not predict that outcomes of 
institutional bricolage and institutional change result in equal and productive outcomes for all 
beneficiaries, as assumed in mainstream institutionalism (Cleaver, 2012; Jones, 2015). 
Nevertheless, this has not stopped practitioners and scholars from trying to steer institutional 
processes. Haapela et al. (2016), Hassenforder et al. (2015) and Merrey and Cook (2012) use 
the body of thought of critical institutionalism to ‘facilitate institutional bricolage’ and to 
support the design of ‘organic’ institutions. Although they aim to consider power relations and 
context, it raises the question whether such initiatives parade old idea as new ones as the 
facilitation of institutional bricolage (if at all possible) appears a participatory process led by an 
‘expert’ (Hassenforder et al., 2015). As such, these initiatives may bear the drawbacks inherent 
to participation as outlined in Section 2.4.2 and continue to control the process of institutional 
change. Institutional processes may, however, not play out at one point in time (also simply 
because the ‘bricoleurs’ may not be present at the meeting or workshop) but may evolve 
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gradually over time. It shows, however, that the design of appropriate local institutions, which 
are easy to control, amend and analyse, remains attractive within development initiatives; as 
also evident in the case studies of this thesis (Scott, 1998 in Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  
Nevertheless, I agree with Hassenforder et al. (2015) that experimenting is needed to generate 
opportunities for improved outcomes. And as Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue, ‘real 
change’, that alters the institution, tends to occur only at the margins of society as the “…centre 
is too constricted in its casing of institutional habits” (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982 p.189). 
Hence, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) divide institutions within society between those that 
operate at the ‘centre’ (those closest to power and influence) and at ‘border’ level. So, while 
innovation may take place at the ‘margins’, in order for water management reforms to reach 
scale, Douglas and Widavsky (1982) argue that transformation must emanate from the ‘centre’, 
simply because the implementation of an innovation is a top down process (Townsend, 2013). 
Thus, it is assumed that through the generation of evidence and knowledge about an innovation, 
benefits “will become evident to all” (Colvin et al., 2014 p.761), and adoption by the centre 
may follow. Literature Chapter 6 continues with innovations in the rural water sector and links 
processes of institutional change to risk perceptions.  
 
 
 Neo-Liberal Branch of the CBM Model 
 
The other arm of the CBM model, influenced by the neo-liberal agenda, is the establishment in 
the 1992 Dublin Principles that water is an economic good and should be paid for. Van den 
Broek and Brown (2015) clarify the meaning of commodification within the CBM model and 
make a distinction between the ‘goods’ and ‘services’. In the CBM model, the ‘good’ does not 
refer to the groundwater as in urban areas, but to the handpump. To secure long-term access to 
the water infrastructure, handpumps are subject to regular maintenance and repair cycles 
(implying spare parts and labour costs) and thus require payments. Besides maintenance costs, 
beneficiaries of rural water services are required to contribute towards the construction of the 
water source, which usually constitutes between 5-10% of the total capital costs of construction 
(Davis and Iyer, 2002; Narayan and Ebbe, 1997). The CBM model assumes that monetary 
contributions lead to a feeling of ownership over the resource, are affordable and willingly paid 
and together secure the long-term access to the handpump (Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Jones, 
2011; Schouten, 2006). The ‘service’ within the CBM model refers to the daily operation and 
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management of the water source. This is not commodified and elected WUC members are 
expected to carry out their roles and responsibilities on a voluntary basis.  
As van den Broek and Brown (2015) highlight, it is assumed that the two individual ideological 
arms of the CBM model complement each other, and that commodification does not threaten 
collective action and CPR theory. The majority of Ostrom’s (1990) successful case studies, 
however, did not involve the need to pay for resource use. In addition, because water is a human 
right, the design principles of ‘clearly defined boundaries’ and the imposition of ‘graduated 
sanctions’ to exclude free-riders may be ethically and socially impossible to enforce and explain 
why Bakker (2003) refers to water as an ‘uncooperative commodity’.   
In sum, due to the mixture of left-wing and grassroots developmental notions and right-wing, 
neo-liberal ideas, the CBM model is a contradictory ideological fusion that meshes theories 
from opposite ends of the political spectrum (van den Broek and Brown, 2015). Both sides 
support the roll back of the state, local control and community self-reliance (Mohan and Hickey, 
2000). The advocacy for ‘collective action’ comes from the absence of trust in African state 
agencies (Page, 2003) and the private sector by the former (Shiva, 2002) and, the opportunity 
to reduce state expenditures by the latter, through promoting the commodification of water and 
ensuring communities cover O&M costs. As a result of this mutual alliance, the CBM model 
has a strong support base. 
 
 
 Sustainable Rural Water Management 
 
Improving outcomes of community managed water sources starts with questions over what we 
aim to achieve and what is meant with sustainability. In the context of rural water service 
delivery, the application of ‘sustainability’ – its meaning and direction – is messy and complex 
and the lack of clarity is highly confusing. This study approaches sustainability in terms of 
finance and management (Wong, 2006) because they are two key elements to ensure a 
handpump “continues to work over time” (Abrams et al., 1998 p. 4). It draws on the increasing 
body of evidence that demonstrates the dearth of funds to pay for maintenance costs (Burr and 
Fonseca, 2013; Fonseca et al., 2013; Foster and Hope, 2016; Godfrey et al., 2009; Harvey, 
2003; Jones, 2010, 2011, 2013; Kalulu et al., 2012; Nabunnya et al., 2012; Peter and Nkambule, 
2012; WaterAid, 2009) and the inactivity of a management body (WUC) to organise community 
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meetings, collect user funds, carry out O&M tasks, organise handpump repairs and maintain 
proper hygiene and sanitation practices near the water source (Carter et al., 2010; Mugumya, 
2013; Naiga et al., 2015; Water Aid, 2011).  
The ambiguity of sustainability in the literature starts from the lack of a common problem 
analysis of handpump failure, see Table 2.6. Due to the disagreement about the problem, the 
rural water sector is confronted with a wide range of diverging frameworks that aim to monitor 
and guide the process of sustainable access to clean water in rural areas.  
Le Gouais and Wach (2013) divide the sustainability frameworks in the rural water sector into 
two categories: those that measure or monitor the sustainability of a project and those that are 
conceptual principle based frameworks. The first set of sustainability frameworks have a 
project-based focus usually including institutional, financial, managerial and technical aspects 
of the water service (examples are: Kaliba and Norman, 2004; Sarah and Katz, 2005; Godfrey 
et al, 2009; Fogelberg and Betancourt, 2009; Adhikari and Bhattarai, 2010; Schweitzer and 
Mihelcic, 2012; USAID-Rotary, 2013;CWSA and IRC, 2012). The latter addresses components 
outside the immediate scope of a water project and includes wider sectoral issues as knowledge 
sharing and cooperation with governmental stakeholders (examples are: Water Aid 
sustainability framework, 2011 and Triple-S8 building blocks for sustainability (Smits and 
Lockwood, 2015). Refer to Appendix 2.2 for the building blocks for sustainable rural water 
management by Triple-S.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 The Triple-S (Sustainable Services at Scale) initiative is a six year programme that aims to improve access to 
rural water services in developing countries. The initiative is hosted by IRC WASH.  
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Table 2.6 
Reasons for Handpump Failure (adapted from van den Broek and Brown (2015 p. 54)). 
Political factors 
 
 Interference of local politicians that advertise for free water in return for votes (Carter 
et al., 2010; Quin et al.., 2011). 
 Lack of legal status and authority of WUC (Harvey, 2007; Lockwood and Smits, 2011). 
Historical factors  The general belief among people that water should be free of charge as practised during 
the state-led paradigm, and expectation of external financial support by government and 
NGOs (Jones, 2011; Quin et al., 2011; Whittington et al., 2009). 
Geographical 
factors 
 Alternative water sources reduce people’s willingness to pay for water from protected 
sources (Parry-Jones et al., 2001). 
Social factors  Water users mistrust the WUC due to the fear of mismanagement of funds (Harvey et 
al., 2006; Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2010; Kamruzzaman et al., 2013; Kleemeier and 
Narkevic, 2010; Montgomery et al., 2009). 
 Preference of community members is to only pay user fees when the pumps breakdown. 
This actually makes the life of WUC simpler, and community members rather spend 
available money on other projects (Whittington et al., 2009).  
 WUC not able to efficiently collect water user fees from community members 
(Whittington et al., 2009; Quin et al., 2011). 
 Trained WUC members are not willing to work on a voluntary basis, lack access to 
skills upgrading, forget their initial training, or simply move away (Harvey, 2007; 
Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Quin et al., 2011). 
 The enforcement of graduated sanctions for non-payment causes internal conflict 
(Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).  
Implementation 
factors 
 Satisfaction and demand of the service (Barnes et al., 2014; Bhandari and Grant, 2007; 
Harvey, 2008; Jimenez and Perez-Foguet, 2010). 
 Community receives insufficient education about the costs of O&M of the water source 
(Harvey, 2008). 
 Promises by implementing organisations that water is free of charge (Carter et al., 2010). 
 Different implementation approaches by service providers (WaterAid, 2011).  
 
Technical factors   Poor construction and lack of supervision (Upgro (no date); Furey, 2014). 
 
 
 
Conceptual based frameworks, such as the ‘building blocks for sustainability’ by Triple-S, 
relate the lack of continued access to water to a ‘water governance crisis’ (Asingwire, 2008; 
Global Water Partnership, 2002; Moore, 2013; Mugumya, 2013; Naiga et al., 2015; Starkl et 
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al., 2013; UNDP Water Governance Facility/UNICEF, 2015). The concept of governance rests 
on the notion that the provision of water services is a joint effort of the public, private and 
voluntary sector in order to achieve ‘good water governance’. Rogers and Hall (2003 p.7) define 
water governance as: “… the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems 
that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at 
different levels of society.” Franks and Cleaver (2007) critically observe that sustainability 
frameworks grounded in this perspective, are embedded in normative principles of ‘good 
governance’ that seek equity, legitimacy, efficiency, transparency and accountability. They 
stress that sustainability frameworks that build on this definition of water governance, fail to 
take into account the context-specific arrangements for organising access to water and the range 
of actors that shape the ways natural resources are governed. They observe that ‘good water 
governance’ does not necessarily lead to ‘good outcomes’ as generally assumed. As a result, 
they developed an analytical tool to understand water management arrangements and adapted 
the definition of water governance into: “… the system of actors, resources, mechanisms and 
processes which mediate society’s access to water” (Franks and Cleaver, 2007 p.293). Although 
this thesis does not specifically use their framework for analysing outcomes of rural water 
management arrangements, it does draw on their insights that mechanisms of water access are 
often not neutral as they are shaped by relationships, resulting in unpredictable outcomes 
(Cleaver, 2012 p.41). This insight helps us to understand that agency and the exercise of 
individual choices and preferences are dependent on social structures and relations of power 
and authority in a specific social field, as also highlighted in Section 2.4.3. This thinking is 
derived from Bourdieu (1989 p.21) who argues that: “… symbolic relations of power tend to 
reproduce and to reinforce the power relations that constitute the structure of social space”. He 
explains that people might not be consciously aware of such power relations and often accept 
their social world in a “taken for granted” (p.18) manner.  
Further, the process of defining ‘sustainability’ is a value-driven exercise that enters into the 
philosophical question of what we value most and what purpose rural water services and 
management arrangements should serve. Mostly, sustainability definitions in the rural water 
sector prioritise one, or a combination of the following aspects (Franks and Cleaver, 2009): 
technical features, such as the efficiency and upkeep of the system (see for example Water Aid, 
2011) environmental conservation (as presented in the Brundtland report of ‘Our Common 
Future’, 1987) or social developmental factors as livelihood, health and general wellbeing 
(reflected in the water governance framework of Franks and Cleaver, 2007; 2009). The way 
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sustainability is approached has a bearing in people’s worldviews. The rural water sector 
involves a wide range of practitioners and academics from different disciplines (engineering, 
economics, social sciences) characterised by their own ontological and epistemological 
perspectives, affecting their values and beliefs (Dobbie and Brown, 2014). Evidently, the 
aspects that one values directs the strategies for improving rural water management 
arrangements.  
That values may differ among actors may be illustrated with the observed phenomenon of elite 
capture in rural water projects. Elite capture is observed as a real risk “… when advantaged 
groups succeed in altering projects for their own benefit, usually at the expense of other people, 
particularly the poor” (Arnall et al., 2013 p. 306). A key concern is the reproduction of local 
inequalities (Adhikari and Goldey, 2010; Cleaver and Toner, 2006; Hapaala et al., 2016; van 
Koppen et al., 2012; Rusca et al., 2015; Rusca and Schwartz, 2014). Yet, Roe et al. (2009, p. 
59) argue that elite capture should “… not always [be] considered as a bad thing”.  
How ‘bad’ elite capture is, depends not only on the individual case but may also link to our 
understanding of ‘sustainability’ and what element of sustainability one prioritises: the 
environment, finances or social well-being (Franks and Cleaver, 2009). The case study of Rusca 
et al. (2015) about a success story of WaterAid in Malawi illustrates this point. In this case, 
WaterAid supported the establishment of Water User Associations (WUAs) to manage the 
rundown and in-debt water utilities in a small town. After some period, the WUA’s managed 
to achieve the desired full cost recovery and were even able to repay the former debts of the 
system. While the WUAs achieved the project goal of WaterAid, Rusca et al. (2015) observed 
that the successful cost recovery was at the expense of the poor who were required to pay more 
for water while already advantaged individuals, represented in the WUAs, were profiting from 
the water revenues. 
This example shows the tensions between securing financial sustainability, in order to allow a 
continuous flow of water, and ensuring marginalised groups have access to water. The pursue 
of “equitable systems” as suggested by Hapaala et al., 2016 may ignore the reality of 
institutional processes where context, identity, belief systems and positions are key for shaping 
such processes. Unequal power relations and the concentration of power in the hands of a few 
may, however, be necessary for ensuring reliable access to rural water services in the user pays 
era.  
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Literature Chapter 6 and empirical Chapter 7 explore how underlying values direct and 
influence rural water management arrangements and outcomes.  
 
 
2.2.11 The Role of Resource Characteristics, Geography and 
Income Levels on Sustainable Rural Water Management 
 
Resource characteristics as size, storage capacity, recharge, water quality, and the available 
information about the resource are found to shape human-environmental relationships (Ostrom, 
2003). It is for example, not hard to imagine that water management arrangements at a large 
river basin differ from those at a single handpump where, in the latter, factors as exclusion, rule 
enforcement and monitoring are assumed to be more feasible according to CPR scholars (Dietz 
et al., 2003).  
Further, Ostrom et al. (1994) and Cornes and Sandler (1994) acknowledge that besides the 
development and enforcement of CPR rules, “… physical exclusion devises such as barbed wire 
fences and electronic sensing devices…” aid the exclusion of outsiders and free-riders, affecting 
sustainable resource use (Ostrom, 2003 p.241). (Araral, 2013a p.224) demonstrates that 
“geography matters in the choice of governing the commons”. Araral (2013b) notes that 
exclusion and monitoring is more complex at mobile resources in comparison to stationary 
resources like forests. He argues that when the resource enables exclusion this may impact on 
the definition and type of good; refer to Table 2.8 for an overview of the typology of goods. 
 
 
Table 2.8 
Typology of Goods (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1977) 
 Excludability Non-excludable 
Rivalrous Private goods Common Pool Resource 
Non-rivalrous Club goods Public goods 
 
 
Araral (2013b) observes that most of Ostrom’s (1990) successful cases were not mobile 
resources but stationary resources as forests. He argues that these successful cases of forest 
management were not CPRs as claimed by Ostrom (1990) but rather private goods as people 
could be (easily) excluded from the resource. Araral (2013b p.19) writes: “[b]ecause exclusion 
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is feasible, access to the resource is limited and property rights are clear and enforceable, these 
resources no longer qualify as common pool resources. Rather, they take the form of private 
property owned by a collective (or partnership) in which exclusion is feasible and hence access 
is limited”.  
Equally this line of thought may be applied to those areas where water resources are abundantly 
available. While water resources are treated as CPRs, when people have access to a variety of 
water sources, water becomes non-rivalrous and non-excludable: a public good.  In such an 
instance, the resource may be prone to the free-riders problem as hypothesised by Mancur Olson 
(1965) because people’s access to water is not dependent on that particular resource. Indeed, a 
number of studies have showed that the availability of alternative water sources decrease 
people’s willingness to maintain a particular handpump (Jones, 2011; Madrigal et al., 2011; 
Parry-Jones et al., 2001; Schouten and Moriarty, 2003).  
Water scarce populations on the other hand (i.e. due to climate change, geographical conditions 
or demography), have an increased incentive to make arrangements for sustainable resource 
use. Water scarce conditions may therefore induce collective action to secure reliable access to 
water. However, as Cleaver (1999 p. 607) observes, if the availability of water is limited, 
participation may be “...less a matter of choice (an expression of agency), and more a matter of 
necessity imposed by constraint”.  
In addition, the economic conditions of local populations are found to influence continued 
access to rural water services. Several studies have demonstrated that the income levels of 
communities are an important factor for the success of cost recovery and the sustainability of 
the water infrastructure (Bain et al., 2013; Hutchings et al., 2015; WHO/UNICEF, 2015). In 
general, water contributions are perceived ‘affordable’ if they do not exceed 5% of the 
household’s total expenditure (Frankhouser and Tepic, 2005; McPahil, 1993). Nevertheless, 
this may vary per country, region and household. Therefore, Willingness to Pay (WtP) surveys 
are a popular method to assess price acceptability in a certain locality (Abramson et al., 2011; 
African Development Bank, 2011; Berry et al., 2015; Koehler et al., 2015; Merett, 2002; Wang 
et al, 2010). 
 
  
Chapter 2 The Entrenchment of the Community Based Management Model and the Quest for 
Sustainability 
 
44 
 
 Recommendations to Improve Reliable Access to Water in 
the Literature 
 
The literature predominantly provides three sets of recommendations to improve the outcomes 
of rural water management arrangements. These are: 1) improving the participatory process to 
build capacity and social cohesion, 2) offering a technological solution and, 3) providing 
external support. I will briefly go through these recommendations. First, much of the literature 
on community managed rural water points seeks the solution in improving the design and 
implementation of participatory processes (see Marks and Davis, 2012 p. 1575) arguing that 
participation enhances a community’s stock of social capital and will cement social relations, 
and thus increase the willingness to volunteer and act for the common good (Kähkönen, 1999; 
Narayan, 1995). In addition, project implementers often place optimism and confidence in 
capacity building activities (Brown, 2011 p.274; see also Carter and Kidega, 2013 p. 21). For 
example, Mandara et al. (2013), claim that a comprehensive training for communities on 
maintenance, record-keeping and financial management will contribute towards the 
sustainability of a rural water service. They propose to expand the WUC training team from 
technicians only to:  “… professionals, practitioners and policy makers as well as  academics 
with varied disciplinary backgrounds and representatives of the public and private sectors” 
(p.96). Additionally, they recommend the facilitation of exchange trips between “…villages 
with successful and unsuccessful water services” (p.96). As well as raising doubts about the 
(financial) feasibility of such trainings at each water source, Brown (2013 p. 14) is cynical about 
approaches that focus on “[p]erfecting participatory processes” and argues attention should be 
geared towards achieving real sustainable outcomes that may actually “take us into 
uncomfortable and uncharted territory”. 
A second set of recommendations promotes technological solutions to improve the functionality 
of handpumps. They promote better construction procedures, proper drilling and full-time 
construction supervision (Casey et al., 2016; Furey, 2014). Also early information systems and 
technology are promoted to increase the sustainability of handpumps (refer for example to 
Thomson et al., 2012). Recent initiatives9 as the ‘smart handpump’ by Oxford University, 
‘SweetSense’ by Portland State University and ‘MoMo’ by the NGO Welldone,  use the mobile 
phone network to remotely monitor the functionality of handpumps in developing countries. 
These innovations provide data about the functioning of the handpump. According to Thomson 
                                                          
9 Refer to the literature list for the websites of the initiatives. 
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et al (2012 p.837) “... analysis of recent historical usage data may provide some indication of 
the nature of the failure and thus speed up the repair cycle”.  
A third set of recommendations to improve the sustainability of handpumps involves the call 
for external support. Increasingly, both academics and practitioners appeal for the need of post-
construction support to communities to provide technical support and advice, administrative 
and financial support, auditing of accounts, and water quality monitoring (Baumann and Furey, 
2013; Kleemeier, 2010; Carter et al., 2010; Barnes et al., 2014; Lockwood, 2004; Lockwood 
and Smits, 2011; Moriarty et al., 2013; Kamruzzaman et al., 2013; Whittington et al., 2009; 
Schouten and Moriarty, 2003; Harvey and Reed, 2006). In these discussions a slow retreat is 
noticeable from the merits of full citizen control over the water service. Whereas in the 1990s, 
the absence of post-construction support meant a sustainable rural water facility (Visscher, 
1997; WSP, 2000; Webster et al., 1999; Parry-Jones et al., 2001), nowadays post-construction 
support is increasingly brought forward as a pre-condition for sustainability.  
The local government is often thought of as the most logical provider of post-construction 
support (Koestler et al., 2010). Yet, the ability of the local government to provide such support 
is questioned as they often lack the resources and capacity-building of the local government 
itself is considered to be vital (Kleemeier, 2010; Day 2011; Quin et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
cases of corruption and elite capture by the local government may not be solved with capacity 
building as they are “part of a deeply rooted if adaptable practice of politics” (Bayart, 1993 in 
Blundo and Le-Meur, 2009, p. 74).  
The call for external support by a vast body of academics and practitioners may indicate a loss 
of confidence in the ‘self-regulating’ local institution to sustainably govern rural handpumps. 
Golooba-mutebi (2005 p. 955) even argues the idea of community control should be abandoned 
and writes: “... in some circumstances, top-down approaches may well do  a  better  job  of  
bringing  about  positive  change  in  deprived  communities”. Nevertheless, despite increasing 
criticism about the functioning of the CBM model, the majority of  the  reviewed  literature  is 
optimistic about finding solutions within the theoretical foundations of the CBM model. 
Chapter 6 moves from the recommendations made in the literature to praxis, and analyses three 
present-day alternative rural water management models.  
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 Concluding Remarks 
 
Despite critical reflections from a growing ‘critical institutional’ scholarship on the theoretical 
foundations and concepts used within the CBM framework, the CBM model is entrenched 
within ideas about ‘good’ development policy and practice. Due to the mutual alliance from 
left-wing and grassroots post-Marxist developmentalists and right-wing neo-liberals, the model 
enjoys a strong support base. As van den Broek and Brown (2015, p. 52) write: 
“Because support comes from both ends of the political spectrum, the CBM model has proved 
very dominant and to date the prevailing view of donor agencies, policy makers and academics 
in the rural water circle is “that communities can and should take full responsibility for their 
[water] systems (Whittington et al., 2009 p. 714).” 
Nevertheless, the rural water sector is divided into different opinions on how to achieve 
sustainable rural water services. It is characterised by disagreement on the root causes of 
handpump failure and consequently how to solve it, as will be further unpacked in literature 
Chapter 6 that examines three contemporary rural water management innovations. Moreover, 
this chapter has highlighted that the quest to realise sustainable rural water services is riddled 
by competing values, such as efficiency, equity and social justice and that solutions may be 
unable to balance the ‘sustainability’ components of functionality, social wellbeing and the 
environment (Franks and Cleaver, 2009). 
The chapter discussed the concept of water governance to advance the understanding of rural 
water management outcomes beyond a particular water point. While critical institutionalism 
refrains from suggesting hands-on strategies to improve the outcomes of institutional processes, 
it calls for an in-depth analysis on the dynamics of natural resources management by examining 
the wider context, underlying social structures and the power of actors in shaping management 
outcomes (Cleaver, 2012; Franks and Cleaver, 2007; 2009). This study responds to this appeal 
and critically analyses the outcomes of the CBM model and alternatives to sustainable rural 
water management in Uganda.  
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Chapter 3 
Setting the Scene: a Background to 
Uganda, Its Rural Water Policy and the 
Case Study Area 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
This present chapter proceeds with a background on the research area of the thesis. A 
comprehensive understanding of the study context is crucial for understanding people’s 
behaviour: it paves the way for grasping the narrative analysis and is a determining factor for 
the selection of research methods (Fisher, 2008; Flick, 2006; Parker, 2005). The previous 
chapter positioned the thesis in the context of related work on the Community Based 
Management (CBM) model and the quest for sustainable access to rural water services. The 
chapter established that rigorous and systematic research on sources of handpump breakdown 
is of both academic and developmental interest.  
This chapter provides a background of Uganda, its rural water policies and the case study area. 
Section 3.2 describes how the provision of rural water services in Uganda evolved on the basis 
of the country’s socio-economic, political and historical background. Section 3.3 provides an 
overview of the present-day rural water supply policies and 3.4 describes the key institutions 
involved. In 3.5 the chapter proceeds with an overview of the challenges in rural water services 
provision in Uganda. The background on Uganda’s rural water policy and institutional 
framework is concluded with an overview of Uganda’s current rural water status and trends in 
rural water access over the years in Section 3.6. Hereafter, Section 3.7 introduces the case study 
area. The chapter closes with a set of concluding remarks in Section 3.8. 
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3.2 The Pearl of Africa: Devastation and 
Reconstruction  
 
Uganda is a land-locked and low-income country in Central East Africa. View Figure 3.1 for 
the present-day political boundaries of East African countries. Uganda has an estimated 
population of 39 million of which 82% resides in rural areas (World Bank, 2016).  Of the rural 
population, 22.8% lives below the poverty line of  USD 1/ per person per day and 47.4% has a 
consumption of twice the poverty line (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2014).  The country – often 
referred to as the ‘pearl of Africa’ – is endowed with abundant natural resources such as 
rainforests, oil and water. Surface water, including lakes, rivers and wetlands of which Lake 
Victoria and the Nile river are the most well-known, comprises approximately 16% of the total 
land area (Nsubuga et al., 2014).  
 
 
Figure 3.1 
East African Political Boundaries 
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In rural Uganda, the prime source for drinking water is groundwater. An estimated 61% of the 
country’s drinking water is accessed through protected springs, shallow wells and deep 
boreholes (ibid.). Uganda’s groundwater resources are, however, under increasing pressure. It 
is estimated that the country will experience water stress10 by 2025 due to its rapid population 
growth of 3.3%11 (World Bank, 2016), climate change and the ongoing degradation of the 
country’s wetlands that regulate the ecosystem (Wong et al., 2005).  
Uganda has had a tumultuous political history. The country was under British rule from 1894 
to 1962. During the colonial period, the British ruled through ‘divide and conquer’ principles.  
Uganda was traditionally run by several kingdoms: Buganda, Toro, Nkoro, Ankole and 
Bunyoro (of which the latter is the focus area of this study) (Pulford, 2014). As Section 3.6 will 
outline, none of the kingdoms in Uganda suffered as much as the Bunyoro region during British 
occupation (Doyle, 2006). The Buganda (closest to the capital Kampala in the south) were 
perceived as more ‘civilised’ than the other kingdoms and gained a privileged political position 
under the British administration (Mutibwa, 1992; Doyle, 2006). They received land, were 
awarded a great amount of internal autonomy and were usually appointed as local chiefs on 
district, county, sub-county, parish and sub-parish level to implement government policies and 
collect salaries. During British rule, investments in social services such as water supply mainly 
targeted Buganda region. While investments in rural water supply were low (at the end of 
British rule, only 18% of the rural population had access to an improved water source (Muhangi, 
1996), the colonial period considerably changed the way how people gained access to water 
services. In the pre-colonial era, access to water was dependent on community self-help projects 
mobilised by clan leaders and elders (Asingwire, 2008). During British administration, water 
services started to be supplied through a bureaucratic top-down and supply-driven approach 
whereby services were supplied, governed and owned by the state (Ibrahima, 2012); a model 
that dominated the water sector until after independence (Asingwire, 2008).  
While the British colonial office considered Ugandan independence should take place around 
1975 as agreed during a 1959 conference in England, increasing rebellion in the East African 
region significantly accelerated the transfer of power. On October 9, 1962 and, just one week  
                                                          
10 When demand exceeds available supply or access is restricted due to poor quality. 
European Environment Agency (www.eea.europa.eu).  
11 According to 2016 estimates of the CIA World Factbook, Uganda is ranked third on the list of countries with 
the highest birth rates in the world. 
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before the independence order was finalised by British officials, power was officially handed 
over (Mutibwa, 1992). From 1962 until 1986 when the current president, Yowere Museveni, 
seized power, Uganda witnessed the often violent12 succession of eight different presidents: a 
period when state control was characterised with state capture, violence and corruption. Public 
power and authority served the needs of particular groups (Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998) and 
was misused “… for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, 
fraud, speed money or embezzlement” (UNDP, 1999 p.70) ignoring the voices of civil society 
(Mulinge and Lesetedi, 1998; van Wyk, 2007). The regimes of Milton Obote (as a prime 
minister from 1962-1966 and as a president from 1966-1971 and 1980-1985) and Idi Amin 
(1971-1979), in particular, deeply scarred the country (Pulford, 2014).  For an in-depth 
overview of Uganda’s political background I refer the reader to: Kanyeihamba, 2002. 
The first few years of Obote’s regime as a prime minister, with representatives of the Buganda 
Kingdom occupying the figurehead posts of vice-presidency and presidency, were relatively 
stable and boosted economic development. However, in 1966, Obote’s fear of being overruled 
by opponents instigated a spiral of violence. He used the military, the police and a secret police 
organisation with members from his own Langi and Acholi tribe (in northern Uganda) to 
establish a one-party state and to kill and imprison alleged opponents, including the removal of 
the Buganda (vice-) presidency and the abolishment of the Buganda kingdom as a whole. When 
Obote attended a Commonwealth conference in Singapore in 1971, Idi Amin – the lieutenant-
colonel of Obote’s army – took over power (Evans, 1996).  Although the self-declared rule of 
Amin was met with public optimism (i.e. he restored the Buganda kingdom and expelled the 
infamous Asian community from the country), Amin did not feel secure either. He recruited 
men from his home area, West Nile district (north-west Uganda), for positions in the army to 
eliminate opponents, starting with the mass killings of Obote’s Langi and Acholi tribesmen. 
During Amin’s reign, military suppression was a key priority. He showed no interest in 
governing the country, used most of the state revenue for the military, plundered the state 
treasury for personal use and ‘solved’ the resulting lack of capital by ordering the central bank 
to print new banknotes. His brutal and devastating tyranny, killing an estimated 250,000 people, 
came to an end in 1979 when a counter-attack by the president of Tanzania crippled Amin’s 
army. Milton Obote regained power after disputed elections and continued to ravage the country 
                                                          
12 Six presidents have been deposed and two presidents resigned after two and ten days respectively. 
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with a civil war. In addition to the death toll caused by Amin, Obote’s  special ‘northern’ army 
killed another 300,000 people (Evans, 2006; Meredith, 2006; Kanyeihamba, 2002). 
The decades of instability took a heavy toll on socio-economic development (Makoba, 2011), 
including the supply of rural water services. Access to safe water in rural areas had significantly 
reduced from 18% at independence in 1962 to only 5% in the 1980s (Mugumya, 2013). 
Following the state-led paradigm, the Ugandan Water Department had established Borehole 
Maintenance Units (BMUs) that operated in 15 different regions across the country to 
implement and maintain rural water services. However, as a result of the political turmoil, the 
BMUs became largely dysfunctional and more than 70% of the boreholes were non-functioning 
in the early 1970s (Muhangi, 1996).  
When Museveni came to power on January 29 1986, after a five-year guerrilla war with his 
National Resistance Army (NRA), he found a bankrupt, indebted, lawless and devastated 
country (Meredith, 2006). The economic crisis pressurised the government to adopt the World 
Bank’s and IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in order to balance the country’s 
budget deficits by liberalising the economy and downsizing the role of the government in social 
services delivery. The SAPs in Uganda are considered to represent one of the few “success 
stories” in sub-Saharan Africa as the country managed to achieve an average annual economic 
growth rate of 6% by the end of the 1990s (Makokha, 2001 p. 10). 
 
 
3.3 Rural Water Reforms 
 
Since 1987, efforts to increase water and sanitation supply have been embedded in overarching 
government planning programmes induced by the World Bank/IMF including the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and the Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). These long-term programmes have aimed to propel socio-
economic development by decentralising the delivery of social services to local government 
authorities and by involving the private sector in public service delivery (African Development 
Bank, 2011b).  
In the first few years of the ‘National Resistance Movement’ (NRM) government, a prime goal 
was to enhance participatory democracy and social service delivery through decentralising 
government administration whereby citizens elect their own representatives – free from any 
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political or tribal denomination – at village, parish, sub-county and district level.  By 
transferring the responsibility for planning, financing and monitoring to local government level, 
the government aimed to achieve quick and effective delivery of water in rural areas; a system 
that was later formalised in the 1995 constitution and 1997 local government Act. During this 
period, the Village Level Operation and Management (VLOM) model emerged whereby 
community members became responsible for the operation and management of their rural water 
sources (Asiimwe and Musisi, 2007; Mugumaya, 2013). Refer to Chapter 2.2.4 for a 
comprehensive description of the VLOM model.  
The Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), that ran between 1997 until 2008, explicitly 
addressed the alleviation of poverty, including the provision of safe drinking water to reduce 
long walking distances and improve time for productive activities, increase school enrolment, 
and reduce the incidence of water borne diseases such as typhoid, malaria, bilharzia and cholera 
(Obitre-Gama, 1999; Water and Sanitation Programme, 2011). The PEAP aimed to achieve 
77% rural water coverage and 80-90% functionality of facilities by 2015, thereby trumping the 
United Nations Millennium Development Goal (MDG) no. 7 that aimed to “[h]alve, by 2015, 
the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation”. 
The commitment to improve access to safe water was supported with policy (3.3.1) and 
institutional reforms (3.4) for the delivery of water services and a shift from a project to a Sector 
Wide Approach (SWAp) (3.4.7) which included an increase in budget for the water sector by 
the government (O'Meally, 2011).  
Below, the relevant policies and Acts of parliament on rural water supply are presented, 
including decentralisation of implementation, demand-driven approaches and community 
management of services.  
 
 
3.3.1 Policy Framework Rural Water Supply 
 
The constitution for the Republic of Uganda (1995) declares access to clean water and sanitation 
as a fundamental right for all Ugandans. In rural areas – consisting of Rural Growth Centres 
(RGCs) with a population between 500 and 5000 and villages with a  population under 500  
(GoU, 2007) – each shallow well or borehole is anticipated to serve 300 people at a maximum 
distance of 1,000 metre per household with a minimal water consumption of 20 litre per day 
per person (MWE, 2014). The Local Government Act (1997), revised in 2000, devolves 
Chapter 3                           Setting the Scene: A Background to Uganda, Rural Water Policy and Case Study Area  
 
53 
 
responsibility for water provision, maintenance of facilities and follow-up support to local 
governments. The Act requires Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to agree their work 
plans with districts and to integrate their plans in the District Three Year Development Plans. 
Refer to Table 3.1 for the structure of Local Councils (LC) at village (LC I), parish (LC II), 
sub-county (LC III), county (LC IV) and district (LC V) levels. Section 3.4 provides a detailed 
overview of the actors’ roles and responsibilities involved in rural water services delivery. 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Decentralisation in Uganda: Key Features of the Institutional Structure (Adapted from: Francis and 
James (2003 p. 328)) 
Local Council 
Level/Area 
Political Head Status of LC level and 
administrative Head 
Technical staff 
LC 5/District District Council 
Chairman 
Local Government 
Chief Administrative 
Officer (CAO) 
Full team 
 
LC 4/County 
 
LC 4 Chairman 
 
Administrative Unit 
Assistant CAO 
 
- 
 
LC 3/Sub-county 
 
Sub-county Council 
Chairman 
 
Local Government 
Sub-county Chief 
 
Subacountant, extension 
and other technical staff  
 
LC 2/Parish 
 
Parish Council Chairman 
 
Administrative Unit 
Parish Chief 
 
- 
 
LC I/Village 
 
LC I Chairman 
 
Administrative Unit 
 
 
 
The National Water Policy (1999) promotes Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of rural water 
infrastructure, capacity building at all levels and involvement of women at all stages in rural 
water services delivery. The policy prescribes a Demand-Responsive Approach (DRA) for 
supplying rural water infrastructure (see Chapter 2.2 for a detailed description of the DRA 
approach) and stipulates that communities need to manage their water resources via a Water 
User Committee (WUC), in line with the CBM model. The National Water Policy specifies an 
expected functionality rate at any one time of 80-90%, and promotes sustainability through 
collaboration between the community, sub-county and district. The National Gender Policy 
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(1999) aims to achieve gender equity and encourages women to play a major role in decision 
making. In relation to water, the Policy recognises women and children as the main carriers of 
water and encourages female participation in the WUCs (a total of 4 men and 3 women) (MWE, 
2007).  
 
 
3.3.2 Key Institutions in Rural Water Services Delivery 
 
This section describes the key stakeholders involved in rural water services delivery in Uganda, 
starting with the government actors on national, regional and local level. Figure 3.2 provides 
an abbreviated overview.  
 
 
National, Regional and Local Government 
 
On national government level, the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) is responsible 
for the development of policies, the management and regulation of the country’s water 
resources, the mobilisation of funding, capacity building of local governments and the 
establishment of priorities within the sector. Further, the MWE monitors the performance and 
functionality of the water facilities in the country. The MWE has three directorates: the 
Directorate of Water Resources Management (DWRM), the Directorate of Water Development 
(DWD) and the Directorate of Environmental Affairs (DEA). The Directorate of Water 
Development (DWD) is responsible for the oversight and delivery of urban and rural water and 
sanitation. The DWD comprises three departments: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation; Urban 
Water Supply and Sanitation; and Water for Production. The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation 
department coordinates the district water and sanitation grant which involves the allocation of 
the grant per district, monitoring how funds are used and building the capacity of the district 
local governments. For this latter task and on regional government level, the DWD established 
eight regional Technical Support Units (TSUs) who provide support and build the capacity of 
districts on a demand-driven basis to improve planning, implementation and supervision of 
rural water services by the districts. Another key player at national level is the Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) that mobilises and allocates funds 
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and coordinates development partner inputs (MWE, 2011; Quin et al., 2011; Ssozi and Danert, 
2012). 
At local government level, the overall responsibility for rural water services provision lies with 
the District Council who are required to oversee the allocation of water sources, coordinating 
and monitoring activities in their area. The district is the highest local government level in 
Uganda (GoU, 2013).  
District Local Councils (elected council with LCV as the chairman) in liaison with the Ministry 
of Water and Environment (MWE) are responsible for the provision and maintenance of water 
facilities. Upon approval of the higher Council or Attorney General, Local Councils can make 
by-laws regarding the management and maintenance of communal water services. The Local 
Government Act enables planning and implementation of activities by the local government 
according to local needs (GoU, 2013).  
The District Water Office (DWO) takes the lead in providing back-up support and technical 
guidance to sub-counties in planning and budgeting, implementation and monitoring their work 
plans. It is responsible for monitoring water quality and the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
of rural water infrastructure. The district is expected to budget for repairs that go beyond the 
community’s financial capacity. In addition, the district is responsible for training Hand Pump 
Mechanics (HPMs), providing tool kits for O&M and stock spare parts that are not readily 
available in the local markets (MWE, 2007). The DWO is required to establish a District Water 
Supply and Sanitation Coordination Committee (DWSCC) where district officials, NGOs and 
private sector organisations meet on a quarterly basis to align work plans in the District. The 
DWO transfers financial resources from the District Water and Sanitation Development 
Conditional Grant (DWSDCG), allocated by the Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic 
Development, to the sub-counties (GoU, 1997; GoU; 2013). 
The sub-county is responsible for overseeing and implementing water and sanitation 
programmes. Sub-county extension staffs (Community Development Officers and Health 
Assistants) are to take the lead in the provision of follow-up support to the Water User 
Committees (WUCs), supervise Hand Pump Mechanics (HPMs) and enact village laws on 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) (GoU, 2013). Refer to Figure 3.1 for an overview of the 
key roles of the central government, district and sub-county in the provisioning of rural water 
services.   
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Figure 3.2  
Roles of Key Actors in the CBM Model of Rural Water Facilities (adapted from MWE (2011 p. 11)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central Government  
 Provide financial and back-up support to Districts  
 Ensure availability of spare parts in the country  
 Policy Regulation and Monitoring 
 Monitor water quality and set standards for O&M 
  Build the capacity of the districts through Technical 
Support Units  
 Conduct studies and Research 
District  
 Financial and Technical Back-up Support to Sub-County 
 Plan for and co-finance training of Hand Pump 
Mechanics (HPM) Masons and Scheme attendants  
 Provide O& M Tool Kits  
 Supervise sub-counties and the Private sector.  
  Plan and carry out rehabilitation of water facilities 
 Monitor the water quality and O&M  
  Stock spare parts not readily available in the local market 
and sell them to WUCs  
 Enact byelaws/ Ordinances on O&M 
Sub-Country  
 Select/Pay for the training of HPM 
 Train WUC and provide back-up support  
  Supervise and monitor the HPM  
 Provide custody of O&M tool kits  
 Plan and allocate resources to O&M  
 Monitor the functionality of water sources  
 Enact by-laws on O&M 
Water User Committee  
 Plan for and oversee O&M; report problems 
 Together with users select caretakers  
 Engage HPM and pay for spares and repairs  
 Set water user charges, hire and pay caretakers  
 Promote sanitation in the community  
 Make rules and regulations on use of the source 
 Open bank account 
 
Development Partners 
 Financing  
 Technical assistance 
  Studies 
NGO  
 Financing 
 Mobilisation and training  
 Planning and 
implementation 
 Follow-up support 
 Monitoring 
Private Sector 
 Manufacturer/ supply and 
distribute tools and spare 
parts 
 Train HPMs, etc.  
 Maintain and repair 
facilities  
 Manage water facility on 
behalf of community  
 Provide other services as 
required 
Water User Community 
 Participate in planning 
and decision making  
 Elect WUC 
 Participate in site section, 
improving sanitation, 
cleaning source 
surroundings, etc.  
 Make contributions in 
cash/kind to capital and 
O&M costs 
Source Caretaker  
 Organise the community for orderly use  
 Clean surroundings of water facilities  
 Undertake minor service (and repairs)  
 Protect the water catchment area  
 Maintain the fence around the source  
 Collect the O&M funds 
 Well maintained water 
facilities  
 Increased use and 
sustainability 
Direct support  
Information flow 
Outcome  
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Local Community 
 
In line with the Community Based Management (CBM) model, the community is responsible 
for the management and maintenance of their water facilities. Communities demand a water 
source, participate in planning towards the construction of the water source and to contribute 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds for preventive maintenance, repairs and payment to 
the caretakers. See Table 3.2 for an overview of typical maintenance activities, minor and major 
repairs of boreholes. Each community elects a Water User Committee (WUC) that consists of 
6-9 members (with at least 3 women) involving a chairperson, treasurer, caretaker, committee 
member and secretary. The WUC serves for two years, after which they need to be replaced by 
a new WUC with the support of the sub-county and village leaders. The community is expected 
to design rules and regulations regarding payment and the use of the water source (MWE, 2011; 
GoU, 2013).  
 
Table 3.2 
Typical Repairs of a Borehole (adapted from: MWE, 2011 p. 28) 
Maintenance  Minor repairs Major repairs 
Clearing drains and surroundings 
 
Maintaining fence 
 
Periodical checking and service of 
handpump 
 
Periodical replacement of fast 
wearing parts (buckets, valves, etc.) 
 
Repair of damaged parts outside routine 
service 
 
Replacement of damaged slow wearing 
parts (handle, chain, few pipes, rods, 
cylinders) 
 
Repair of cracks to platform or drain 
 
Fishing of dropped 
pipes and rods 
 
Desilting of borehole 
 
Repairs to borehole 
casing and screens 
 
Replacement of 
platform and drain 
 
Replacement of rising 
mains 
 
 
Private Sector  
 
The private sector in rural water supply is involved during construction and post-construction 
maintenance. Each financial year, private sector firms are contracted by the District Local 
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Government to carry out hydrological surveys and construction work. Private Hand Pump 
Mechanics (HPMs) are trained by the District to carry out routine maintenance and repairs and 
are paid by the community (GoU, 2013). Since 2011, the MWE of Uganda aims to increase the 
availability of technical support for major maintenance and repair by formalising the role of the 
private sector in a Public Private Partnership (PPP) framework through the implementation of 
Hand Pump Mechanic Associations (HPMAs). The HPMA regulates and coordinates HPMs in 
the district (Magara, 2013) and strengthens the position of the HPM through training sessions 
and improved access to the market (Triple-S, 2012). In 2014, the government decided to allow 
District Local Governments (DLGs) to contract the HPMAs as the first priority for maintenance 
and rehabilitation of water services. This development is expected to enhance the financial 
sustainability of the associations as it will not be solely dependent on payments by the 
community (Mirembe and Magara, 2014). 
 
 
Sub-County Water Supply and Sanitation Boards  
 
Since 2014, the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) of Uganda has been piloting the 
inclusion of rural water points in the ‘Sub-county Water Supply and Sanitation Boards’ 
(SWSSB) (IRC/Triple-S, 2014b). The SWSSB was originally developed for piped water 
schemes in rural growth centres and due to its success (Mirembe, 2014), the government is 
looking to expand its function (MWE, 2014). The volunteer SWSSB, as piloted in two districts, 
consists of technical sub-county staff, Water User Committee (WUC) members and opinion 
leaders from the communities. They provide management support to WUCs and pool funds for 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) at sub-county level. The WUC collects and remits water 
user fees to the SWSSB (in future they may send the funds through mobile money) and in the 
event of breakdown, the SWSSB informs the Handpump Mechanic Association (HPMA) and 
pays the association for the repair from the stored community fund. If the community lacks the 
funds for the repair, the board provides a loan. If successful, the District Water And Sanitation 
Conditional Grant (DWSCG) will be directly transferred to the sub-county to supplement funds 
for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) (Watsisi, 2013). Chapter 6.3 further elaborates on the 
SWSSBs.  
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Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) or Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) mostly 
operate at grassroots level to implement rural water and sanitation programmes. Uganda hosts 
an estimated 200 NGOs that are active in service delivery and the Uganda Water and Sanitation 
NGO Network (UWASNET) registers 121 NGOs (MWE, 2012). The Local Governments Act 
(1997) requires NGOs to integrate their work plans in the District Three Year Development 
Plans.  
 
 
Key Coordinating Bodies 
 
The Water Policy Committee assists and advises the Ministry of Water and Environment 
(MWE) to promote inter-ministerial and inter-sectoral coordination (GoU, 2008). The Water 
and Sanitation Sector Working Group (WSSWG) coordinates the policy and technical 
developments in the sector. The group consists of representatives from the MWE and other 
relevant ministries, development partners and representatives of UWASNET.  The WSSWG 
plays an important role in the country’s annual Joint Sector Reviews (JSR), which is an annual 
forum where stakeholders come together to discuss and plan sector developments. The 
WSSWG decides which plans will be formally endorsed (UWASNET, 2011 p. 5). The District 
Water and Sanitation Coordination Committee (DWSCC) operates at District Level. This 
committee, consisting of political leaders, relevant district departments and NGOs, coordinates 
and oversees the water and sanitation activities in the district (GoU, 2008; UWASNET, 2011).  
 
 
The Sector Wide Approach 
 
Lastly, an important element in Uganda’s water sector is the shift in 2002 from a project 
approach to a Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) to harmonise aid and strengthen the allocation 
of funds (O’Meally, 2011). The water reform processes in the 1990s increased the importance 
of the sector and attracted donor funding from agencies such as the World Bank, European 
Union, DANIDA, SIDA, UNICEF, Austria, DFID, France and Japan. While water coverage 
rapidly increased from 18% in the 1990s to 51% in 2001 (refer to Figure 3.3) (NWDR, 2005; 
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MWE, 2007), the aid provided in the water sector was fragmented, ignored local government 
systems and was insufficiently coordinated (O’Meally, 2011). Therefore the SWAp framework 
was initiated in 2002 and involved 1) leadership by the host country; 2) a single comprehensive 
programme and budget framework; 3) a formalised process for donor coordination, 
harmonisation and alignment of procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management and 
procurement; and 4) efforts to increase the use of national/local systems with long-term capacity 
building for administration, programme design and implementation, financial management, 
monitoring and evaluation (Handley, 2009).  
 
 
3.4 Challenges of Decentralised Service Provision in 
Uganda 
 
Although the Ugandan water sector is characterised by a strong sector policy and institutional 
framework (O’Meally, 2011), a number of authors (Francis and James, 2003; Green, 2010; 
Muriisa, 2008; Ojambo, 2010; Stein and Bickers, 1994; Quin et al., 2011) have raised concerns 
with the processes of decentralised service delivery, most notably the politicisation of the 
decentralisation process and insufficient fiscal decentralisation, the lack of competent staff and 
the lack of accountability and transparency within the local government.  
First, the country has seen a rapid increase in district creation: from 34 in 1991 (Green, 2008) 
to 112 in 2016 (MWE, 2016). The formation of new districts has been subject to criticism as 
district creation further constrain already tight local government budgets and tend to strengthen 
the position and support for the president Museveni and ruling NRM party. With every new 
district new political and technical staff are hired and end up on the payroll of the government, 
potentially silencing and paralysing the opposition (Stein and Bickers, 1994; Green, 2010). 
Quin et al. (2011) describe how politics also influence rural water services delivery at district 
level. Their study in Uganda reveals that politicians at the district level tend to favour sub-
counties that voted for them, leaving other sub-counties behind. 
Second is the inadequate devolution of finances from the ministry to the district and from the 
district to the sub-county. Financial resources from the national government are often 
transferred through late with the result operations are delayed and sub-counties are often under-
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resourced as districts tend to be reluctant to transfer money to the sub-counties (Quin et al., 
2011). 
A third concern is the lack of competent staff and sufficient human resources (Lockwood, 2004; 
MWE, 2008; Perry Jones et al., 2001; Quin et al., 2011). Quin et al. (2011) note that District 
Water Offices (DWO) are understaffed and do not meet the desired staff quota set by the MWE. 
Ojambo (2012) attributes the lack of competent government staff to the ongoing creation of 
new districts through which there are not enough trained and skilled people available who 
understand their roles in a decentralised system. In addition, local governments often lack the 
funds to pay allowances to extension staff – a prerequisite for government staff to travel to the 
field. As a result, extension staff tend to be unmotivated or resign (Quin et al., 2011).  
A fourth challenge is the lack of accountability and transparency and corruption within local 
governments in Uganda. Ojambo (2012) argues that corruption at district level is partly related 
to delayed transfers of government funding. “By the time the money is received [at the district], 
the time for some of the planned activities would have passed” (p.86). Sending money back to 
the central government could affect future funding and therefore local governments make up 
project results to justify expenditures. Accounts of local government staff in the study of Quin 
et al. (2011), reveal a practice of reporting shallow wells as deep boreholes and counting NGO 
constructed water sources as district work. According to Muriisa (2008), low salaries of 
government officials - the salary of a graduate civil servant is around 210,000 UGX per month 
(USD 60) – are a reason for officials to misappropriate government funds.  
Another vulnerable element of the decentralisation framework in Uganda is the powerful 
position of local politicians in comparison to district staff (Francis and James, 2003; Quin et 
al., 2011; Muriisa, 2008). Local politicians appoint the people within the District Tender Board 
(body that awards contracts) and the District Service Commission (body that appoints district 
staff). The members of these boards are not elected and Francis and James (2003, p.333) 
emphasise that “… successful tenderers are friends, relatives or protégés of the political class, 
or proxy companies operating on their behalf”. This is illustrated in the study of Quin et al. 
(2011), who write about a District Water Officer (DWO) that was forced to award a contract to 
the company of a local politician. Muriisa (2008 p. 93) reaches a grim conclusion: “[i]n the 
decentralised framework, I can rightly assert that there is decentralisation of corruption”.  
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3.5 Uganda’s Rural Water Status: Access and 
Sustainability 
 
Accompanying the arrangement of the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) framework in 2002, the 
government of Uganda considerably supplemented its funding for the water sector. Due to the 
government’s political motivation to alleviate poverty (as set out in the Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP)) by providing access to water, the government increased its budget to the 
water sector from 0.5% in 1997 to 2.8% in 2002 and 4.9% in 2004 (O’Meally, 2011). The 
increase in government support for the water sector was made possible due to the debt relief in 
1998 that was granted by the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. As a result, the 
government of Uganda decided to channel a large share of the previous debt payments to the 
water sector (O’Meally, 2011). During these years, access to water services in rural areas 
steadily increased, as Figure 3.3 demonstrates, and increased from 18% in 1990 to 67% in 2016 
(MWE, 2016).    
Despite the many years of commitment to improve access to water in rural areas, the political 
priorities of the government have shifted away from water provisioning (O’Meally, 2011). The 
latest versions of the PEAP – the National Development Plan (NDP) I and II for the periods 
2010-2015 and 2015-2020 – underwent a radical change and prioritise an export-oriented 
strategy to increase economic growth and employment by investing in roads, energy, schools 
and water for production. Critics, such as Hickey (2005), Shinyekwa and Hickey (2007) and 
Williamson and Kizilbash Agha (2008) argue that the NDP is at the expense of the poor that 
have no access to basic social services and are now excluded from development programmes.  
The consequences of the renewed focus in the NDP on economic growth are dwindling 
resources in the water sector (MWE, 2009, MWE, 2016) and a stagnation in rural water access. 
Figure 3.3 depicts the trend of access to improved rural water services in Uganda in the period 
between 1962-2016 and Figure 3.4 provides an overview of Uganda’s national budget for the 
water sector (Danert, 2010 p. 28-30; O’Meally, 2011). In the end, Uganda did not reach its own 
national target of the Poverty Eradication Action Programme (PEAP), that aimed to achieve 
77% water coverage by 2015. However, the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) no. 7 on 
water was realised five years before the deadline (UNDP, 2015b).  
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Figure 3.3 
Trend in Access to Improved Rural Water Supply in Uganda, 1962-2016 (Sources: MWE (2007; 2008; 
2010; 2013; 2016)). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 
Water Sector Share of Uganda’s National Budget 2004/5 – 2010/11 (From MWE (2010 p.17)) 
 
*After 2010/2011 the share for the Water Sector remained stable 
 
 
The renewed focus on sustainability in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), remind us 
that the effectiveness of rural water supply programmes should not only be judged in terms of 
improved access rates but also in terms of long-term and reliable access to rural water services. 
According to the Ugandan Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE, 2016), 14% of the rural 
water infrastructure is non-functional; considerably lower than the estimated one third non-
functionality rate of rural water infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa (Oxford/RFL, 2014). 
However, it is argued official figures over-report functionality (Burr and Fonseca, 2013) as 
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illustrated by the example of Kanungu District in south-west Uganda, where the ministry 
reported a functionality rate of 78% and the study of Koestler et al. (2010) revealed a 
functionality rate of 40%.  
Due to questionable non-functionality rates, it is rather difficult to calculate the financial costs 
of handpump breakdown in Uganda. However, the estimated handpump non-functionality rate  
of one out of three in the sub-Saharan African region (Baumann, 2006; Oxford/RFL, 2014; 
RWSN, 2010), may serve as a basis to produce a general picture about the costs of handpump 
breakdown in Uganda. According to 2016 figures of the MWE, the country totals 46,15813 
handpumps. Thus, for the purpose of a general picture, I assume a non-functionality rate of one 
third. Further, I use the average implementation costs14 of rural handpumps in Uganda (Harvey, 
2003; Parry-Jones et al., 2001): $5,000 for deep boreholes and $2,500 for shallow wells fitted 
with an India Mark II or III handpump (the most common handpumps in Uganda). The 
calculation is:  
 
Capital costs deep boreholes: 30,174 x $5,000 = $150,870,000 
                           
Capital costs shallow wells: 15,985 x $2,500 = $39,962,500 
 
Total capital costs: $15,870,000 + $39,962,500 = $190,832,500 
 
Costs of 1/3 breakdown: $190,832,500 / 3 = $63,610,833 
 
From the educated guess above, the financial loss in terms of capital expenditures would total: 
$63,610,833; equivalent to almost 4 times the annual rural water grant to the 112 districts in 
Uganda (MWE, 2016, Annex 7, p. 27). This figure excludes the usually unknown ‘software’ 
costs such as mobilising communities and community meetings (Harvey, 2003). So, the actual 
financial losses are likely to be higher. 
It is against this background that the thesis critically evaluates the challenges of the CBM model 
and alternative approaches for sustainable rural water management. The next section introduces 
the case study area: Masindi and Kiryandongo districts.  
 
                                                          
13 This figure includes 30,174 deep boreholes and 15, 985 shallow wells. 
14 excluding ‘software’ costs such as mobilising communities and community meetings 
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3.6 The Rationality of Witchcraft Beliefs 
 
Up to this point in the context chapter, social and economic processes in Uganda were related 
to formal government reforms. The previous sections discussed the political turmoil in the 
country, the decentralisation efforts by the sitting NRM president, and the delivery and status 
of rural water services from the post-colonial era until today. This section turns its attention to 
the informal processes, rules, norms and beliefs that influence people’s everyday lives in rural 
Uganda and African rural life more broadly. 
While Uganda is internationally recognised for introducing macro-economic and public sector 
reforms and has made considerable economic progress, a range of authors such as, Jones (2009); 
Knighton (2005); Leopold (2005) and, Whyte (1997) point out that these achievements are 
poorly visible in the countryside and have, just like the erratic interventions of development 
agencies, a limited impact on the everyday lives of rural citizens (Booth, 2012; Ferguson, 2015). 
The state, Jones (2009) argues, operates outside the rural economy and does “… not reach much 
beyond the district capital” (p.2) as it functions on the basis of external financial resources and 
donor relations. In Uganda, taxes rarely exceed 10% of the district budget. Various scholars, 
such as the renowned Dambisa Moyo (2009), have warned against the effects of such enormous 
tax gaps, as it tends to limit accountability mechanisms of the government to its constituency, 
may silence the population and open the door to corruption. 
To better understand accountability mechanisms at government level and to avoid a simplistic 
suggestion that African politicians and civil servants are a pack of knaves without any sense of 
morality, Chabal (2009) sheds light on the coexistence of formal and informal codes of 
accountability in African politics. Whereas formal codes of accountability are informed by 
western values, promoting democratic elections and the overall public wellbeing, informal 
accountability mechanisms are based on “ … the morality of a tradition of reciprocal obligation” 
(p. 69). The existence, and the urgency to meet obligations of reciprocity is tied to the value 
that is attached to community membership. Chabal  (2009) notes that without a community and 
a kin network (creating a sense of belonging), an individual loses its ‘humanity’ and a 
meaningful existence. The inextricable tie between an individual and a community is well 
illustrated with the African term ‘ubuntu’: I am what I am because of who we all are. In this 
context, accountability is understood in the way how one is able to meet the expectations of 
those who are represented. Chabal (2009): “what matters to people is how people in power 
discharge their obligations under existing systems of reciprocity” (p.51-52). Informal modes of 
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accountability have, therefore, often more grip on political processes than formal mechanisms. 
Equally within New institutional Economics, Douglass North (1992a) highlights that “[f]ormal 
rules may change overnight but the informal constraints cannot” (p. 13). In the event such 
informal obligations are ignored, people in powerful positions may lose their legitimacy and 
may be forced to account through accusations or extortions of witchcraft (Chabal, 2009).  
The veil of witchcraft often greatly influences behaviour – from a local farmer to a national 
politician – due to fear of ‘bewitchment’ or the anxiety of witchcraft accusations (Golooba-
Mutebi, 2005).  The definition of witchcraft (what it means and entails), varies across the 
African continent and may even take different forms within a single locality (Sanders, 2003; 
Quarmyne, 2011). What witchcraft beliefs do share is the powerful influence of the 
‘community’ and locality on people’s everyday lives and the ‘dark side’ of kinship wherein the 
‘community’ in which an individual finds solace, trust and fellowship, might also be the one 
that inflicts harm and even death (Chabal, 2009; Dolan, 2002; Golobaa-Mutebi, 2005).  
Witchcraft is forbidden by law in Uganda (Witchcraft Act 1957) and most African countries 
(Quarmyne, 2011).  Nevertheless, witchcraft beliefs are omnipresent in African societies and 
permeate through social, economic and political domains.  Although witchcraft is “part of the 
fabric of everyday village life” (Abrahams, 1994, p. 13), the meaning and impact of witchcraft 
is challenging to comprehend for ‘outsiders’ as the subject is often avoided in public debates 
and interpersonal conversations. Witchcraft is, however, a long standing topic of enquiry 
amongst cultural anthropologists (i.e.  Douglas, 1967; 1970; Marwick, 1965; Mitchell, 1956; 
Moore and Sanders, 2001; Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Sanders, 2003, Turner, 1957) that have 
aimed to grasp its function, meaning and impact and have studied the roles, circumstances and 
motives of those involved through extended periods of ethnographic research.  
From this wealth of research, I touch upon a number of insights from the reviewed literature, 
being the seedbed for witchcraft and its possible functions. Witchcraft appears to thrive in poor 
communities and, ironically, often thwarts economic prosperity as a result of it (Geschiere, 
1988; Golooba-Mutebi, 2005). Witchcraft is often associated with dispute and jealousy about 
economic disparities (Baptista, 2010; Derman and Hellum, 2007; Dolan, 2002; Golooba-
Mutebi, 2005; Katsi et al., 2007; Pieterse, 2014). Economic differences within a locality tend 
to feed the expectation that affluent individuals must take care of the less well-off households 
(Golooba-Mutebi, 2005). This notion is also observed by Chabal (2009) who highlights the 
dominant public virtue to recirculate, and not to accumulate, wealth. He explains that business 
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people may, therefore, struggle to achieve economic efficiency as they are expected to 
generously redistribute their wealth for the good of the locality in which they take part. 
Although witchcraft is generally used to close the path to affluence, wealthy people are often 
suspected to have used the same powers to prosper (Golooba-Mutebi, 2005).  
In South Africa, Niehaus (1993) observed an increase of witchcraft in those communities with 
high migration patterns. The case study areas Masindi and Kiryandongo districts also 
experience a high influx of migrants and host a multi-ethnic population with 56 different 
languages, as further detailed in Section 3.7. Niehaus (1993) found that whereas previously 
witchcraft was used between communities and not among kin to avoid the disruption of close 
social relations, nowadays, witchcraft was taking place within communities as the risk of 
damage to interpersonal relationships was lessoned due to trends of extended family 
breakdown. Niehaus findings, showing the heyday of witchcraft in crumbled communities, are 
similar to the insights of early anthropologists (Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Turner, 1957; Mitchell, 
1956; Marwick, 1965) who also showed that witchcraft may rise in societies with weak and 
abrasive social relations. Chabal (2009) relates the migration patterns also to the recent upsurge 
of the Pentecostal church in Africa. Equally, Jones (2009) observes the rising influence and 
significance of the Pentecostal church in rural Uganda. Chabal (2009) argues that the collapse 
of the community results into “… congeries of individuals who do not belong […], and who 
must find other groupings in order to regain their ‘humanity’” (p.47). Membership of the 
Pentecostal church and the related move away from the norms and codes of conduct prescribed 
by the community, is expected to protect people against the dangers of witchcraft (Chabal, 
2009; Jones, 2009). 
Witchcraft serves a number of functions15. It is meant to explain the inexplicable, such as 
misfortune and illness (Pritchard, 1937). It is thereby also used to treat “illness, trauma, death 
or simply bad luck” (Chabal, 2009 p.76). As described earlier, witchcraft is used for 
accountability purposes – to force politicians to comply with their obligations of reciprocity – 
and is used as a social leveller to impose the distribution of resources from the wealthy to the 
poor (Chabal, 2009) and to eliminate potential rivals in the run for economic gain (Dolan, 2002). 
On the one hand, witchcraft is used to keep social control and to prevent change (Moore and 
Sanders, 2001) and on the other hand, witchcraft is employed as a vehicle to propel change and 
                                                          
15 Two separate discourses may be discerned. One that views witchcraft as a response and a critique to the 
project of modernity and the second that views witchcraft as part of modernity related to traditions of the locality 
(Sandors) .  
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to correct social imbalance. The latter may well be illustrated by feminist studies, such as that 
of Catherine Dolan (2002). In her study in Kenya, she describes how horticulture practices for 
a French bean production company improved the economic position of women, but as men own 
the land and dominate in the economic sphere, they risked to losing their economic gains in 
favour of their respective husbands. Women resorted to the powerful weapon of witchcraft to 
challenge the legitimacy of prevailing gendered roles. Although some argue that men and 
women are just as much involved in witchcraft (Pieterse, 2014), women are often more 
associated with witchcraft due to their marginalized position (Dolan, 2002 p. 664). 
Returning to the subject of this thesis – water is also a highly gendered subject. Women in 
Uganda are responsible for most of the water related tasks in the household (Baguma et al., 
2013).  As the collection of water from a borehole is a time consuming (and heavy) task it tends 
to negatively affect the economic productivity of women. Meanwhile, women are often 
expected to budget for the water user fee as they dominate within the water domain (Naiga et 
al., 2015).  Due to the relevance of ongoing access to water for women, the donor community 
has advocated their increased participation in water related matters since the 1990s (as 
embodied in the 1992 Dublin principles).  Although men traditionally fill in public positions 
and dominate in decision-making processes, women acquired permanent seats in the Water 
User Committees, often as the treasurer, due to the efforts of the donor community and local 
water project implementers. Nevertheless, as Chabal (2009) notes, the representation of women 
in these formal committees may not change their actual level of participation.  
Given the emphasis of rural water programmes to draw on local knowledge and practice (as 
described in literature Chapter 2), the highly gendered norms related to accessing and managing 
water resources and the fact that water control is subject to struggles over power, it is 
remarkable that the role of witchcraft on shaping rural water management outcomes has not 
been given much attention in the literature. Only a few studies mention how the fear over 
witchcraft accusations and extortions of witchcraft, respectively disable or enable individual 
agency to influence the course of rural water management arrangements. The study of 
Schwieger (2015) in Namibia, describes that disgruntled poorer households are unable to 
enforce cross-subsidisation arrangements for accessing water with their wealthier neighbours 
due to fear of receiving accusations of practising witchcraft. Derrman and Hellum (2007) in 
Zimbabwe write that witchcraft was used against people that tried to prevent free-riding and 
stopped them from  accessing water. Katsi et al., (2007) found the reverse in a case study in 
Zimbabwe, and demonstrate that people used witchcraft against those whose refused to pay for 
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accessing water. In Mozambique, Baptista (2010) observed cases of witchcraft (by women) to 
obstruct an outside intervention for a higher level of water service in the village.  
This thesis points at the significance of witchcraft and the role of women in shaping rural water 
management outcomes in the case study area. Because the examination of cosmological 
worldviews was not part of this study, future in-depth ethnographic study is warranted in order 
to develop a comprehensive understanding on the role of witchcraft beliefs in rural water 
programmes and how witchcraft and super natural beliefs guide rules on resource use, structure 
human interaction processes and rural water management outcomes. 
 
 
3.7 Case Study Area 
 
This research took place in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts in mid-west Uganda. The 
districts are located at a distance of about 250 kilometres from the capital city Kampala. Refer 
to Figure 1.1 for the study area and the location of the researched villages. In 2010, the two 
districts were carved out of Masindi.  Both districts are endowed with surface water, wetlands 
and rainforests and border Murchison National Park. They host a multi-ethnic population with 
56 different languages scattered over rural villages, rural growth centres, towns and a refugee 
camp in Kiryandongo (Kiryandongo District Local Government, 2013). Masindi consists of 7 
sub-counties and 201 villages and Kiryandongo entails 4 sub-counties and 228 villages. The 
districts are at an altitude of 1,000-2,000 m above sea level and receive an estimated annual 
precipitation of 1200 mm. Rainfall is bi-annual and allows the region to have two planting 
seasons. Despite the high average rainfall in the area, two sub-counties bordering the east of 
Masindi and the south-east of Kiryandongo district experience water shortages, especially 
during the dry season (Masindi District Local Government, 2009). The main economic activity 
in rural mid-west Uganda is subsistence farming, depending on family labour. Common crops 
are potatoes, maize, cassava, peanuts and greens and the largest cash crops in the area are maize 
and sunflower. Households in the area are commonly large, hosting an average of 6-9 
individuals (UBOS, 2014b). The average monthly household income in the area is 185,000 
UGX (USD 36) and an estimated 21.4 percent of the population lives below the poverty line of 
USD 1 per person per day (UBOS 2010).  
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Access to the study area was genereated through close partnership with The Water Trust (TWT) 
that operates in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts. Refer to methodology Chapter 4.3 for a 
comprehensive description of TWT and my roles in the research process. From 2012-2014, 
when I was the Programme Manager of TWT, I initatied the development of the CBM-lite 
model (see Chapter 6.3.2 for a detailed description of the CBM-lite model and Chapter 7 for 
the development and implementation process of the alternative rural water management model). 
During this period, public support for trialling CBM-lite was gauged in six villages with 
Shallow Hand Dug Wells (SHDWs) in Kigumba sub-county of Kiryandongo district. Refer to 
Figure 3.5 for the location of the CBM-lite villages and the villages that were initially included 
in the feasibility study of the pilot project. 
The CBM-lite model has been piloted in four villages in Kiryandongo district. Mpumwe, a 
relatively large village of 297 households covering three sub-villages with six16 handpumps. 
Nyakatugo; located close to the town of Kigumba with 132 households and three handpumps. 
Most of the households in this village were engaged in business activities and relatively more 
affluent than the households dependent on subsistence farming in the other more remotely 
located pilot villages. A few households in Nyakatugo were connected to piped water from the 
Ugandan National Water and Sewerage Company (NWSC). Yet, due to regular power cuts in 
the area these households still used water from the village handpumps on a regular basis. Mboira 
II; a poor immigrant village of 147 households with two handpumps and a protected spring. 
Lastly, Nyakabette II; a large village of 264 households with three handpumps.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 In Mpumwe village, two water sources (constructed by the local government) were not included in the pilot 
project. They were non-functional and vulnerable to poor water quality due to their location in a swamp area. 
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Figure 3.5 
Case Study Area: CBM-lite Pilot Villages 
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3.6.1 Colonial History of Masindi and Kiryandongo Districts 
 
Masindi and Kiryandongo lie at the heart of the Bunyoro region which was once the biggest 
and most important kingdom of East Africa before Great Britain occupied the country in 1894. 
Pre-colonial Bunyoro covered an estimated 13,000 square miles and included extensive lands 
to the west of Lake Albert and the Semliki river and Tooro and Busongora region as depicted 
in Figure 3.6. The region was endowed with rich natural resources and controlled lucrative 
ivory trade routes. The Bunyoro had a centralised government system, run by the king of 
Bunyoro – the Kabaleega (Doyle, 2006).   
It is argued “… that nowhere else in east Africa was the introduction of colonialism so painful 
as in Bunyoro” (Doyle, 2006 p.91). The British conquest started with the war against the 
Kabaleega who refused to submit to British rule and ended with the dismemberment of the 
Bunyoro region. In 1893, the British colonisers gave large parts of their conquered southern 
Bunyoro territory to the Buganda kingdom (refer to Map 3.6) – which had been a long-time 
enemy of the Bunyoro kingdom. In response, from 1894 until 1899, the Bunyoro fought a fierce 
guerrilla war against British occupation and the British allies. The war resulted in high Bunyoro 
casualties due to unequally matched sides. The fields and the plantations of the Bunyoro were 
destroyed and, where once the kingdom was enriched with cattle, during the war most of it was 
killed or confiscated by the British. In these years, the region was hit with drought and 
epidemics such as the tsetse fly (sleeping sickness), killing more cattle and causing people to 
flee their homes. In 1899, the Kabaleega was captured, mutilated and expelled to the Seychelles 
(Doyle, 2006; 2006b). 
After the forced surrender to British rule, one third of the Bunyoro region was given to the 
Buganda and although figures are lacking, many more Bunyoro were killed in these regions. In 
the remaining Bunyoro region, representatives of the Buganda kingdom were stationed by 
British officials as chiefs. Because the Buganda chiefs looked down on the Bunyoro and had 
no interest in serving the needs of the population, the area failed to recover.  Bunyoro was in a 
crisis and faced famine but was heavily taxed and farmers were forced to grow cash crops. Even 
in the late colonial period, Bunyoro was one of the most backward districts of the protectorate 
and for a long time, the attitude of the Bunyoro towards the Buganda and the British has been 
extremely hostile (Doyle, 2006; 2006b).  
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Figure 3.6 
Areas Transferred from Bunyoro Region to Buganda in 1893 (Source: Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom, date 
unknown) 
 
 
 
3.6.2 Rural Water Context of the Case Study Area 
 
Safe water in rural villages in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts is extracted from protected 
springs, shallow wells and deep boreholes. Refer to Table 3.3 for an overview of the water 
resources in the case study area. At the time of the study, five Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) in Kiryandongo and two NGOs in Masindi were involved in rural water and sanitation 
projects.  
The handpumps in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts installed by the local government are 
primarily India Mark II or III (also referred to as U2 and U3), whereas those installed by the 
case study NGO The Water Trust (TWT) are Consallen handpumps. Although the Consallen 
handpump was vigorously promoted by UNICEF in 1983, the pump is nowadays only installed 
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by TWT and the Busoga Trust17 (a local NGO in western Uganda) who use the pumps due to 
its high quality18. The Consallen pump is corrosion resistant as it uses polyethylene rising mains 
and stainless steel rods; qualities that make Consallen more robust than its India Mark II and 
III counterparts.  
Because there are relatively few Consallen handpumps in Uganda, the spare parts of the 
Consallen pump are sold directly from the NGOs offices. Refer to Appendix 3.1 for a graphical 
image of the Consallen and India Mark II handpumps.  
 
 
Table 3.3 
Overview Water Resources in Masindi and Kiryandongo district (from MWE, 2016; UBOS, 2014) 
 Masindi Kiryandongo 
No. of protected springs 384 15 
No. of deep boreholes 214 301 
No. of shallow wells 487 250 
*% Rural population access to water 94% 74% 
*% Functionality of rural water sources 90% 85% 
*% Active Water User Committees 77% 87% 
District Grant 2015/6 467,502,642 UGX  
(132,027 USD) 
628,396,962 UGX  
(177, 465 USD) 
*Similar to the comment made in Section 3.6 about ‘Uganda’s Rural Water Status’, the official figures may be 
lower in reality.  
 
 
3.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
Much of the literature praises the water reforms in Uganda: Robinson (2002 p. 1) notes they are 
seen “by independent observers” as “the most dynamic and successful sector reform processes 
in sub-Saharan Africa” and O’Meally (2011 p.1) asserts that Uganda has made, “major strides 
in sector coordination and performance”. While Uganda has indeed greatly improved access to 
rural water services over the last 2,5 decades, nowadays the declining funding levels are “only 
sufficient to match the annual population growth in the rural areas” (MWE 2013, p. 64). 
                                                          
17 Before TWT gained an independent NGO status in 2012, it was part of the Busoga Trust.  
 
18 Despite the good reputation of the Consallen handpump, politics and finances played a role in the decision of 
the Ugandan government and UNICEF headquarters to pursue with the India Mark handpumps (Parry-Jones et al., 
2001) 
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The increasing pressure on existing rural water facilities increases the concern for 
‘sustainability’ and the assurance that rural communities have long-term and reliable access to 
water services. This chapter has shown the good intentions of the Ugandan government to 
ensure the sustainability of rural water services. However, it remains to be seen whether the 
‘good’ intentions equal ‘good’ outcomes, i.e. long-term and reliable access to rural water 
services. Against the backdrop sketched out in this chapter and literature Chapter 2, the thesis 
investigates the outcomes of CBM and the CBM-lite model in the case study area, Masindi and 
Kiryandongo districts, in mid-west Uganda.  
 
The next chapter describes how the research was undertaken. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology and Methods 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter describes the methodology used in this study. The previous chapter reported on 
the research context and provided an historical, political and socio-economic background of 
Uganda, the relevant policies related to rural water management and an overview of the research 
area Masindi and Kiryandongo districts. As I highlighted in the previous chapter, it is important 
to report the research methods in their context (Fisher, 2008; Flick, 2006).  
In literature Chapter 2, I identified a controversy in the literature, namely disagreement on the 
root causes of handpump breakdown and the end-goal of sustainable rural water services and 
diverging solutions for addressing the downtime of rural water infrastructure. This thesis 
examines the handpump non-functionality problem from the angle of the Community Based 
Management (CBM) model that promotes user payment and community control and guides the 
Operation and Management (O&M) of rural water facilities in developing countries. Refer to 
the introductory Chapter 1.3 for the research aim and objectives of the thesis.    
This chapter describes the research strategy, design and methods used for the empirical research 
objectives 2 – 4. The structure of this chapter is as follows:  
 Section 4.2 describes the overall research strategy of the study and provides an overview 
of the major themes discussed in this chapter.  
 Section 4.3 reflects on my role in the research process and the origin of the research 
project.  
 Section 4.4 reports on the research design used in the study and explains how the study 
designs are connected to the proceeding empirical chapters and research objectives.  
 Section 4.5 sets out the sampling method. 
 Section 4.6 explains how access to the study area was gained.  
 Section 4.7 provides a detailed overview of the research methods
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 Section 4.8 proceeds with the research ethics;  
 Section 4.9 outlines the study analysis;  
 Section 4.10 draws attention to the sources of error and bias in the research and, 
  Section 4.11 set out how the thesis evaluated ‘sustainable’ rural water management.  
 The chapter closes with a set of concluding remarks in 4.12. 
 
 
4.2 Qualitative Research Strategy: an Overview 
 
The discussion on the merits and demerits of qualitative and quantitative research represent a 
long-standing debate in science (Bryman, 1988; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; 2000; Hammersley, 
1992; Hindess, 1973; Patton, 1990; Marsh, 1982; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2000). For the 
purpose of this chapter, I explain my philosophical views about the nature of reality and my 
positionality on the qualitative-quantitative spectrum.  
This study is an evaluative inquiry of the Community Based Management (CBM) approach for 
rural water sources in Uganda. The thesis uses a predominantly qualitative research design 
because it aims to gain a holistic and in-depth understanding how the CBM model impacts on 
the maintenance of rural water sources and ultimately their long-term access. Within this 
research field, I position myself as a “’weakly constructivist’” (Brown, 2008 p. 115) that, 
similar to constructivists, approaches social reality as being unconsciously and consciously co-
constructed by individuals that interact and give meaning to their world (Byrne-Armstrong et 
al., 2001) but argues that policy arrangements can be modified to improve the outcomes of 
natural resources management practices. I am therefore interested in the daily practices, norms, 
worldviews and social interrelationships of local communities and how they impact on the way 
rural water sources are managed and, how and why actors in the rural water sector may 
influence the way rural water management policies are (re)shaped. Yet, and along with a 
positivistic worldview, I believe that rules and policies can influence and direct human 
behaviour (Lindenberg, 2012). While the study has an emphasis on qualitative research 
methods, I have used a mixed method approach to complement the qualitative and in-depth data 
with multiple surveys (Mason, 1996). In turn, the qualitative data was used to interpret the 
outcomes of the surveys. 
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This thesis heavily draws on insights from critical institutionalism and the notions of the role 
of power, history, context and identity (Cleaver, 2012; Cleaver and de Koning, 2015). 
Nevertheless, its prime focus is to systematically and empirically evaluate the CBM approach 
by investigating how its key fundamentals – user payment and community control – play out in 
Masindi and Kiryandongo districts. To this end, the study predominantly adheres to the policy 
prescription in developing countries that requires users to pay for their own water services (how 
much and for what aspects will be described in Section 4.11). This body of work does therefore 
not adopt the social justice lens prevalent in critical realist and pragmatic studies that i.e. may 
question the impact of enforcing user payment on a pro-poor agenda (Charmaz, 2016; Chowns, 
2014; Denzin, 2015; Mertens, 2009; Morgan, 2014) but aims to unravel how reliable access to 
rural water systems can be safeguarded in a user pays era. 
The study has been the result of an iterative research strategy where data collection was 
alternated with theory (Bryman, 2001; Patton, 2002). This approach advanced my 
understanding about the research population and the wider context. Moreover, the longitudinal 
element in the research process enabled the assessment of differences over time and allowed 
the generation of a ‘richer’ case study description. The various fieldwork periods permitted me 
to critically reflect on multiple concepts and their consequences on rural water management 
outcomes, to verify the data and obtain saturation of data collection (Miles and Huberman, 
1994), to establish a trusted relationship with my respondents and to keep track of the 
developments in the in-depth studied villages, the rural water sector in Uganda and the 
(practitioner) literature.  
To study rural water management practices in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts in mid-west 
Uganda, the thesis adopted three research designs: the cross-sectional research design, action 
research and the critical case study design with a longitudinal element. Refer to Table 4.1 for 
an overview of the timetable of these research strategies and my professional roles during the 
research process. The combination of these three research designs have, I believe, enabled this 
study to go beyond a descriptive account of ‘what happened’. By translating and investigating 
the ‘what’ to the ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Rowley, 2002), this thesis hopes to advance the water 
sustainability debate in both academic and practitioner circles. 
For securing methodological rigour, two key concepts – validity  and reliability – were given 
due consideration during data collection, management and analysis. View Table 4.2 for their 
definitions. The following sections of this chapter explicitly describe the steps undertaken in 
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this study and refer to the concepts of reliability and validity to demonstrate how rigour in this 
study was aimed for.  
 
 
Table 4.1 
Timetable of Action Research, Cross-Sectional Research and Critical Case Study (Author’s 
Construct) 
Key Dates Purpose Role 
July 2012 – January 
2013 
Development CBM-lite 
model 
Programme Manager TWT 
January – July 2013 Feasibility study CBM-lite 
model 
Programme Manager TWT 
August 2013 Start implementation CBM-
lite model in 3 villages 
Programme Manager TWT 
October 2013 - 
January 2014 
Data collection CBM and 
CBM-lite 
Programme Manager TWT 
and PhD researcher 
11 – 25 June, 2014 Data collection CBM and 
CBM-lite 
PhD researcher 
19 October – 20 
November, 2014 
Data collection CBM and 
CBM-lite 
PhD researcher 
12 March – 5 April, 
2015 
Data collection CBM-lite PhD researcher 
19 October – 20 
November, 2015 
Data collection CBM-lite PhD researcher 
 
 
 
Table 4.2  
Validity and Reliability (From: Silverman, 2005 p. 210) 
Validity 
 
“By validity I mean truth: interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately represents the social 
phenomena to which it refers” (Hammersley 1990, 57). 
 
Reliability 
“Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by 
different observers or by the same observer on different occasions” (Hammersley 1992, 67). 
 
 
 
 
Cross-
sectional 
research 
Action 
Research 
Critical 
case study 
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4.3 The Role of the Researcher 
 
This thesis is rooted in my working experiences in northern and mid-west Uganda from 2011-
2014. In northern Uganda, I managed the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programme 
for ZOA (an international relief and rehabilitation organisation). From June 2012 until January 
2014, I was the Programme Manager for The Water Trust (TWT) – a small Ugandan WASH 
Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) with an expertise in the construction of Shallow Hand 
Dug Wells (SHDWs). TWT comprised of fifteen field staff, an Executive Director based in the 
United States (US) and a six headed Board. The organisation was founded by American 
philanthropists, with a background in the finance sector. The organisation’s funding stream was 
largely secured through private donations derived from the social network of the board 
members in the US.  
By the time I started working at TWT, I was intrigued by the way communities managed their 
water resources: how the principles of CBM were adopted and enforced and the differences of 
water management processes between communities. In both northern and mid-west Uganda, I 
observed communities struggling to maintain their water sources (such as minor repairs, 
maintaining the fence and clean surroundings), let alone carry out preventative maintenance, 
and contribute or enforce user payments. In the cases where the handpump had broken down, 
communities often lacked the cash on hand to pay for the repair.  As a result, the Community 
Development Officers (CDOs) of TWT (and those of ZOA in northern Uganda) were mainly 
tasked to mobilise community meetings to facilitate new Water User Committees (WUC) 
elections, re-train the WUCs and remind the communities about the use of paying upfront water 
user fees.  
From August 2012, I started to use the weekly staff meetings to discuss the difficulties 
communities were facing in maintaining their water sources.  Gradually, these staff meetings 
became a platform to collectively brainstorm how the raised challenges could be addressed and 
what TWT could do to facilitate improved maintenance of rural water facilities.  Meanwhile, I 
engaged with local government staff, other NGO staffs and community members during field 
visits to understand their problem analyses and proposed ways forward. In this period, that 
almost lasted 12 months, I spearheaded the development of an alternative rural water 
management model; known as CBM-lite. Prior to a feasibility study in six villages, the CBM-
lite model was piloted by TWT in three (and later four) villages in August 2013. Three months 
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later, in October 2014, I started as a PhD researcher at the University of Portsmouth that allowed 
me to study the CBM approach and the CBM-lite innovation in-depth.  
 
 
4.4  The Research Design and the Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis involves three stages that are critical for developing an improved system, refer to 
Figure 4.1 (Piggot-Irvene, 2006). The study’s research objectives are closely aligned to these 
three stages. Table 4.3 shows the structure of the thesis and indicates the research designs used 
per research objective.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 
Three stages for continued improvement (adapted from Piggot-Irvene (2006 p. 488)) 
 
 
 
Following the literature review in Chapter 2, the first empirical Chapter 5 analyses the outcomes 
of the current CBM model through a cross-sectional study. The second empirical Chapter 7 
reflects on the implementation process of the CBM-lite model; an alternative rural water 
management model that was the result of action research undertaken during my service for the 
NGO TWT. The third empirical Chapter 8 critically reviews the outcomes of the CBM-lite 
model in four case study villages. The concluding Chapter 9, brings the findings and 
Analyse Current 
Situation
Implement
Improvements
Evaluate
Improvements
Developing an 
Improved System 
Report and 
Recommendations 
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interpretations of the different chapters together and provides relevant policy and academic 
recommendations.  
 
 
Table 4.3  
Structure Thesis: Overview of the Research Objectives and Employed Study Designs 
Research objective Research design Chapter 
1. Examine the underlying ideologies and theoretical 
underpinnings of the CBM model. 
 
Literature review Chapter 2 
2. Evaluate the outcomes of community based managed water 
sources in mid-west Uganda. 
 
Cross-sectional 
research  design 
Chapter 5 
3. Analyse the risk perceptions of community members, NGO 
staffs, and local and national government officials about the 
introduction of an alternative rural water management model – 
referred to as CBM-lite. 
 
Action research Chapter 7 
4. Evaluate the outcomes of the CBM-lite model in four pilot 
villages in mid-west Uganda. 
Critical case study Chapter 8 
 
 
The cross-sectional research design was adopted to address research objective 2 that aims to 
evaluate the outcomes of the CBM model. The purpose of a cross-sectional research design is 
to estimate a certain prevalence within a given population at one point in time (Levin, 2006; 
Mann, 2003; Olsen and George, 2004). This thesis selected the cross-sectional research design 
to compare and contrast the outcomes of the CBM model and rural water management practices 
across 100 communal water sources in Masindi and Kiryandongo Districts. These water sources 
were examined to learn about community practices and attitudes towards Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M). Cross-sectional studies are descriptive in nature, and while most cross-
sectional research designs use surveying techniques only (Merriam, 2009; Silverman, 2005), 
this study employed a mixed-method approach to understand the outcomes of the surveys and 
to establish cause and effect relationships. One of the criticisms levelled at the cross-sectional 
research approach is that it is only a snapshot at one point in time (Levin, 2006; Olsen and 
George, 2004). To prevent a narrowed perspective, the study adopted a longitudinal element by 
drawing on previous observations and past events of the research participants and by conducting 
the study through intervals over a period of two years from October 2013 – October 2015. 
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The third research objective – an analysis of actors’ risk perceptions on the CBM-lite model – 
has been addressed by action research. Action research aims to address ‘real life problems’ 
and aspires to bring about change in a participatory manner (Sagor, 1992). It includes a cycle 
of data collection, analysis, reflection and action and involves the people that implement and 
investigate the change (Laws et al., 2003 p. 339). Action research is perceived as a way to 
bridge the gap between theory and practice (Ferrance, 2000; Masters, 1995). While the 
approach gained popularity in the 1970s, especially in education and health, it is also subject to 
criticism and downplayed as “unscientific and the work of amateurs” (McFarland and Stansell, 
1993 in Hansen and Borden, 2006 p. 48). This thesis voices the PhD researcher wherein I reflect 
on the steps undertaken during the action research process and the resultant findings. Section 
4.10 reflects on the disadvantages of my dual role as practitioner and PhD researcher. 
The fourth and last research objective, that aims to  understand the implementation process and 
the outcomes of the CBM-lite pilot in four villages in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts, has 
been studied through the case study research design. The case study design is “… useful in 
providing answers to ‘How?’ and ‘Why?’ questions” (Rowley, 2002 p. 16) that may remain 
unanswered in a priori theory and sweeping statistical surveys. I agree with Flyvbjerg (2001; 
2006) that in order to gain an understanding of complex issues such as every day social practices 
and i.e. the role of power relations, an intensive and detailed case study allows the researcher 
to immerse in, and, better grasp the study context. As the famous anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
(1973 p.5) formulated: “Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental 
science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning”.  
As with every research strategy, there are limitations with the case study design. An important 
criticism about the case study design has been directed at its limited focus and its incapability 
to make generalisations to a wider population (Bryman, 2001; Yin 1984). Flyvjberg (2001) and 
Ostrom (2005) argue, however, that it is possible to generalise on the basis of a case study by 
strategically selecting ‘critical cases’. Section 4.10 will elaborate on another important criticism 
about the case study design which is the risk of researcher bias. The critical cases in this study 
are the villages where TWT implemented the CBM-lite pilot. The pilot villages are typical rural 
communities in Kiryandongo district where both TWT and the local government constructed 
water sources. The selection of four villages allowed me to compare and contrast the outcomes 
of the CBM-lite pilot in the same periods of time and identical geographical contexts (Bryman, 
2001) and to avoid the risk of ending up with an ‘extreme case’ (Flyvjberg, 2001). Yet, it is 
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argued that various case studies may limit the extensiveness of the data collection (Bryman, 
2001; Dyer and Wilkens, 1991). To ensure sufficient and in-depth material, the critical case 
studies were studied at multiple intervals in time (refer to Table 4.1). 
The longitudinal element to the case study was critical to this research and enabled me to keep 
track of the developments of the CBM-lite pilot and processes of institutional change. I believed 
that shorter field visits were more valuable than one extended fieldwork period as, in the words 
of North (1995 p. 25), community dynamics and institutional processes “… change only 
gradually” and may therefore rather be understood over a longer period of time.  
Figure 4.2 depicts the steps undertaken during the action research and shows the relationships 
between the action research and case study phase. 
 
 
Figure 4.2  
The Action Research and Critical Case Study Cycle (Author’s Construct) 
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4.5  Sampling 
 
Because Uganda and Masindi and Kiryandongo districts were already predetermined (as 
described in Section 4.2), sampling took place at three levels: villages, water sources and 
respondents. There are a range of sampling strategies, including random and purposive 
sampling that are either non-stratified or stratified and in the case of the latter, are proportional 
or non-proportional (Cox, 2015). It is often argued that random sampling is a more reliable and 
valid sampling technique and therefore the best way to generalise research findings over larger 
subsets of the population (Bryman, 2001; Cox, 2015; Patton, 1990 Silverman, 2005). Yet, 
random sampling was not feasible in this study as: 1) the villages and water sources were 
accessed through either TWT or the local government, 2) it was impossible to randomly select 
respondents at village level (household registers were not always available and random 
selection would consume time and therefore embody a costly undertaking), 3) the research 
involved a case study analysis, including observations that cannot be randomly selected and, 4) 
key informant interviews (Cox, 2015).  
This thesis includes a total of 117 water sources in 103 villages. The sampling method that has 
been adopted in this study has been purposeful, in particular purposeful random sampling and 
purposive sampling. The strategy of purposeful random sampling is a type of random sampling 
but using small sample sizes (Flick, 2006; Merriam, 2009; Silverman, 2005). In the cross-
sectional research design, purposeful random sampling was used for the selection of TWT water 
sources for the Water User Committee (WUC) survey (Section 4.6.5 provides an overview of 
the surveys in the research and Appendix 4.1 provides a detailed description of the WUC 
survey).  From the TWT database, consisting of 165 water sources in October 2013, a total of 
84 water sources in 84 different villages were randomly selected to take part in the WUC 
survey. The other water sources in this thesis have been purposively selected. The cross-
sectional design included, next to the 84 TWT water sources in the WUC survey, 13 water 
sources in the ‘Water User’ survey (refer to Section 4.6.5 and Appendix 4.1) and 18 water 
sources in 15 villages were I undertook semi-structured interviews (Refer to Section 4.7.1). 
These three data sets overlapped each other: two of the 18 in-depth studied water sources, and 
the 13 purposively selected water sources by TWT staff in the ‘Water User’ survey also featured 
in the WUC survey. 
Of the sample of 18 water sources in 15 villages where I undertook semi-structured interviews 
with community members, 7 water sources in 4 villages were constructed by the local 
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government. These water sources were purposively selected by the District Engineer of Masindi 
local government. The criteria for selection of the government water sources were their 
geographical location. Because TWT only operates in five of the seven sub-counties in Masindi 
District, the selected government water sources were based in the other two sub-counties to 
compare the research results across geographical area and type of implementer (government 
versus NGO).  Refer to Table 4.4 for a comprehensive overview of the sample in the cross-
sectional research design.  
 
 
Table 4.4 
Sample Cross-sectional Research Design (Author’s Construct) 
No. water 
sources 
No. 
villages 
Dataset Sample Actor Overlap 
84 Water 
source 
84 
villages 
Water User 
Committee 
survey 
Randomly 
selected 
Author  
13 water 
sources 
13 
villages 
Water User 
survey 
Purposively 
selected 
TWT staff 13 water sources 
overlap with 
WUC survey 
18 water 
sources 
15 
villages 
Indepth studied 
water sources 
Purposively 
selected 
TWT staff and District 
Engineer of Masindi local 
government 
2 water sources 
overlap with 
WUC survey  
 
Total sample in Cross-sectional study: 100 water sources (99 villages) 
 
 
Further, this thesis includes a critical case study consisting of four villages with in total 17 water 
sources. These four villages were also purposively selected. The villages were identified by 
TWT staff to take part in the CBM-lite pilot on the basis that the WUCs in these communities 
had struggled to fulfil their roles and responsibilities in the past. Of the six initial selected 
villages, four villages participated in the CBM-lite pilot. Chapter 7 provides a detailed 
description of the feasibility study, selection and implementation of the CBM-lite model. 
This study entails multiple layers of respondents at the micro, meso and macro level who were 
non-randomly selected. At the micro level, and at each studied water source, members of the 
WUC were targeted to take part in a survey or semi-structured interview, as further described 
below. Respondents for the interviews and surveys were selected through convenience 
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sampling by random walks in the village. During these walks, a representation of respondents 
as wide as possible was pursued. A constraining factor, yet inherent to convenience sampling, 
was the restricted nature of interactions to those at home during the time of data collection. This 
was especially the case during the rainy seasons when farmers predominantly work in their 
fields (March till May and September till November). Furthermore, at the meso and macro 
level, key informant interviews were undertaken with TWT staff, employees of other local and 
(inter)national NGOs and local and national government officials. 
 
 
4.6  Access to the Study Area 
 
Access to the majority of the villages in this thesis was granted through my close collaboration 
with The Water Trust (TWT). The organisation was well-known in Masindi and Kiryandongo 
districts. TWT ran bi-monthly radio shows and most of the studied villages cooperated with the 
organisation in the construction of Shallow Hand Dug Wells (SHDWs) and had been involved 
in hygiene and sanitation programmes. In addition, my role as (former) TWT Programme 
Manager greatly influenced the way how access to the villages was gained. I was familiar with 
the region and many of its people: I knew most of the studied villages, had built good 
relationships with the relevant Water, Sanitation and Hygience (WASH) actors in the research 
area and due to my understanding of the study context, I did not need to undertake a scoping 
study (Silverman, 2005). Especially in the pilot villages, my frequent interactions with village 
leaders and community members before I embarked on the PhD research project led to 
increased levels of openness during formal and informal interviews. After some time, the 
closest to an unattainable ‘insider status’ was the referral of ‘sister’ by some community 
members and local government officials.  
The prior working relationships with the local government greatly advantaged me in this study. 
The local government officials at district and sub-county level were supportive about the study 
and our prior engagements led to frank conversations about rural water supply, CBM and their 
own experiences with community life. Although the established social relationships in the study 
area were beneficial for the quality of the data and the entire data collection process, my 
previous role and strong involvement in the CBM-lite pilot also involved a number of 
disadvantages, which are discussed in 4.10. 
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A typical day to the field started with an early weak-up call and ride on the back of a motorbike 
to the village consuming a travel time between 30 to 60 minutes. Usually, I visited one or two 
villages per day, depending on the weather, the condition of the dirt roads and satisfaction with 
the data collected. In TWT villages, I was accompanied with a TWT staff member. In the cross-
sectional research design, I moved to the field with the senior Community Development Officer 
(CDO) of TWT who had worked for the organisation since 2008. During this study, I stayed in 
Masindi town which was near the main office of TWT and therefore the departure location to 
the villages. The in-depth interviews in the cross-sectional research design were conducted over 
two separate field trips: June-July 2014 and October-November 2014.  
For the follow-up of the pilot villages, I stayed in Kiryandongo district, either in Kigumba or 
in Bweyale town near the TWT field office and the pilot villages (refer to Figure 3.5). The four 
pilot villages had been assigned to three CDOs of TWT who regularly visited the pilot villages 
and who accompanied me to ‘their’ pilot community. After I left TWT in January 2014, I visited 
the pilot villages over four different research periods: June-July 2014; October-November 
2014; March-April 2015 and; October-November 2015 (refer to Table 4.1).  
The government water sources were studied with the Masindi District Engineer who was keen 
to assist me in the research due to our previous working relationship. With the Masindi District 
Engineer, I visited 7 government constructed water sources in 4 villages (as noted in Section 
4.5) over a period of two days in June 2014. At all the water sources, the District Engineer had 
mobilised the WUCs. To these water sources, I travelled on the district motorbike and covered 
the fuel expenses.  
During data collection in the villages, TWT staff and the Masindi District Engineer  translated 
community meetings, interviews and focus group discussions. People in Masindi and 
Kiryandongo districts speak a multitude of local languages, such as Runyoro, Rutoro, Rukiga, 
Alur and Rugungu or Kiswahili. Refer to context Chapter 3.6 for a detailed background about 
the case study area. The translators mastered the local languages and were well-versed in 
translating the answers of the respondents back to English. The disadvantages of relying on 
translators are discussed in Section 4.10.  
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4.7  The Research Methods 
 
This research employed a mixed method approach to triangulate research results and strengthen 
the validity of the findings (Denzin, 1978; Silverman, 2001; 2005). The study involved a range 
of qualitative research methods: interviews, focus group discussions and participant 
observations that were supplemented with surveys and the review of documents and records.  
This section provides an overall summary of the methods used.  I refer the reader to Appendix 
4.1 for a detailed overview of the methods used (including the sample size, purpose and 
rationale) per research design. 
 
 
4.7.1 Semi-Structured Interviews: Micro-Level 
 
The semi-structured interviews with community members have been an important method for 
gaining a deep understanding about the influence of people’s geographical and sociocultural 
context on water management processes (Bryman, 2001; Patton, 1990; Robson, 2002; 
Silverman, 2001; 2005). In these interviews I reflected on people’s personal and family 
backgrounds and their perceptions on community relations, structures and processes. I asked 
people about their usage of water, participation in water related matters, how the water source 
was managed, maintained and repaired in the past and today, challenges and suggestions for 
improvement.  
In total, I conducted 66 in-depth interviews with community members: 30 interviews about 
CBM and 36 interviews about the CBM-lite model. The people I interviewed in the villages 
were not younger than 16 years old and of the 66 interviewees, 18 (27% of the interviewees) 
were female. Because women are usually in charge for the collection of water in the household 
I was conscious to interview them. The difficulties to sufficiently include women in the study 
are discussed in Section 4.10.  
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4.7.2 Semi-Structured Interviews with Key Informants: Meso- and 
Macro-level 
 
Overall, I conducted 38 semi-structured interviews involving TWT staff (12), local (10) and 
national (1) government officials , NGO representatives (4), the Manager of the Savings and 
Credit Cooperative (SACCO) in Kigumba (2) and a representative of an insurance company 
(LEADS) with a branch in Masindi (1). These semi-structured interviews were helpful in 
gaining insights in people’s understanding about the challenges of rural water supply and 
allowed me to compare the research findings in the villages with the interviewees personal and 
professional experiences.  
In addition to these interviews, I conducted 8 semi-structured interviews with actors engaged 
in developing or piloting alternative rural water management models. These interviews were 
part of a mapping exercise with PRACTICA Foundation (a Dutch organisation) where multiple 
organisations were interviewed, of which I approached eight:  
1) Sector lead for the WASH sector at SNV (Kampala) 
2) Programme Officer WASH Inter Aide (Sierra Leone)  
3) Water and Sanitation Consultant at Bushproof (Madagascar) 
4) PhD candidate University of Oxford (engaged in the smart handpump project of the 
University of Oxford) 
5) Programme Manager at Water for People (Kampala) 
6) National Learning Facilitator for IRC (Kampala) 
7) WASH regional coordinator GOAL (Uganda) 
8) WASH advisor International Lifeline Fund (Uganda) 
Although I do not explicitly refer to these interviews in the text, they have been insightful in 
gaining a deeper understanding about the debates on community management and innovation 
in the rural water sector. The interviews have been an inspiration for writing Chapter 6 that 
explores the depth of rural water management innovations in the sector and compares the CBM-
lite innovation with two other handpump management innovations.  
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4.7.3 Focus Group Discussions 
 
Another important data collection method were Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) or group 
interviews (Bryman, 2001; Patton, 1990; Robson, 2002; Silverman, 2001; 2005). Altogether, I 
conducted twelve FGDs with in total 72 community members of which 15 were female and 57 
were male. Seven FGDs were conducted in the cross-sectional research design: six with WUC 
members and one with female community users. Five FGDs were conducted with community 
members and Water Operators in the CBM-lite case study villages.  
 
 
4.7.4 Participant Observations  
 
The ethnographic method of participant observation was applied at micro- and meso-level.  In 
the villages, participant observations were used to develop a familiarity with people’s social 
environments (Kawulich, 2005). This included observing people’s daily activities, engaging in 
informal conversations and attending community meetings. Furthermore, a meeting with 
Masindi district and a gathering with national and international NGOs in Kampala have been 
an important source of data, as indicated in Appendix 4.1.  
 
 
4.7.5 Surveys 
 
This thesis includes four distinct surveys. The surveys concerned the water sources constructed 
by TWT and were undertaken by TWT staff under my supervision. Appendix 4.1 provides a 
detailed description of the different surveys. Refer to Appendix 4.2 for the two surveys 
undertaken in the cross-sectional research design (the Water User Committee survey and the 
Water User Survey) and Appendix 4.3 for the two surveys in the action research (the 
Willingness to Pay Survey and the Willingness to Participate Survey).   
 
 
4.7.6 Documents and Records 
 
A review of written records was an important source of evidence to verify anecdotal information 
(Bryman, 2001; Patton, 1990; Robson, 2002; Silverman, 2001; 2005). Where possible, I tried 
to supplement the anecdotal accounts of the WUCs and Water Operators by examining the 
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accounting and receipt books in the villages. In the pilot villages, I was able to review the 
administration books of the Water Operator and the accounts of the Savings and Credit 
Cooperative (SACCO) where the Water Operators stored the funds for the O&M of the water 
sources.   
 
 
4.7.7 Dissemination of the Study Findings 
 
To compare my research findings with the experiences of research participants and rural water 
practitioners, I presented my findings at three occasions in March 2015 (during my third 
research trip as a PhD candidate). This involved a presentation to the staff of TWT in Masindi 
and a workshop at two learning forums in Lira (northern Uganda) and Kampala, hosted by the 
Dutch development organisation SNV that invited local and (inter) national NGOs and 
government officials. The meetings were organised as a result of the repeated interactions and 
interviews with one of the key research informants employed at SNV. Next to verification and 
further discussions, these meetings generated new and unique data at a meta-level since 
participants expressed their views and provided feedback about the research findings. Although 
respondent validation is perceived as crucial element for testing the validity of the research, I 
agree with Fielding and Fielding (1986, p.43) that respondent validation exercises, as those 
described above, do not fully meet validation purposes but “… should be treated as yet another 
source of data and insight”. 
 
 
4.8 The Research Ethics 
 
Ethics – ‘the study of morality’ – is at the heart of any research project that concerns primary 
research. The Greek term ‘ethos’ refers to principles of proper behaviour and is therefore at a 
more abstract level than ‘morality’ which judges behaviour as either right or wrong (Iphofen, 
2009). The ethics principles of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) represent 
good conduct in social science research. These principles were given due consideration in my 
ethical review by the ethics commission of the University of Portsmouth. View Appendix 4.4 
for the favourable opinion of the research plans. For the purpose of the methodology in this 
thesis, I turn to Bryman (2001) who emphasises four ethical principles when conducting 
research in the context of a developing country. Refer to Table 4.5 for an overview.   
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Table 4.5 
Ethical Considerations (Source: Bryman, 2001). 
Ethical Considerations 
1. Harm to research participants 
2. Gaining informed consent of participants 
3. Invasion of privacy 
4. Deception 
 
 
1. Harm to Participants 
 
This research has protected the identity of the participants to avoid any harm with the 
publication of the research results (Bryman, 2001; Mason, 1996). As such, I refers to peoples’ 
position and official role, not names and only with their full consent. During the research 
process, care was given to avoid inflaming sensitive situations and souring community relations 
as payment, and in particular collections and storage of funds, were sensitive topics. Therefore, 
I paid careful attention to changing the course of the conversation when it turned to pointing 
fingers at ‘the guilty’ of, for example, those households not contributing. Yet, despite the 
endeavour to avoid conflicts as a result of the research, I could not always prevent tensions 
because payment, inherent to CBM, simply constituted a key undermining factor for 
community harmony (as this thesis will fully demonstrate) and in some instances community 
members brought in prior events and old sores into the discussion. Lastly, as Uganda is a 
patriarchal society, I was careful when trying to include women in the study. Next to asking 
women’s consent for participating in the study, I aimed to establish non-threatening interview 
conditions by asking how and where they preferred the conversation to take place.  
 
  
2. Informed Consent  
 
Language was a key barrier in this study and enclosed an ethical concern with gaining informed 
consent. The use of translators were therefore key to ensure participants were fully aware what 
they were signing up for. Prior to every interview I explained the reason of the interview, the 
type of questions I would ask, the possibility to opt out and the expected duration (Bryman, 
2001). Because none of the respondents in this study were given any monetary compensation 
for their participation, I emphasised non-cooperation would be without any consequences. In 
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one to one interviews with community members, I asked people’s consent to record the 
interview. With key informants ensuring informed consent was less challenging: the interviews 
were conducted in English without the use of translators and most of the informants had been 
exposed to research before.  
 
 
3. Invasion of privacy 
 
The privacy of respondents must be protected (Bryman, 2001; Robson, 2002). I safeguarded 
people were happy with recording and I respected the reluctance of households to discuss 
sensitive issues (Bryman, 2001; Robson, 2002). Further, I was aware that people are often busy. 
In some instances, I helped the respondents with household chores such as stringing beans while 
talking.  
 
 
4. Deception 
 
A real threat in this study was ambiguity about my role. Many research participants knew me 
due to my role with the NGO The Water Trust (TWT). As a result, I was aware that research 
participants could bear the hope that I could arrange the construction of a new water facility or 
the repair costs of a village handpump. Because I was mostly escorted by TWT staff, I was even 
more conscious to explicitly explain my positionality as a researcher. The disadvantages of the 
accompaniment of TWT during data collection are described in Section 4.10.  In many ways I 
rubbed against the status of an insider given my previous role in Uganda, which facilitated the 
research and access to the study area. However, I was always mindful to realise the potential 
impact of my presence on participants. After all, I remained a cultural outsider; a European  
fair-skinned female. In some instances, this position did raise the expectation that I could 
intervene and solve the community’s financial deficiencies and in other occasions my position 
did provide me with more ‘open-doors’ and information than presumably my male counterparts. 
Hence, my positionality as a researcher needed constant re-emphasis.
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4.9 The Analysis of the Research Findings 
 
This study involves a comprehensive and  holistic dataset. The qualitative content analysis 
included texts derived from the interviews and observations that were carefully noted and 
extended after each field day or interview (Bauer, 2000; Boeije, 2005; DeCuir-Gunby et al., 
2010; Kohlbacher, 2008; Silverman; 2001; 2005; Wester and Peters, 2004). The semi-
structured interviews with village members were recorded and later transcribed. During the 
entire research process, I kept a journal to record problems and ideas that arose during the 
fieldwork and a book to note interpretations and analyses (Spradley, 1979). The raw data of the 
surveys was entered into the statistical software ‘SPSS’ for statistical analysis. Yet, due to the 
relatively small surveys sizes and to avoid specious statistics, the data has been used as a way 
to tabulate research findings (Silverman, 2001; 2005).  
A core element of this study has been its iterative research cycle that allowed repeated inductive 
examination of the data and a rigorous revisiting of the theory (Burnard et al., 2008). Two sets 
of data-driven coding were developed to compare the data; open and axial coding (Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). Open coding included the noting of ideas, concepts and themes in the transcripts. 
Hereafter, in the axial coding stage, topics were compared and contrasted between the 
respondents, villages and sub-groups (community – local government and NGOs). In this stage, 
I established linkages and their frequency by using labels and assigning each topic with a colour 
(Burnard et al., 2008; Kohlbacher, 2006). Due to the iterative research process and the re-
reading of transcripts, coding followed a circular process through which the themes were 
redefined with the generation of more data and insights in the literature (DeCuir-Gunby et al., 
2010).  
An important component for the analysis of the data has been the process of writing academic 
papers with my PhD supervisor Dr. Julia Brown. On the basis of draft manuscripts we arranged 
writing and brainstorm sessions to discuss the data and enrich the analysis in relation to the 
literature. These sessions took place in January 2015 for our first paper in Geoforum on the 
outcomes of the CBM model and in June 2015 for our second paper in the Geographical Journal 
on actors’ risk perceptions, currently under revision, and third paper on the outcomes of the 
CBM-lite innovation. 
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4.10 Sources of Error and Bias 
 
Qualitative research is subject to problems related to generalisability, subjectivity and 
transparency. Sources of error and bias affect the quality of the research (Patton, 1990; Bryman, 
2001). Masindi and Kiryandongo districts were not randomly selected, but were selected due 
to my familiarity and history with the region. The lack of random selection may give rise to 
suspicion about the generalisability of the research findings (Silverman, 2005). Gobo (2004 p. 
435) highlights, however, two kinds of generalisations: “a generalisation about a specific group 
or population (which aims at estimating the distribution in a population) and a generalisation 
about the nature of a process.” This thesis attempts to understand people’s relations and 
processes and aims therefore to generalise about structural aspects and patterns. This aim is 
clarified by Mason (1996 in Gobo 2004 p.452 ) who writes: “you may have sampled people but 
what you really want to compare are their experiences.” Although I recognise that a small study 
sample, often intrinsic to qualitative research, may thwart the prospect of making 
generalisations about structural social practices over a wider population, this study combines 
scale and depth. ‘Scale’ was targeted through a mixed method approach which enabled a 
comparison of  rural water management outcomes across multiple villages.  ‘Depth’, on the 
other hand, was achieved by thorough study of respondents and villages by means of interviews 
and observations over prolonged periods of time.  
Due to my working history in the study area and the relationship with the NGO The Water Trust 
(TWT), the research was prone to the problem of reactivity and researcher bias. The fact that I 
fulfilled a key role in the development process of the CBM-lite model, may have created a so 
called “halo effect” whereby research participants may want to perform better (Patton, 1990 
p.473). To prevent this distorted reality in the analysis on the CBM-lite pilot villages, I 
conducted long-term and repeated observations to permit the research participants to get 
familiar with the new situation and to return to usual habitual patterns.  
The threat of researcher bias or “the tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions” 
(Flyvjberg 2001, p. 81) may come in when the observer is intimately involved with the subject 
studied (Mc Taggert, 1994; Francis, 1991; Kock et al., 1997). When the observer is “over-
involved” (Etherington, 2004 p. 166), the risk of “subjective and arbitrary judgement” 
(Flyvjberg, 2001 p.81) may arise. Indeed, my involvement in the development of the CBM-lite 
model caused me to be keen to see the pilot to succeed. Due to these personal sentiments with 
the evolvement of the pilot project, I was sensitive to reflect about my position and recognised 
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that the interpretations of the respondents were filtered through my own perceptions, prejudices 
and worldview. It required a reflexive attitude about my role (Bergold and Thomas, 2012 p.52), 
and as Flyjvberg (2001 p. 81) notes, it “sensitised” me even more to collect and analyse the data 
in a rigorous and transparent manner.  
The fact that most of my interviewees are male has been an unintentional gender bias. All of 
the government officials were male and interviewing women in the villages was at times 
challenging. Some of the women claimed they were busy with household tasks and tended to 
be short of answers. The women on the Water User Committees (WUCs), on the other hand, 
were more vocal and most of the in-depth interviews with the female WUC members were very 
insightful and informative. The diffidence of the female community members may have been 
influenced by the use of male translators; a factor that may have been less intimidating to female 
WUC members who were generally more educated with larger social networks outside the 
village.   
The use of translators can be another source of bias. I asked TWT staff and the Masindi District 
engineer to translate during fieldwork in the villages as most of the community members were 
not well-conversant in English. I recognise that there are issues with using translators in general 
and with using translators representing an NGO or the local government in specific. First, I 
could not be sure that informed consent, despite my instructions, was rightly conveyed and, 
second, that responses were accurately rephrased. Third, research participants may have been 
less straightforward and may have geared their answers to what they thought was socially and 
politically desirable. To avoid such distortions, I triangulated different research methods as 
described in Section 4.7 and aimed for heterogeneity in the selection of respondents by 
approaching people with different livelihood strategies, roles in the community, gender and age 
categories.  
An important area of bias concerns myself as researcher and background as practitioner. Just 
as I made concerted effort to collect and analyse the data in an objective and neutral manner, I 
agree with Hammersley (1990; 1992) that reality is perceived through particular lenses, and not 
only by the subjects studied but also by the researcher itself. Hence, whereas a research account 
can represent reality it does not reproduce it, and while there is confidence about the validity of 
the research it does not imply certainty of its truth (Hammersley, 1992, 50-51). To ensure a 
transparent presentation of the research findings, I decided to separate descriptive empirical 
accounts with my interpretations in the discussions and the final concluding Chapter 9. 
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My academic education, as an anthropologist and human geographer, in combination with my 
practitioner background influenced the way how I approached the evaluation of the CBM and 
CBM-lite model. Due to my anthropological training, I was inspired to deeply understand social 
practices and to extricate social patterns. Other than the transcripts of development handbooks 
that tend to emphasise the processes of delivering social services in rural communities, my 
practical experience made me to prioritise actual outcomes over processes (see also Brown, 
2008; 2014). Because the thesis approaches the problem of handpump breakdown by evaluating 
the CBM model, the study investigates its key pillars – user payment and community control – 
as described in detail in the following section. 
 
 
4.11 Evaluating Sustainable Rural Water Management 
 
This thesis refers to the term ‘evaluation’ in the broad sense of the term.  In the words of Patton 
(1990 p. 11): “[w]hen one examines and judges accomplishments and effectiveness, one is 
engaged in evaluation”. As literature Chapter 2.6 highlighted, there are numerous frameworks 
that evaluate the sustainability of rural water sources on the basis of assumed financial, 
managerial, institutional and technical preconditions or wider issues involving levels of 
capacity, external support and an enabling environment. Brown (2014) discusses the inherent 
normative aspect of all evaluations –what is key is to be honest about the desired goals and ones 
background.  
This study, evaluates sustainable rural water management on the basis of the two key principles 
of the Community Based Management (CBM) policy: user payment and community control 
over the management of the rural water infrastructure. Refer to literature Chapter 2.4 and 2.5 
about these individual branches of the CBM model; referred to as the neo-liberal and grassroots 
arms. View Figure 4.3 for a graphical presentation of the evaluation framework of 
‘sustainability’ in the thesis. For the operationalisation of user payment, I used the WASH cost 
benchmarks (Burr and Fonseca, 2013) to calculate whether user payments and stored funds 
were sufficient to cover the maintenance and repair costs of the water source. Refer to Table 
4.6 for the estimated annual costs of minor and major repairs per technology. Because this study 
took place in Uganda, I operationalised the term ‘community control’ on the basis of the 
community management activities set out in the Ugandan rural water policy; view Table 4.7 for 
an overview (GoU, 2013).   
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Figure 4.3 
Evaluating Sustainable Rural Water Management (Author’s construct) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 
User Payment: Breakdown of Maintenance Expenditures (Adapted from Burr and Fonseca (2013, p. 
63)) 
Cost components of maintenance Estimated costs per 
SHDW per annum 
Estimated costs per deep 
BH per annum 
 Minor maintenance and repairs 
Expenditure on labour and materials needed for 
routine maintenance  
85,500 UGX (USD 30) 171,000 UGX (USD 60) 
 Major maintenance 
Renewal, replacement and rehabilitation costs  
256,500 UGX (USD 90) 342,000 UGX (USD 120) 
 Total estimated costs per annum 342,000 (USD 120) 513,000 UGX (USD 180) 
*USD 1 = 2850 UGX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community 
Based 
Management 
Model 
Community 
Control  
(Grass-roots 
Arm) 
User 
Payment 
(Neo-liberal 
arm) 
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Table 4.7 
Community Control: Breakdown of Community Management Tasks (Government of Uganda (2013 p. 
16)) 
 Appoint water source caretakers (WSCs) to manage the day today O&M of water facilities; including 
cleaning the surroundings, carrying out preventive maintenance and minor repairs of the water facilities. 
 
 Ensure proper use and maintenance of their water facilities. 
 
 Collect cash or contributions in-kind from water users for the purpose of maintaining the water facilities. 
 
 Open a bank account and ensure safe custody of money collected. 
 
 Pay for the services of the technicians. 
 
 Report repair requirements beyond the financial capacity of the water user communities and technical 
capacity of the technicians (e.g. replacing pipes and de- silting) to the Sub-County. 
 
 Pay for the cost of the spare-parts for repairing their water facilities. 
 
 
4.12 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter described how the research was undertaken and what philosophical perspectives 
and personal experiences and perceptions laid the basis for this present research. Departing 
from the evaluation framework presented in the last section (4.11), the next empirical Chapter 
addresses the second research objective which aims to evaluate the outcomes of the CBM 
model across 100 water sources in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts in mid-west 
Uganda.  To understand the outcomes of the CBM model, Chapter 5 provides an in-depth 
analysis on programmatic,  participatory, and community processes
Chapter 5   Blueprint for Breakdown?  
101 
 
Chapter 5:  
Blueprint for Breakdown? Community 
Based Management of Rural 
Groundwater in Mid-West Uganda. 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter19 describes the implementation and post-construction stages of the constructed 
water sources by the Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) ‘The Water Trust’ (TWT) and 
the Masindi and Kiryandongo local government. The chapter is structured into three main 
sections: the process of accessing clean water (5.2), the construction (5.3) and post-construction 
phase (5.4). The chapter focusses in particular on the post-construction phase and deconstructs 
the outcomes of 100 community managed water sources under the Community Based 
Management (CBM) model. Section 5.5 discusses the outcomes of the cross-sectional study in 
relation to the literature presented in Chapter 2. I refer the reader to the methodology Chapter 
4 for a detailed overview of the cross-sectional study design (4.4), data collection methods 
(Appendix 4.1 and Section 4.7) and analysis (Section 4.9) and the background of the case study 
NGO TWT (Section 4.3).  
 
 
5.1  Accessing Clean water 
 
In line with the Demand Responsive Approach (DRA) and Uganda’s rural water policy, each 
village is required to demand a water source by writing an application letter, either to the local 
government authorities or to TWT. This letter is signed by the Local Councillor (LC) I20 of the 
village and delivered at TWT, sub-county or district office. 
                                                          
19 This chapter is an elaborated account of the case study presented in the paper ‘Blueprint for breakdown? 
Community Based Management of rural groundwater in Uganda’ by van den Broek and Brown (2015). 
 
20 The lowest of the five levels of elected government officials in the district. 
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 NGO staff members regularly visit the local offices to update local government officials about 
the construction progress in the villages and to pick the community letters. 
Most villages in the operation area of TWT already have a protected water source. Each village 
can receive multiple protected water sources by TWT or the government dependent on the 
number of households. The minimum number of households eligible for a Shallow Hand Dug 
Well (SHDW) from TWT is 30 households. As such, large villages can receive multiple water 
sources.  
Twice a month TWT runs a radio show to inform the public about hygiene, health and the 
application process for a SHDW. Despite the repeated efforts to inform the public about the 
possibility to receive a communal SHDW, some areas only produce few application letters. 
However, field staff are under pressure to reach annual construction targets that are determined 
by TWT (in dialogue with the Programme Manager, Chief Executive Officer and the Board). 
Every year the Board (as at the time of this study) expects the NGO to construct more sources.   
Most funding is derived from affluent individuals and families (often acquainted to members 
of the board) that pay for the construction of a water source (USD 7,500 per source) with the 
promise of ‘flowing water’ within a year.  Each water source is assigned to a particular donor 
and through the website of TWT, donors can follow the construction of ‘their’ water source. 
Once construction is finished, they are immortalised through a plaque stating their names and 
sometimes a personal message (often used to remember a deceased relative or friend).  
Under pressure to meet the annual targets, TWT staff approach villages that appear to lack clean 
water. During these visits, staff ask the village leadership whether the village needs clean water 
and if so, if they want to apply for a SHDW. After receipt of an application letter, the NGO 
conducts a needs assessment and a baseline survey amongst all households in the area and 
arranges a general village meeting. 
Through the village leadership, households are mobilised to attend to the first village meeting. 
According to TWT staff, the attendance at the meeting is dependent on the need of water in the 
projected catchment area. As a result, the turn up varies from village to village.  A staff member 
said: “[s]ometimes you are forced to do spot mobilisation, otherwise there will not be enough 
people.” (30 October 2014) 
During the first village meeting, a TWT staff member explains the requirements of the project. 
The NGO aims to ‘create a sense of ownership’ through requiring contributions of local 
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materials (sand, bricks, and stones) for the construction of the SHDW (all together around USD 
100), community participation in the construction of the well and, community hospitality by 
accommodating and feeding the technician for approximately a one month period. In addition, 
TWT requires all the households in the catchment area (approximately the households within a 
1,5 km radius from the water source) to have a pit latrine before it installs the handpump. 
The local government requires community members to pay 100,000 UGX (USD 35) for a 
shallow well and 200.000 UGX (USD 75) for a deep borehole. According to the government, 
payment is sufficient to show the community’s willingness to maintain the handpump.  
During the first village meeting, TWT staff facilitate the election of a Water User Committee 
(WUC). Each water source is required to have six members of which at least one member is 
stipulated to be a woman for ‘gender equality’. If possible, TWT encourages a woman to take 
the role of the treasurer, as women are perceived to be better financial managers than men. 
WUC members are selected through the raise of hands. Usually the staff members explain the 
WUC roles and asks the community members who best fits what role. As a result, people 
propose numerous names and the person with the most number of votes is offered a position. 
Occasionally, selected community members refuse to be part of the WUC. A TWT staff 
member explains that: “[s]ometimes people argue they are too busy” (10 November 2014). 
However, during a focus group discussion in Kihonda village, community members disclose 
that: “[p]eople fear to be elected for the Water User Committee. Being on the Water User 
Committee creates hatred. For example, if you confiscate a jerry can” (23 October 2015).  
After the first village meeting, the NGO keeps in touch with a representative of the village. The 
selected WUC, village leader or focal person in the village, mobilises the materials for the 
construction of the SHDW. The follow-up of the materials by TWT is important as otherwise 
“[p]eople forget about the application” (TWT staff member, 12 November 2014). Moreover, as 
another TWT staff member said: “[m]aybe one out of the 20 villages would call you back and 
tell you that they are ready” (5 November 2014).  
The process of material collection for the construction of the SHDW varies from village to 
village. In most villages, the households that will benefit from the water source contribute a 
portion of the required materials, either in kind or monetary. Occasionally, an affluent person 
in the village donates the materials.  
Once the materials are collected, the technical personnel of TWT site the location of the SHDW 
through identifying the presence of water by observing features as valleys, trees, anthills and 
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dry rivers. In most cases, this method is successful. However, occasionally TWT has to re-site 
the well due to hard strata or shallow water exposing the well to contamination.  
Before construction can take place, the landowner of the proposed site needs to donate the land 
to the community and ratifies the construction of the SHDW by signing an agreement. In some 
instances, the owner is not willing to give the land away and another site needs to be selected.  
 
 
5.2  Construction phase 
 
TWT expects the households in the catchment area to participate in the construction of the well 
(a minimum of 5 people each day). Predominantly the men help the NGO technician with 
digging, brick lining, finishing the apron slab, drainage channel and fencing. Women usually 
prepare the lunch for the workers. Without the participation of the community members, the 
construction is on a stand still. Often the participation of community members does not happen 
automatically. A technician said:“[y]ou have to speak soft words to community members. You 
will have to become one of them or otherwise people will not show up and help you” (8 October 
2013). 
Twice a week, technical TWT staff members monitor the work of the technician to ensure best 
SHDW construction practices. The social staff members of TWT, also referred to as the 
‘Community Development Officers’ (CDOs) monitor the construction of the household pit 
latrines and the participation of the community members in the construction. 
In the period between January and October 2014, nine of the twenty-two sites needed re-
mobilisation, which often implied individual household visits by the CDOs and the convening 
of a community meeting through the LC I. A staff member said: “In most villages we need to 
push the community members to participate” (10 November 2014). 
However, even at sites with no delays in construction, problems of collective action may have 
occurred. During a visit to a site under construction, a WUC member revealed that only half of 
the household representatives in the catchment area participated in the construction. Twenty-
two of the forty households were not willing to help in the construction. He said: “[i]f they want 
to work they come. If they don’t, there is nothing I can do” (Kinyara I Kamugiri, 29 October 
2014). In this village, a few members of the WUC were not engaged in the SHDW project and 
as a result a TWT staff member scheduled a re-election for the WUC.  
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Condoned by TWT (2013/2014) community members in two villages decided not to contribute 
their labour but hired local labourers at a cost of approximately USD 215. Yet, to instil the 
image of local participation, a TWT staff member said this fact should be concealed from the 
donors and therefore not communicated on the online reports (29 October 2014). 
Nevertheless, the varying levels of collective action during construction were not predictive of 
the level of participation in other activities as attendance at meetings and construction of pit 
latrines. For example, in two villages in the period between January-October 2014, community 
members were actively engaged in the construction but their turnout in meetings was low and 
pace of latrine construction slow.  
After construction, TWT trains each WUC for half a day in their roles, bookkeeping, finance 
and key services they need to provide. Each WUC receives the phone number of the Hand Pump 
Mechanic (HPM) and a price list of the spare parts. Similarly, the local government is expected 
to train WUCs upon completion of construction. However, not every water source fitted with a 
handpump constructed by the local government has a trained WUC due to financial constraints.  
A local government official in the district water office of Masindi explains:  
“Officially, the training for the water point needs to be two days. However, 
facilitation is expensive. We only have a budget of 24,000 UGX per training. 
This includes fuel but the trainers will also need food. Although three people 
preferably conduct such a training, only one or two people can do this for 24,000 
UGX. Furthermore, the trainers will not stay long because the community 
members will ask for food. If you are there from 10 am in the morning until 4 
pm in the afternoon people will ask for food and maybe even for facilitation21. 
People will not understand the concept” (15 June, 2014). 
The local government official reached out to the Technical Support Unit (TSU) to increase the 
budget and cover a two day training and meals for the participants per constructed government 
source. So far, the budget only includes the fuel to reach the village (23 October 2015).  
TWT installs the handpump after construction but unlike the local government, postposes the 
assembly of the handle until all households in the catchment area have constructed a latrine. 
Although this method uses peer pressure to improve sanitation and hygiene, the rate of latrine 
                                                          
21 The term ‘facilitation’ is used to refer to a per diem that covers travel and subsistence that is paid to government 
officials from government budget to carry out field visits. This payment has encouraged community members to 
similarly request for money while attending meetings to compensate their time (Jangeyanga, 2013; GoU, 2010).  
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construction varies from 2 to 12+ months after construction is finished. When all households 
have access to a latrine, the local government officially commissions the NGO installed 
handpump.  
After a warranty period of six months, TWT expects the water users to cover the Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) costs by themselves. At this stage, the NGO expects the WUC to convene 
a community meeting with the LCI to agree on the payment schedule of the water user fees, 
rules of resource use and sanctions. Although TWT advises communities to pay a water user 
fee of 1,000 UGX per month, the water user fee is not standardised by the government. The 
District Water Officer (DWO) of Kiryandongo explained: “[i]t is upon the community to decide 
how much they can afford to pay” (20 August 2013). As a result, amounts and timing of 
payment varied considerable across the studied water sources, as shown in Table 5.3 below. At 
the majority of the studied water sources, community members agreed to pay to the caretakers, 
in others to the chairman or treasurer.  
 
 
5.3  Post-construction 
 
Data from the WUC survey and in-depth studied villages with in total 10022 studied WUCs, 
revealed that only 3 water points had sufficient fees to pay for major repairs and only 20 had 
sufficient funds to pay for minor repairs. Of the remaining 77 WUCs, 24 had insufficient funds 
for even minor repairs and 53 did not had any funds. View Table 5.1. 
 
 
Table 5.1 
Available Funds for O&M at 100 Water Points   
 
                                                          
22 Two water sources featured in both the WUC survey (N=84) and the 15 studied villages that covered 18 water 
sources. 
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The collection of the water user fees was seen as a crucial condition for the long-term 
sustainability of the handpump by the interviewed local government officials from both Masindi 
and Kiryandongo district. In their experience, the lack of sufficient upfront water user fee 
payments could put water users at risk if they were not able to quickly cover the costs of repair 
after handpump breakdown. In such cases people could be forced to either travel longer 
distances to fetch water, or would opt for the abundant nearer but open and contaminated water 
sources. For numerous water sources, the inability of the community to cover the repair costs 
have resulted in long down-time periods.  
 
Below I will explore the reasons behind the lack of funding for O&M. These are grouped into 
collective action (5.4.1) and enforcement of graduated sanctions (5.4.2).  
 
 
5.3.1 Collective Action 
 
In the CBM model, collective action ought to take place in three distinctive activities: (1) 
payment of water user fees, (2) participation in public meetings about the water source, and (3) 
voluntary participation of the WUC members. Below I will explore the challenges community 
members face in meeting these expectations of collective action.  
 
 
5.3.1.1 Payment of Water User Fees 
 
The water user survey provides an insight into the water user payments in a sub-set of the 
studied villages. The water user survey includes a sample of 13 water sources and 195 
respondents and was conducted by staff of TWT under my guidance in October 2013, refer to 
the methodology Chapter 4 and Appendix 4.2a for detailed information about the water user 
survey.  
From this survey, depicted in Table 5.2, water users argued to pay regular water fees at only 
one water source and indicated non-payment at two water sources. At four water sources 
respondents argued they contributed water user fees in an irregular fashion, which meant that 
both the water users and the WUCs did not strictly and continuously adhere to agreed payment 
schedules. At the remaining six water sources a mixed picture emerged as respondents claimed 
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different user payment habits (from regular, irregular to non-payment) while using the same 
water source. The interview data, however, deviated from the results of the water user survey. 
For example, in the survey, water users appear to pay in Kyakamese village. Yet, from the 
interviews with the WUC members and after seeing the WUC administration books that showed 
the household contributions, only 26 of the 56 households paid the agreed water user fees, 
whereas the majority of the households were not paying or paid irregularly.  
 
 
Table 5.2 
Water User Fee Payments per Village (Water User Survey, N=195) 
Village Regular Irregular Non-payment Total 
Pucheng 0 1 14 15 
Nykabale Ansonzi 9 3 4 16 
Iranda-Wateso 3 9 3 15 
Kyamugenyi 0 14 1 15 
Kyaganywa-Masaba 0 0 15 15 
Kigengere 0 0 15 15 
Kijogoro 14 1 0 15 
Kiruli-Nyandima 0 15 0 15 
Kyakamese 15 0 0 15 
Kitengule 3 12 0 15 
Kyababyara 0 14 0 14 
Katikara A 0 15 0 15 
Kapila 0 15 0 15 
Total 44 99 52 195 
 
 
From the 18 in-depth studied water sources, people paid regular water user fees at five water 
sources, did not contribute water user fees at eight water sources, and paid irregular at five water 
sources. View Table 5.3 for an overview of the payments and the collection approaches at each 
of the in-depth studied water source locations. 
The majority of the interviewed community members argued that affordability of water user 
fees was not a problem nor a reason for free-riding. Even community members that admitted 
they were not paying argued that: “[o]ne cannot fail to pay 1,000 shillings” (community 
member Kyakamese, 13 June, 2014). Some community members did reason that payment 
before the harvest could be a problem as most small scale farmers run out of cash in that period. 
A former WUC member said: “[w]hen the season comes people are looking for money.” 
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(Nyakasakazi, 12 June, 2014). Vulnerable groups, such as widows, female-headed households, 
people with a disability and elderly people were in the studied water points exempted from 
payments. For example, the list of households that defaulted on payments in Kyakamese village 
did not include vulnerable households. So these ‘defaulters’ were perceived as being capable to 
pay the agreed water user fee. So, why do some people decide not to contribute and to 
collaborate? 
The study identifies six reasons from 18 in-depth studied water sources across 15 villages in 
Masindi and Kiryandongo districts why people were not willing to pay upfront water user fees. 
Refer to Chapter 4 and Appendix 4.1 for a detailed overview on the methodology.  A first reason 
for non-payment was that community members felt they already contributed at the construction 
stage. The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) officer of TWT explained: 
“When I ask community members about their water user fee contribution they often tell 
me they already paid. However, when you ask further they mean they have paid for the 
materials to construct the water source” (16 June 2014).  
Second, (potential) misuse of funds was a frequently cited reason for community members to 
avoid payments, as they feared the misappropriation of funds by the WUC members. A 
community member explained: 
“It is not all about education and other issues but sometimes people feel that if they are 
going to give that money, the committee will misuse the money. They feel that they are 
cheated especially if the water source takes long to break down. People ask themselves: 
‘where does this money we collect go?’ If money is not spent they feel that money is 
used by the water user committee members. That is what most of the people think” 
(Kihaguzi 25 June 2014).  
Chapter 5   Blueprint for Breakdown?  
110 
 
Table 5.3 
Water User Fee Payments and Collection Approach at 18 Water Sources (source: semi-structured interviews and review of WUC documents by the author). 
No Water point Collection approach Payments 
Water points with sufficient funds for major repairs 
1 Kihonda-Nykachaki – TWT 
SHDW 
WUC moves to households. Regular: 1,000 UGX per month. 37 households use the water source.  
WUC funds: 370,000 UGX (November 2014). 
 
2 Abira – TWT SHDW Households bring the money to the WUC 
chairperson.  
Regular: 1,000 UGX per month. 56 households use the water source. 
WUC funds: 470,000 UGX (August 2013) 
3 Kidwera I – TWT SHDW WUC introduced alternative scheme to pay 
for O&M of the water source. 
 
No collection: 
WUC funds: 405,000 UGX (November 2014) 
  
Water points with sufficient funds for minor repairs 
 
4 Bisenye I – 
government BH 
Caretakers in Bisenye cluster collection and 
collect annually. 
Regular: 5,000 UGX (regular queue) – 8,000 UGX (fast queue) per year. Caretakers 
received a monthly incentive of 8,000 UGX. An estimated 270 households lived in the 
village. 
WUCs funds: 450,000 UGX per borehole (November 2014).  
5 Bisenye II – government 
BH: needed major repair 
Similar as above Regular: Similar as above 
6 Bisenye III – government 
BH 
Similar as above 
 
Regular: Similar as above 
7 Kyakamese – TWT SHDW Households bring the money to the caretaker  Irregular payment: Households pay 3,000 UGX per quarter. 30 of the 56 households 
contributed in 2014. 
WUC funds: 280,000 UGX (August 2013) 
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8 Nyakasakazi – TWT 
SHDW 
Households bring the money to the caretaker Irregular: 3,000 UGX per semester (USD 1.06). An estimated 26 households used the 
water source.  
WUC funds: 90,000 UGX (June 2014) 
 
9 Nyakabale-Ausonzi – TWT 
SHDW 
Funds collected by caretaker at water point. Irregular: Community agreed on 500 UGX per month. An estimated 60 households 
used the water source. The caretaker received 5,000  UGX per month but varied due to 
irregular payments water user fee.  
WUC funds: 200,000 UGX (August 2013) 
 
10 Kyakayaga II – TWT 
SHDW: need minor repair 
No collection prior July 2014, the water 
source was locked and money collected at 
water point. 
Regular: Every season a household pays 3,300 UGX. The secretary received 300 UGX 
per household in the month of money collection. An estimated 34 households used the 
water. 
WUC funds: 102,000 UGX (November 2014) 
 
Water points with insufficient funds for minor repairs 
11 Kyababyara No collection  
 
12 Kalunja – government BH No collection Irregular: Collected 1,000 UGX per household during a meeting in July 2014.  
WUC funds: 20,000 UGX (November 2014) 
13 Kidwera II – TWT SHDW No collection  
 
14 Kyarutanga I – government 
BH: needs major repair 
No collection  
15 Kyarutanga II –government 
BH: needs major repair 
No collection  
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16 Nyakabette  – TWT SHDW  WUC members collect at random from water 
users 
Irregular: Secretary reported 40,000 UGX (August 2013), Treasurer reported  85,000 
UGX (who kept funds in his house) 
17 Kihonda – TWT SHDW No collection  
18 Mboira I – government BH: 
needs major repair 
No collection  
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Community members frequently raised the lack of ‘accountability’ as a problem and a reason 
for non-payment. A WUC member in Kihonda explains: “People don’t want to pay if there was 
no accountability from last month” (23 October 2015). Suspicion of misuse amongst the water 
users increases when multiple WUC members collect the water user fees. For example in 
Nyakabette village, the LC I collected water user fees as well. He was accused of ‘eating the 
money’ by interviewed community members. The expression of ‘eating the money’ was a 
frequently used idiom in the locality to explain someone had taken the money. This problem 
was frequently raised, also when I was the Programme Manager at TWT. For example, during 
this period there was a case where a treasurer had taken 250,000 UGX to repair his motorbike 
(a ‘boda boda’ used as a motor taxi in Uganda). Although he planned to quickly recover the 
funds through his earnings as a boda boda rider, the handpump broke down soon after he had 
taken the money, meaning that the handpump could not be repaired immediately. Hence, to 
avoid such incidences, most community members would rather pay when the water source is 
broken. 
The third reason was the availability of other water sources nearby; either protected water 
sources or open and contaminated sources. Payment rules differed amongst various water 
points, and therefore people would opt to fetch water at nearby locations where payment was 
not enforced. Nevertheless, the requirement to pay at a protected water source was not always 
the reason why people collected from an open water source. Distance played an important role 
in the decision to collect from an open water source and some community members preferred 
the taste of the swamp water. Often this water was not boiled before consumption.  Despite the 
health warnings of TWT and health workers, community members argued: “[w]e have fetched 
water from these sources for generations and we have never experienced any problems (15 June 
2014).” Frequently, the community members in the studied villages linked sickness to 
witchcraft and mentioned that the costs or collection of firewood was not a reason to neglect 
the boiling of water. During a focus group discussion in Mboira I, a community member said: 
“if we go the clinic, they tell us to boil the water. We do this for two or three weeks, and then 
we stop. We are used to take water just like that” (22 March 2015). 
The households that were willing to pay for the upkeep of a protected source were usually 
educated.  
“Out of the 70 households, you may find 20 that are willing to pay. Those 20 are literate. 
They have moved. They are educated. They know the importance of clean water (LC I, 
Kyarutanga, 10 November 2014). 
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The fourth reason for non-payment were tensions in the village which pre-dated a water project. 
For example, in Kidwera I village, tensions existed about land borders and income disparities 
between households. The WUC chairperson (a successful businessperson) of the village said: 
“[p]eople don’t want to work together. People cannot sit on the same table and discuss issues 
about water” (10 November 2014). 
Similarly, a community member in Kyakayaga village said: 
“The wealthy households have educated their children, they have nice jobs. In this 
village, people hate them for nothing. Most of the poor people don’t even want to relate 
with them” (11 November 2014). 
The WUC members usually represent the more affluent and higher educated members in the 
village. In Kidwera I for example, the poorer households expected the wealthier households to 
cover their water user fees. However, the affluent households refused to satisfy this request. 
The WUC chairperson was in a difficult situation as he belonged to the affluent families in the 
villages. Due to his status as a ‘rich man’ he was not able to collect any money from the water 
users. Similar was the position of a WUC secretary in Kyakamese village: “People assume that 
I have more money as I am a teacher, and they expect me to pay for them. It is a big challenge. 
Therefore I could not chair this committee” (13 June 2014). 
At several water points tensions between households occurred due to money collection.  In 
these villages WUC members (mostly the caretaker) said that community members harassed or 
threatened them at times of fee collection. Harassments were a reason for the caretakers to step 
down or not to ask money from every household. For example:  
“I don't want to push community members. Those who are willing to pay will pay” 
(Caretaker Kyababyara 5 June 2014). 
“I stopped to be part of the WUC. There were some people who threatened me to beat 
me up when I asked for money” (Former caretaker Kyarutanga II 13 November 2014). 
In seven villages, the requirement to pay for water caused people to vandalise the locks and 
chains that regulate the opening hours of the water source. Vandalism of handpump was also a 
great concern to the DWO in both Masindi and Kiryandongo district23. A caretaker explained: 
                                                          
23 Handpumps were also a target for thieves. At numerous water sources the head of the handpump had been 
stolen and allegedly sold to a junkyard.  
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“Some people don’t want to pay. They just go and break the padlock” (Bisenye 13 November 
2014). 
Ironically, the lack of a lock was also a reason not to pay. In Kyakayaga, the WUC stopped the 
collection of water user fees after an unknown community member had stolen the chain and 
lock of the water source in February 2014. The community members did not want to pay the 
water user fee, as everyone was able to access the water free of charge. 
The fifth reason for non-payment was the expectation of external support by the local 
government or the NGO. Most of the interviewed WUC members felt that they needed financial 
support to maintain the water source and in some villages community members argued they 
were not required to pay for the upkeep of the handpump, saying: “The Water Trust gave it for 
free” (community member Kihonda, 23 October 2015). 
Sixth, community members were aware that WUC members were not able to enforce sanctions 
upon free-riding. Even the households that contributed, realised that defaulters were not 
penalised. This resulted in an incentive to stop payment, causing a snow-ball effect of free-
riding For example, a community in Kihonda explained: “If my neighbour doesn’t pay while I 
am paying, I don’t pay next time” (23 October 2015). 
 
 
5.3.1.2 Community Participation in Public Meetings and Public Works 
 
In most of the studied villages community engagement was weak; in both public meetings about 
the water source and in public works to keep the source clean. Most WUCs did not organise 
regular meetings to discuss issues about the water source. In cases the WUCs and the LC I did 
organise a meeting, most community members did not attend. Typical comments about such 
meetings were: 
“If you ask people to come to a meeting about the water point they are not coming. So, 
it becomes your thing. While it is not even your thing. And you are earning nothing by 
doing all this” (Kyakemese June 2014). 
“Very few people come to meetings. There is no lunch and people prefer meetings where 
they are facilitated”  (Bisenye 12 November 2014). 
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“Few people come to meetings. Maybe around ten people will come. They feel they are 
wasting their time” (Kyarutanga I 13 November 2014). 
Community meetings were usually organised at a time the WUC wanted to collect water user 
fees and most community members prioritised their own livelihood needs above public matter, 
arguing they were “too busy to attend a meeting” (TWT staff member 10 November 2014). As 
a result, community members rather apologised and preferred to work in their field. A 
community member said:  “During these WUC meetings, they only talk about paying water 
user fee. So, why should I go to a meeting that is only costing me money?” (Interview Kidwera 
II, 10 November 2014) 
Similar to these community meetings, calls from the WUC to the water users to clean at the 
water source often resulted in a low turn up. “People … don’t want to clean and respond,” said 
the Chairman in Nyakabale-Ausonzi (12 August, 2013). The treasurer in Kyakamese 
complained:  
“As people are paying they also feel that they should not work at the water source. But 
now the problem is that so many people don’t pay at all (13 June, 2014). 
Nevertheless, at four water points (Nyakasakazi, Kihonda-Nyakachaki, Abira, Kidwere I), the 
WUC organised regular community meetings to show accountability. The majority of the 
people attended these WUC meetings and village gatherings in general. A WUC member in 
Kihonda-Nyakachaki: “The majority comes to our meeting. Only when someone is sick the 
person will not come” (10 November 2014). 
 
 
5.3.1.3 The Voluntary Participation of the Water User Committee 
 
The WUC members experienced a range of challenges in fulfilling their tasks. First, the 
collection of water user fees was often time-consuming and a frustrating process. A WUC 
member in Kidwera I said: 
“[…] there was an old man and whenever we started to collect water user fees he would 
tell us: “why do you come to me first? You go to others and then to me. Why always 
me” (10 November 2014)? 
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“It is very difficult to get money from people. I am tired of it” (Treaserer Kyakemese 
June 2014). 
 
“I am not happy, because we always need to chase people to pay water user fees” 
(Caretaker Kyarutanga October 2014). 
 
Often WUCs members were required to visit households several times to collect the water 
contribution. A WUC member in Kyarutanga I explained: “If a person does not want to pay, he 
will not tell you direct. He will say: ‘my child is sick’. We can go back many times… until there 
are many times” (13 November, 2014). 
Second, a number of WUC members (especially the caretakers) were threatened or harassed by 
fellow community members. Requests to pay water user fees had in some instances infuriated 
the indebted. The WUC members were non-confrontational and did not collect fees from those 
households that persistently refused to contribute. In a number of villages former WUC 
members told me about some vicious experiences: “I stopped being part of the WUC. There 
were some people who threatened me to beat me up when I asked for money” (Former caretaker 
Kyarutanga II, 13 November 2014). 
Third, the voluntary nature of the work was provided as a reason to limit the commitment in 
the WUC. A government extension worker of Masindi district said on several occasions: 
“Nobody wants to volunteer, they [WUCs] want to be paid” (14 June 2014). 
 
“They lose morale because they work for free” (23 October 2015). 
 
None of the WUCs were complete due to migration or resignation and the members that 
remained and were labelled as ‘active’, did often not spend much time on their responsibilities. 
The voluntary work was sometimes used as an excuse to access the public funds for personal 
consumption. In one of the villages, the former Chairman of the WUC recounted: 
“[t]he retired WUC members heard 1,000 shillings [is to be collected]. They thought 
there was some eating, but then they found no money, so no eating. They retreated from 
the committee” (5 August, 2013).  
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Although volunteering in the WUC was not a gratifying job, at most locations one or two people 
remained engaged in water source affairs. The DWO of Kiryandongo observed: “often one 
person becomes a committee”. Nevertheless, the lack of a complete WUC was seen as an 
obstacle to long-term sustainability by TWT. As part of their post-construction monitoring, 
M&E staff counted the number of ‘active’ members in the WUC (following government 
monitoring guidelines). During these field visits, WUCs were reinvigorated and inactive 
members were replaced, often during ad hoc arranged community meetings under the auspices 
of TWT staff. A M&E staff member recounts his day: 
“[t]oday I organised a community meeting in Kiruli I. The water source was in a bad 
condition. There was no fence and there are several spare parts that need to be replaced. 
We re-elected the WUC and we agreed that everyone had to pay 5,000 shillings to pay 
for the repair. After collection they will collect 1.000 UGX on a monthly basis.” 
 
The WUC survey showed that 35 of the total 84 surveyed WUCs, (over a third) had been re-
elected through the facilitation of TWT. 
 
 
5.3.2 Enforcement of Graduated Sanctions 
 
WUCs were not able to enforce the mutually agreed sanctions to wrongdoers, such as public 
shaming and confiscation of jerry cans. Four factors contributed to the difficulty to enforce 
sanctions. First, most WUCs (apart from Abira and Kihonda-Nyakachaki) did not exactly know 
how many households were using the water point. Households in the case study crossed village 
borders dependent on distance and convenience, and often used multiple protected and open 
water sources. Furthermore, most villages inhabited a number of temporary settlers and 
regularly welcomed newcomers. As a result, the number of households that paid for the use of 
water fluctuated per year. For example, in Kyababyara village (where funds are only collected 
after breakdown), 46 households paid in April 2013 while only 32 households paid in January 
2014.  
Second, the reputation of the WUC member(s) was at risk upon enforcing the by-law. A WUC 
member in Kidwera observed that: “this could only bring hatred in the village” (10 November 
2014). A community member in Mboira I explained: 
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“In our country there are people who usually break the law. After setting the by-laws, 
people have a negative attitude against the person that enforces the by-law. You become 
a public enemy” (30 October 2014). 
The threats WUC members received substantially weakened their preparedness to enforce the 
by-laws. Nevertheless, emotions of “hatred” were not only felt against the WUC. In Kihonda 
people were discontent with free-riders, for example:  
“[s]ome time back, the WUC decided to punish the community members by locking the 
pump. Everyone was now affected by not taking water. Twenty households would raise 
the money [the catchment area counted around 40 households] but then again the 
following month the others were not paying again. This created hatred in the village” 
(23 October 2015). 
Third, the enforcement of sanctions could destabilise relations with friends and (extended) 
relatives in the community. For example, in one community, community members accused the 
caretaker of not collecting money from his friends. Other frequently mentioned problems with 
enforcing a by-law were: 
“It becomes hard to enforce a by-law on your relative” (Kyarutanga October 2014). 
“What do you do if someone pleads with you and tells you he has no money?” (Mboira 
I June 2014) 
A fourth reason was that WUCs lacked authority to enforce a by-law and were dependent on 
the LC I for rule compliance. Yet, in none of the villages a local leader had punished a 
household for non-payment of water user fees. Community members accused some village 
leaders of being “lazy” (Bisenye village 12 November 2014) while others observed their need 
for popular support to stay in power: 
“The Local Councillors are afraid as people might look bad at him” (WUC members 
Bisenyi October 2014). 
 
“The Local Councillor I fears to be voted out of power and that is why he does nothing” 
(Community member Kyakayga October 2014). 
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The need for support (presence at meetings, follow-up or financial) from the local government 
or TWT was regularly raised. The presence of an external body at a community meeting to 
explain O&M requirements was often perceived as invaluable:  
“Since the government is above us and if the community hears they are coming they 
will attend in good numbers and they will fear” (13 June 2014) 
 
“Staff members of The Water Trust should come to ensure people get convinced, pay 
the money and accept the whole process” (13 June 2014) 
 
Follow-up of defaulters by the sub-county was commonly raised as a way to avoid free-riding 
and develop collective action because: “it helps to threaten people” (Kyakayaga, 30 October 
2014). However, the problem was that government officials usually needed to be paid to carry 
out such duties. A WUC member in Kyakamese explained:  
“Maybe I should say the system has really defeated us. If you get an officer from the 
sub-county, you need to give them something to move. Yet, our money is not enough. 
We did it once, but we realised the very people who were helping us were instead 
dwindling our account (13 June, 2014). 
The only recourse communities could attend to, was TWT. However, the NGO was not in a 
position to police the villages. A TWT staff member said: “we don’t want to be the dictator in 
the village” (6 August, 2013).  
Although water source by-laws were not enforced, the majority of the villages did enforce by-
laws on road works. On a number of Saturdays in a year, the LC I calls community members 
to maintain the road and slash surrounding grass. These roadworks are a longstanding and 
unquestioned tradition.  
“Maintaining the road is done from time immemorial. That is why everyone comes and 
if not, people will and make you pay or confiscate a goat (TWT staff member, 5 
November 2014).” 
The by-law for non-participation of road maintenance varied per village but in general, the 
money or goods were collected from the free-riding household by the executive committee of 
LCI. The earnings were shared to buy drinks and food for the community members that did 
work on the road. Road maintenance was done in most of the studied villages. In those 
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communities where this tradition was lost, people ascribed this to the incapacity and weakness 
of their LC I. 
Although the above account paints a discouraging picture, six water points in four villages were 
able to successfully raise funds for the O&M of their handpumps. 
 
 
5.3.3 Alternative Water User Fee Collection Approaches 
 
This section reviews the cases where people were able to successfully raise funds for the O&M 
of the water source. 
Abira, is an isolated village with one protected water source and the next source 3 km away. 
Fees are stored on a mobile money account and the households are cooperative as, according 
the LC I, they belong to the same clan (11 November 2014). By the anecdotal village legend, 
the clan migrated from Nebbi to Masindi District in the 1920s. Their king was imprisoned by 
British soldiers after he commanded the massacre of another clan that was keen to overthrow 
the clan’s power in Nebbi. Saddened by the loss of their king, the people of the clan desired to 
visit their king in Masindi prison. But unable to walk the long distance back and forth from 
their home to Masindi, they decided to settle near the final station of their beloved king. The 
village ‘Abira’ is named after the sub-village of the king in Nebbi District.  
The current LCI of the village is simultaneously the WUC chairperson living next to the water 
source. He is seen as a strong leader because he is the grandson of the late imprisoned king who 
strictly follows-up the by-laws in the village. “People know the by-laws and they fear to be 
arrested” (LC1/ WUC chairperson Abira village, 11 November 2014).  
The LCI charged a fine of 1,000 UGX for non-participation and denied access to the water 
source if a household refused to pay. As such, households paid the monthly water user fees, 
attended meetings about the water source and helped in cleaning and slashing if called upon.  
Similar to Abira, Kihonda-Nyakachaki has one protected water sources with the nearest source 
1.5 km away. Households in this village contribute water user fees, attend meetings about the 
water source and participate in public works such as cleaning and slashing water source 
surroundings when called upon. The water point in Kihonda-Nyakachaki has a respected WUC 
chairperson. A community member says: “[h]e was born in this area. We know him and he has 
been very social with the people around him. Therefore we trust him.” (10 November 2014).  
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Together with the treasurer and the secretary, the WUC chairperson moves to the 37 households 
in the catchment area to collect the water user fees. In the period between January-October 
2014, every household contributed the monthly water user fee and the WUC stored the money 
in a bank account. Despite their success, the WUC members did experience harassments during 
collection: 
“There are many challenges. People abuse us. Some people think we use this money to 
develop ourselves and others keep on promising. But at the end we get the money” 
(WUC chairperson, 10 November 2014).  
 
Bisenye is a rural growth centre with three water sources. The village is densely populated and 
the demand on the water sources is high which results in repeated maintenance costs. The 
sources are managed by committed and paid caretakers that live near the water source. They 
open and lock the handpump, collect user payments, and mobilise community members to clean 
the surroundings and maintain the fence. Repairs are handled by the chairperson of the WUC 
and the water fees are kept by the treasurer. The caretakers efficiently cluster the collection of 
the water user fees by collectively demanding an annual fee from the households at the 
beginning of the year. At the busiest water source (with a female caretaker) a two-tier annual 
payment system is developed with an ordinary line (5,000 UGX) and a priority line (10,000 
UGX): “the VIP line” (caretaker, 12 November 2014). At this water point regular fights take 
place as a result of women jumping the long queue. “Two weeks ago a women bit another lady 
in the breast!” (caretaker 12 November 2014).  
The caretaker enforces graduated sanctions for misconduct. She locks the borehole “if people 
are exchanging bad words” and “canes” the women and children that are fighting. The three 
caretakers are reasonably successful in collecting the O&M funds but not all households pay. 
A prime cause are the temporary labourers (around 100 households) that came to the village 
two years ago after a rich foreign individual offered land for free to cultivate in return for 
opening the land.  “They can be chased away any moment, but we don’t know when” (caretaker, 
12 November 2014). In addition to the labourers, there are a few households that that “don’t 
want to pay” (caretaker, 12 November 2014). 
“Some of the people are not working. They just stay in the centre. They don’t dig. They 
just go and steal when the caretaker is not there. These are the youth” (WUC 
chairperson, 12 November 2014) 
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In 2014, the lock and chain were broken twice from the ‘busy’ handpump and the female 
caretaker had been robbed of cassava because “someone must have disagreed with the 
handpump being locked. It rained that evening and the footmarks from my kitchen led to the 
handpump” (12 November, 2014). 
Similar to other villages, people fear the WUC is misusing the funds.  “People say that the WUC 
is eating the money, not knowing that the borehole needs a lot of money (treasurer, 12 
November 2014). The former WUC used to store the funds at a bank account. But they stopped 
using the bank account because 70,000 shillings was “lost” due to bank charges. “Taking the 
water user fees to the bank is too expensive” (WUC chairperson, 12 November 2014). The 
WUC keeps detailed payment records and regularly checks the available funds. Every year the 
WUC organises a community meeting to show accountability. But few people tend to turn up. 
“The people who talk are the very people that don’t come. In total 5 to 10 percent of the 
community may come” (WUC chairperson, 12 November 2014). 
 
In Kidwera I, the WUC developed an alternative scheme to raise funds for the O&M of the 
water source. In the village, the WUC did not collect any funds for two years after its 
construction in 2009. In 2011, a TWT staff member visited the water point and told the 
community to collect a monthly water user fee. During a meeting, the community agreed to pay 
500 shilling per month. Although more than 100 households used the water source, it took six 
months until the WUC had collected 90,000 UGX. The mobiliser of the WUC (active as a youth 
mobiliser at the sub-county and the son of the late father that donated the land for the water 
source) was frustrated with the slow collection process.  As a result, he introduced the idea to 
invest the 90,000 UGX in seeds and to plant maize on one acre of his family land.  The 
community agreed and collectively they cleared, weeded, planted and harvested the maize. The 
profits of the harvest (405,000 shillings) were stored in the WUC moneybox.  
Although the WUC members told the neighbouring villages about their successful approach the 
model has not been replicated elsewhere.  
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5.4  Discussion 
 
Unlike the local government, TWT strictly followed the CBM guidelines. Yet, outcomes of 
NGO and local government constructed sources did not diverge. In this discussion I explain 
why the two wings of the CBM model both individually and collectively endorse the 
management failings narrated in the case study.  
 
 
5.4.1 Problems Arising from Neo-Liberal Inspired Commodification 
 
The commodification of the CBM model includes a monetary user contribution towards the 
construction of the source and regular user payments to cover Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) costs of the handpump to ensure ongoing access to ‘the good’. Initial contributions (in 
the case study both monetary and in kind) are assumed to lead to ‘a sense of ownership’ that 
result into an enduring willingness and commitment to pay a small amount for the upkeep of 
the system. A requirement that does not seem unreasonable. Marks and Davis (2012) show that 
households who invested in individual water access (such as piped water) have a commitment 
to continually pay the monthly water charges. Despite the individual contribution, this 
willingness to regularly pay water user fees was absent in the collectively managed sources. 
Only 3 percent of the surveyed water sources had sufficient funds for major repairs and only 47 
percent of these water sources had made an attempt to collect funds for O&M (refer to Table 
5.1). The lack of funds for O&M poses a serious threat to the long-term functionality of the 
water source as also highlighted by Burr and Fonseca (2013) and Jones (2011). 
Participants in the study expressed that the refusal to pay water user fees was related to the 
(potential) misuse of funds by the WUC and their lack of ‘accountability’ on collected water 
user fees. Increasing transparency, introducing checks and balances and banking the funds 
appear therefore a logical solution to increase user willingness to pay (Foster, 2012; 
Oxford/RFL, 2014; Foster and Hope, 2016). Also, participants did not always understand what 
the water user fees were for; they already contributed towards construction and groundwater is 
for free. People did not fully grasp that a handpump requires regular maintenance and that 
without upfront funds, repair costs may be too high for water users to cover, potentially leading 
to lengthy interruption of supply.  
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The collection of funds – inherent to commodification – was damaging to social relationships. 
Remarkably, in most cases the free-rider was not questioned and subject to abuse but rather the 
collector while carrying out voluntary duties. Most WUC members were reluctant to chase 
debtors and destabilise friend and family relations. To understand the local resistance to pay 
water user fees, it may be helpful to look at the wider social-political context in Uganda. In a 
2015 report by Transparency International, Uganda is ranked among the most corrupt countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), showing that powerful government officials often abuse their 
power to access public funds. Cleaver (2012 p. 48) observes that WUCs (with roles as 
chairperson, secretary, etc.) draw on state-like bureaucracies. This symbolic similarity between 
state institutions and the WUC may legitimise non-payment by the water users due to the 
general awareness and the informal norm that those in power may ‘eat the money’.  
Indeed, the WUC members that do not resign, feel they need and deserve to be compensated 
for their challenging and voluntary tasks. It is at this stage, that commodification begins to 
extend from the ‘goods’ to the ‘service’ of water provision. In a number of case study villages, 
the commodification of the service was a mutual agreement while in others some WUCs 
informally abused funds for personal expenditures. The trend towards the commodification of 
the service was also reflected by a higher layer of political power. WUCs that relinquished 
attempts to discipline debtors and viewed the local government as their only remaining option 
to enforce locally agreed water source rules, were required to pay for the ‘service’ of the official. 
The payment of a per diem to an already salaried official is not unusual and is often taken for 
granted, however it illustrates how a voluntary undertaking on both village and local 
government level, have become commodified. This ‘movement’ of commodification seriously 
undermines the CBM model.  
 
 
5.4.2 CPR theory, Grass-Roots Romanticism and the Messy Reality 
 
The CBM model departs from an understanding that communities are harmonious (Mohan and 
Stokke, 2000; Brown, 2013). The case study however, reconfirms the ‘myth’ of community as 
raised by Critical Institutional scholarship and supports Cleaver’s (2001 p. 45) nuanced 
understanding of the term community as “the site of both solidarity and conflict, and shifting 
alliances”. 
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According to Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory, crafted WUCs are able to build trust, 
norms of reciprocity, enforce mutually agreed rules and graduated sanctions to ensure the 
sustainability of the water source. However, all the in-depth studied WUCs had fallen apart and 
in most cases only one or two individuals remained engaged. At only a few water sources 
individual ‘bricoleurs’ were able to positively influence the functioning of the institution as a 
result of their social identity, as Cleaver (2012) highlights. The bricoleur in Kidwera I came 
from a wealthy family with ample land and fulfilled a respectable role at the local government. 
The combination of the bricoleur’s authoritative status and resources, and creative ability to 
avoid repetitive confrontational rule enforcement and capability to manoeuvre within the CBM 
model realised public support and cooperation. However, the majority of the studied water 
sources lacked such a resourceful bricoleur. Because community members eschewed 
confrontational collection approaches and were not organically organised around water (while 
most of Ostrom’s (1990) cases were created organically) people often let the maintenance of 
the handpump run its course. In contrast was road maintenance which is a long-standing 
tradition that saw most people cooperate, accept and enforce the mutually agreed sanctions.   
Although participatory strategies are fundamental to the CBM model, community meetings 
were not well attended and volunteering for the upkeep of the handpump proved problematic 
as also demonstrated by Harvey (2007), Lockwood and Smits (2011) and Quin et al. (2011). 
Community meetings are a traditional way of organising collective action and mutual 
agreement but changes in rural areas as increased wealth, transport and communication (World 
Bank, 2010) may interrupt communal gatherings and even the traditional respect for the LC I  
(responsible for calling community meetings) whose authoritative role was contested in the 
majority of the 15 villages where I conducted semi-structured interviews. The presence of TWT 
became necessary to reinvigorate the WUC and remind the water users of their duties. However, 
ironically, their persistent follow-ups may have weakened people’s feelings of responsibility 
for the handpump.  
The CBM model is based on the assumption that water is a common pool resource; rivalrous in 
nature and difficult to exclude (hence, Ostrom’s (1990) first design principle of ‘clearly defined 
boundaries’).  However, water was often non-rivalrous in the case study area as it was 
characterised by abundant open, yet contaminated, water sources and community members 
were able to avail themselves of alternative protected water sources. In these cases, water from 
a handpump rather resembled the characteristics of a public good, non-rivalrous and non-
excludable. The lack of motivation to collect or pay upfront (contributing limited available 
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resources) and actively maintain the water source may therefore not be surprising. Similar to 
the results of Jones (2011), Madrigal et al. (2011) and Schouten and Moriarty (2003) WUCs in 
water stressed villages, were more successful in collecting user funds for future repairs and  
maintaining their water sources than in villages with abundant available water. Furthermore, 
the need for clear boundaries of the resource as prescribed by CPR theory proved difficult in 
reality. First, people bounded in the same geographical location are not static (Guijt and Shah, 
1998) and most WUCs did not know which households were using the water source due to 
migration, short-term residency and the habit of using multiple water sources. Second, water is 
a human right and exclusion upon non-payment would be morally wrong. The lack of clarity 
who is accessing the resource and the inability to deny access contravene the ‘rule’ of exclusion 
in CRP theory. In addition, the fact that by-laws are verbal and differ for each point is also 
unhelpful. 
The need to pay water user fees requires the WUC to enforce discipline upon free-riders. Here, 
the commodification of water encapsulated in the neo-liberal paradigm damages the potential 
for collective action by disrupting social relations and often exacerbating pre-existing tensions. 
The potential to access the funds tempted some WUC members to use the funds for personal 
use and created mistrust among water users, both undermining collective action.  
In reality, the WUCs had no authority and were not able to enforce sanctions and the local 
councillors similarly lacked authority or were not willing to intervene. Their incapacity to 
support the WUC to carry out their work was illustrated by the calls of the WUC to involve the 
local government in the management of the handpump. WUCs were often unwilling to carry 
out their duties and the constant reinvigoration of TWT had little long-term impact. In addition, 
water users were well aware that they could not be punished for free-riding. Instead, non-
payment was the norm and a rational choice (and was also the cause of the reluctance of the 
WUC to collect water user fees). 
In sum, the two wings of the CBM model are conflicting and ideas about human agency and 
factors shaping human behaviour in CPR theory were not identifiable in the case study area. 
 
 
5.4.3 Evaluating the Recommendations in the Existing Literature 
The problems with the CBM model as presented above are increasingly acknowledged in 
academic and practitioner literature. The reviewed literature mainly focuses on three sets of 
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recommendations to improve handpump sustainability: increasing social capital, technological 
innovations and external support. The question is, do they increase involvement and willingness 
to pay?  
Increasing the ‘stock’ of social capital is envisioned through participation and capacity building 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Mansuri and Rao, 2013). However, it is difficult to see how any 
more could realistically have been done by the NGO in motivating and guiding the application 
arrangements, in getting the participatory design and implementation process right and in 
reinvigorating the failing WUCs. There was little evidence that these efforts resulted in social 
cohesion and underlying divisions based on wealth and education are not easily resolved 
through tweaking participatory processes. The efforts of TWT may unintentionally reduce 
community engagement and the findings suggest that close social relations frequently inhibit 
the collection of fees and the enforcement of rules. Ironically, increasing the stock of social 
capital in these villages, as frequently suggested (Bisung and Elliot, 2014; Kähkönen, 1999; 
Pretty, 2003; Sun et al., 2010), may only exacerbate these problems. Equally, Field (2003), 
Portes (1998) and Portes and Landolt (1996) question whether social capital is always such a 
positive attribute, and demonstrate it may actually constrain collective action outcomes (they 
refer to the ‘dark side’ of social capital). In addition, the fear for witchcraft may have 
exercebated the reluctance to sanction community members (Chabal, 2009; Golooba-Mutebi, 
2005). There is value in practical capacity building – skills such as recordkeeping, financial 
management and knowledge about waterborne diseases, but workshops are costly and 
attendance not guaranteed and above all improvements in these areas would not address 
problems stemming from the voluntary status of WUCs, the availability of alternative water 
sources, and the reluctance to enforce sanctions on family and friends, nor encourage payment. 
The rare cases of success were down to unique characteristics, which may prove difficult to 
engineer and recreate. 
Technological innovations such as smart sensors that monitor usage and downtime are another 
set of recommendations that are believed to improve the smooth functioning of handpumps 
(Hutchings et al., 2012; Hope et al., 2011; Thomson et al., 2012). While such innovations 
generate a wealth of information about the use and status of handpumps, they are unlikely to 
solve the low levels of user payments, fee collection issues or enforcement of sanctions. It is 
further unclear who will pay for the sensors and the installation costs. 
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Lastly, in both the literature  (Barnes et al., 2014; Baumann and Furey, 2013; Carter et al., 2010; 
Harvey and Reed, 2006; Kamruzzaman et al., 2013; Kleemeier, 2010; Lockwood, 2004; 
Moriarty et al., 2013; Schouten and Moriarty, 2003) and in  the communities studied there are 
calls for external support to enhance sustainability. Although post-construction support is a 
fundamental part of rural water planning, local governments often lack the resources (Day, 
2011; Kleemeier, 2010) struggle with corruption (Blundo and Le Meur, 2009) and capacity 
building of the local government itself is considered vital (Quin et al., 2011). Blundo and Le 
Meur (2009 p.47) therefore argue that corruption by the (local) government is not so much the 
result of a lack of knowledge that can be resolved with capacity building, but part of deeply 
rooted political practices. Nevertheless, in the event external support by the local government 
was provided free of charge and on a regular basis, this would be an option to investigate. But 
at this point, the call for external support is a strong indication that the model is not working. 
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Chapter 6  
Better The Devil You Know? 
Understanding Rural Water Management 
Innovations by Analysing Actors’ Risk 
Perceptions 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter24 is to understand why the Community Based Management (CBM) 
paradigm has proven so resilient to change, despite its widely acknowledged poor performance 
across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). While alternatives to CBM have been developed, 
this chapter will show that they remain within the existing CBM framework, because 
innovations that deviate too far from CBM represent a possible risk to strongly held values. 
Relational risk theory of Boholm and Corvellec (2011) provides a conceptual framework and 
lens to explore the development (Chapter 7) of an innovation (CBM-lite) devised by the author 
when employed as the Programme Manager for The Water Trust (TWT) in Uganda. Because 
risk perceptions influence behaviour and human action (Eiser et al., 2012) and are part of social 
practices (risk  perceptions are influenced by social practices and have a stake in creating and 
sustaining them (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011)) an analysis of actors risk perceptions may 
provide new insights in the handpump sustainability debate and enhance the geography of water 
literature. To date, the role of risk perceptions in rural water management policy and innovation 
in a developing context is under recognised and unacknowledged25.Moreover, there has been 
little examination of risk perceptions in advancing rural water supply arrangements. Thus, the 
thesis makes an important contribution to knowledge in the rural water sector. 
                                                          
24 Some of the arguments presented in this chapter draw upon the paper ‘Better the devil you know? A relational 
reading of risk and innovation in the rural water sector’ by Brown and van den Broek (under review with The 
Geographical Journal).  
 
25 Dobbie and Brown (2014) and Brown et al. (2009) write about risk perceptions in the urban water sector in 
Australia.  
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This chapter builds upon the case study findings of Chapter 5 that demonstrated the failure of 
CBM to enable community members to realise the key principles of the model: voluntary 
collective action and regular (upfront) user payment for the upkeep of the water system. The 
case study illustrated that the three sets of recommendations frequently raised in the rural water 
literature (refer to literature Chapter 2.7) – improving participatory processes, offering 
technological solutions and providing external support – are unlikely to increase community 
involvement and willingness to pay as they are confined within the theoretical foundations of 
the CBM model. Given the increasing body of work that criticises the outcomes of community 
based managed rural water sources in combination with the evidence that breakdown rates of 
rural water infrastructure are not substantially different from the state-led paradigm (Baumann, 
2006; Evans, 1992; Oxford/RFL, 2014; RWSN, 2010), this chapter aims to understand why 
there is still strong sector support for the CBM model. 
This chapter draws upon insights from the literature review of Chapter 2 that may help explain 
the strong support for CBM. First, institutional theory indicates that even dysfunctional 
institutions, such as CBM, can remain if there is necessary support (North, 1990). Indeed, the 
perseverance of the CBM model might be the result of its endorsement from left-wing grass-
roots  developmentalists and right-wing neo-liberals that both promote a reduced role of the 
state, local control and community self-reliance (Mohan and Hickey, 2000). Second, CBM may 
persist due to disagreement on the causes of handpump failure, and the lack of consensus over 
what values (such as financial, environmental or social developmental factors) should reflect 
the end goal of ‘sustainable rural water services’ (Franks and Cleaver, 2009). Amongst such 
different opinions there is little common ground over a way forward. 
This chapter further unravels the strong support for CBM by providing a theoretical literature 
review on the themes of innovation and risk. The chapter looks at how sustainable rural water 
management may be realised and goes beyond ‘simply’ critiquing the CBM model. It introduces 
an alternative rural water management model – CBM-lite – which was designed during my 
period as the Programme Manager for The Water Trust (a local Ugandan NGO) and has been 
grounded in action research, to improve the parlous funding situation of rural handpumps and 
the inactivity of the Water User Committees (WUCs) in mid-west Uganda. Refer to 
methodology Chapter 4.4 for a detailed overview of the action research and to 4.3 for a detailed 
description of my role in the development of the CBM-lite model. This present chapter 
introduces the CBM-lite innovation and its rationale, and serves as the theoretical foundation 
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for the analysis of research objective three: to analyse actors’ risk perceptions about the 
CBM-lite innovation, which will be attended to in the next empirical Chapter 7.  
Section 6.2 proceeds with a discussion about the alternatives that represent a move away from 
CBM. It argues that without a radical change in government, donor and NGO policy concerning 
post-construction support, the financing of handpump Operation and Maintenance (O&M) must 
come from communities themselves: hence the user pays principle remains fundamental. 
Section 6.3 moves to the importance of testing innovations because it may bring meaningful 
information on how communities can be enticed to pay for the maintenance of their rural water 
sources and what strategies may improve the management of rural handpumps. It presents 
therefore two current innovations: the ‘Smart Handpump’ project by the University of Oxford 
and the ‘Sub-county Water Supply and Sanitation Boards’ by IRC/triple-S and the Ugandan 
Ministry of Water and Environment. The section builds upon the three resource management 
categories of Karen Bakker (2007) to provide a nuanced and useful analysis on what level 
innovation is taking place. The analysis shows that these new endeavours only marginally 
deviate from the CBM model. It demonstrates the tendency towards the status quo in the rural 
water sector which features in both the literature (as argued in literature Chapter 2) and in praxis.  
Section 6.3 proceeds with the introduction of the CBM-lite model – the central focus of the 
following chapters in this thesis – which is potentially an inexpensive and practical solution for 
achieving sustainable rural water management practices but may prove controversial as it 
refines the organisational and governance arrangements of the CBM model. Because the CBM-
lite model deviates from mainstream CBM, insights into actors’ risk perceptions on CBM-lite 
may prove helpful for understanding the lack of reform in the sector and for developing 
appropriate future rural water management arrangements.  
To this end, Section 6.4 introduces the relational theory of risk of Boholm and Corvellec (2011) 
that may go some way to explain the inertia to change in the rural water sector and why 
innovations do not tend to deviate too far away from CBM. A relational reading of risk provides 
insight into varying interpretations of a risk posing object. The theory shows the fluidity of risk; 
how risk perceptions relate to a certain context, give way to new interpretations on related 
matters of risk and how they may be subject reassessment. The chapter closes with a set of 
concluding remarks in Section 6.5. 
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6.2 Room for Alternatives to Community Based 
Management in the User Pays Era 
 
How much ‘room for manoeuvre’26 is there to deviate from community based rural water 
management and to move away from user payment and community control? Here, ‘control’ 
refers to the day-to-day management of rural water facilities, involving management processes 
and mechanisms of access, such as organisational, financial, technical and legal arrangements, 
that mediate access to the resource (Cleaver, 2012). While in general, social services are 
delivered through the state, the market or the community, in reality there is no simplistic 
dichotomy between these three players. Social service delivery models often overlap (Bakker, 
2007) and involve a range of other actors (i.e. networks of agencies, organisations, stakeholder 
groups and individuals) that may play a role in the day-to-day management of rural water 
facilities (Franks and Cleaver, 2009). Refer to Table 6.1 for an overview of the actors that could 
potentially take responsibility for a) paying the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of the 
handpump and b) controlling the management of the rural water service.  
 
 
Table 6.1 
Potential Actors in the Management of Rural Water Services (Author’s construct) 
     State CBM plus 
(Baumann, 2006) 
Community Market 
Payment Operation and 
Maintenance 
State State/Donors & 
Community 
Community Community or 
State 
     
Control over the day-to-day 
management of the water source 
State/Community Community Community Market/NGO 
 
 
The notion that rural communities in low-income countries should not be solely responsible for 
the often expensive and recurrent Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs of rural water 
infrastructure is gaining ground in the literature. Baumann (2006) developed the ‘CBM-plus’ 
model which advocates that states in developing countries should cover 70% of the major repair 
costs of rural water sources. Similarly, Franceys et al. (2016) argue that subsidies from the 
international donor community are needed to finance the recurrent capital maintenance of rural 
                                                          
26 Cleaver and de Koning (2015) state “[i]t is common for critical institutional accounts to consider how much 
room for manoeuvre different actors have to shape institutions and to promote change” (p.8). 
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water infrastructure and to invest in strengthening the capacity of the (local) government for 
improving the overall management of rural water services. Swyngedouw (2006 p.75) 
anticipated that: “without massively enhanced national and international public support, the 
MDGs will remain an empty promise”. Indeed, while globally the MDG target of progressing 
universal access to water has been met, in low-income Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), coverage 
declined due to the high level of ‘slippage’ of rural water infrastructure (Sadoff et al., 2015).  
In these suggestions, communities remain responsible for mediating access to the water source. 
Yet, to date, there is little evidence that support is forthcoming from sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
governments or donors. Political agreement to cover repair costs from government budgets may 
be difficult to obtain and it remains uncertain whether state agencies and local governments, 
often charged with corrupt behaviour and ‘lack of capacity’ (Polzer, 2001; Kleemeier, 2010), 
are a most realistic player to operationalise a subsidy programme for funding the capital 
maintenance costs of rural water infrastructure.   
Even with a preparedness of governments and donors to fund or subsidize capital repair 
expenditures in low-income countries or communities and given the fact that communities in 
the suggested CBM-plus model are still required to pay for maintenance and minor repairs, an 
engagement with the ‘user pays’ principle persists. The ‘room for manoeuvre’ in the field of 
handpump control – a proposition that is reflected in the calls to ‘professionalise’ rural water 
services – may therefore warrant thorough investigation (Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Moriarty 
et al., 2013; Smits et al., 2010).  A number of authors have studied the possibility of extending 
the role of the private sector into the daily operation and management of the water source, 
impacting on the mechanisms of access to water (Koestler, 2009; Moriarty et al., 2013; 
Kleemeier and Narkevic, 2010; Lockwood and Smits, 2011; Econ One Research 2003; Kariuki 
and Schwartz 2005; Requena and Triche 2006; Triche, Requena and Kariuki 2006; Valfrey-
Visser et al 2006; Vezina 2002). These literature reviews report that markets for high quality 
and reliable water services (such as piped water schemes but also handpumps) in rural areas 
exist.   
Generally, there are two different propositions for involving the private sector in the Operation 
and Management (O&M) of rural water sources. The first, represents the use of Private 
Operators (also sometimes referred to as social entrepreneurs) in the management of the 
handpump (Lockwood and Le Gouais, 2011; Kleemeier, 2010). Here, the  ‘service’ of 
delivering water and maintaining access to the handpump is being commodified or in other 
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words, paid for. In these arrangements, the commodification of the ‘good’ usually remains the 
cost recovery of handpump spare parts and Hand Pump Mechanic (HPM) labour expenditures 
as common in the CBM model. The second proposition, involves a (local) company in the 
delivery of the water service that supports community groups and, or, Private Operators in the 
maintenance and management of the water infrastructure. Such initiatives represent Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs) whereby the company or private operator is contracted in a 
particular geographical area (which may include both town and rural settings) and regulated by 
a dedicated regulatory body, or the local government in conjunction with the community 
(Kleemeier and Narkevic, 2010). In these (suggested) models, users tend to pay for both the 
water (the ‘good’) and the service as in urban water management arrangements. The 
involvement of the private sector in the management of rural water services is believed to 
increase efficiency and longevity of the water infrastructure, if there is ‘political will’ (GWP, 
2000; Kleemeier and Narkevic, 2010; Valfrey-Visser et al., 2006) or ‘political capacity’ (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2015) to adopt and support such strategies. In particular because the 
establishment of PPPs in rural areas “surely” requires financial support for capital investments 
in the short to medium term (Kleemeier and Narkevic, 2010, p. 2; Tremolet, 2002; Tremolet et 
al., 2002). Nevertheless, the same arguments about rolling back the state in favour of a more 
‘efficient’ private sector were used to justify private sector involvement in the urban water 
sector; arguments that have been greatly discredited by urban human rights scholars as also 
highlighted in Chapter 2.5 (Bakker, 2007; Finger and Allouche, 2002; Johnstone and Wood, 
2003; Laurie and Marvin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2005).  
Although not much has been written about private sector involvement in the management of 
rural handpumps, some authors raise concerns about market mechanisms in rural water service 
delivery (Adams and Halvorsen, 2014; Cleaver and Toner, 2006; Roe et al., 2009; Uno, 2005). 
They question the use of financial arrangements and the ability of rural communities to pay for 
accessing the water, and the capacity and commitment of the private sector to delivery these 
services.  Further, it remains uncertain whether the private sector can be enticed to take on the 
rural water challenge, given their poor track record in urban water supply where they have 
tended to focus on “low hanging fruits” (Mason, 2013) –‘cherry picking” affluent districts, and 
have faced considerable backlash and contract cessation (Bakker 2013 p.94). 
Nevertheless, the call to ‘professionalise’ rural water management arrangements by removing 
voluntary collective action, may indicate a shift towards political ‘right’ measures. The 
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economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1944) predicted that market-based approaches 
inevitably succeed community management, i.e. the ‘Middle Way’. He wrote:  
“… most people still believe that it must be possible to find some Middle Way between 
‘atomistic competition’ and central direction. […] Yet mere common sense proves a 
treacherous guide. […] Planning and competition can be combined only by planning for 
competition, but not by planning against competition” (p. 31).  
The calls for professionalisation may ultimately set in motion a splintering of support for CBM 
of those who remain hopeful of improved outcomes by strengthening CBM and those that aim 
to remove management responsibility from the community by introducing the private sector in 
the management of rural water sources.  
 
 
6.3 Rural Water Management Innovations 
 
Until donors and governments are committed to fund recurrent capital repair expenditures of 
rural water services, the sector needs to engage with the user pays principle. The key question 
therefore is how communities can be enticed to pay for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
(including capital repair costs) when affordability is not an issue (Bey et al. 2015 p.97; Chowns, 
2014; 2015; Fonseca, 2014; Harvey, 2008). It is only through testing innovations that 
meaningful information can be accumulated about what strategies may improve handpump 
maintenance and how “a policy that ‘works’” (Parsons, 2006 p. 6) can be realised.  
Islands of rural water management innovations do exist within the SSA water sector; of which 
three will be presented below. These are 1) the Smart Handpump project by the University of 
Oxford, 2) the Sub-county Water Supply and Sanitation Boards (SWSSB) by IRC-Triple-S and 
the Ugandan Ministry of Water and Environment, and, 3) CBM-lite by The Water Trust (TWT), 
which is the central focus of this chapter and onwards. Both the Oxford Smart Handpump 
project and the SWSSB project have been put forward in the media and at various forums as 
promising models to address handpump failure in rural areas (View Appendix 6.1). While these 
initiatives are labelled as ‘innovative’, the aim of this section is to reinforce the argument in 
literature Chapter 2.7 and to demonstrate how the initiatives only minimally deviate from CBM 
and rather introduce elements on top of the CBM model.  
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To understand at what level innovation is taking place in comparison to the CBM model, it is 
helpful here to use Bakker’s (2007) three resource management categories, developed to 
promote a more nuanced analysis of neo-liberal reforms in the urban water sector. It has a 
relevance to innovations within the rural water sector where there has been a similar tendency 
towards sweeping generalisations such as ‘professionalising rural water services’ (Lockwood 
and Le Gouais, 2011; Moriarty et al. 2013). Table 6.2 provides an overview of the different 
aspects within each resource management category as identified by Bakker (2007).  
 
 
Table 6.2  
Resource Management Categories (adapted from Bakker (2007 p. 443)) 
Resource management categories Aspects of resource management 
Resource management institutions Primary goals 
 Regulatory framework 
 Property rights 
 
Resource management organisations 
 
Primary decision-makers 
 Organisational structure 
 Business models 
 
Resource governance 
 
Accountability mechanism 
 Key incentives 
 Key sanctions 
 Consumer role 
 Participation of consumers 
 
 
Because the three innovations presented below have been designed to operate within the 
existing CBM institutional framework and pursue both user payment and community control, 
Bakker’s (2007) first category, institutions, remains unchanged. The rural water management 
innovations will therefore be described according to Bakker’s (2007) management and 
governance categories. These two resource management categories not only sophisticate the 
analysis of rural water management innovations but also provide insight about the individual 
elements encapsulated within the objective of community control. Refer to Table 6.3 for a 
summary of the problem analyses underlying the three innovations and their proposed solutions 
to improve handpump functionality. 
  
Chapter 6                     Better The Devil You Know?  
 
138 
 
Table 6.3 
Summary Problem Analysis Handpump Non-Functionality and Proposed Solutions (Author’s 
Construct) 
Initiative Problem analysis  Solution 
Smart handpump project 
(University of Oxford) 
Weak payment systems 
and slow repair process 
(Koehler et al., 2015). 
Handpump fitted with monitoring technology to 
speed up information about breakdown to 
technician and pooling of funds. 
 
 
Sub-County Water 
Supply and Sanitation 
Boards (IRC-Triple-S 
and MWE of Uganda) 
 
Ineffective WUCs and 
inadequate external 
support (IRC/Triple-S, 
2014; Bey et al., 2015). 
 
Additional bureaucratic layer to supervise WUCs. 
 
 
CBM-lite (The Water 
Trust) 
 
Dearth of funds to pay for 
repairs and inactivity of 
the WUCs. 
 
(1) Incentivised user paid Water Operator, (2) 
clustering village water sources to pool funds 
for O&M (3) banking user funds and (4) 
insurance style product to ensure sufficient 
funds for handpump repairs.  
 
 
Innovation 1: The Smart Handpump Project 
 
Funded by the UK Government, DFID, NERC and ESRC 27 , the University of Oxford 
established the ‘Smart Handpump’ project in Kenya. In this pilot project, mobile phone 
technology is fitted in a handpump to generate automated data about the water system: how 
much it is used and when, allowing predictions about the depth of the water in the wells. This 
data is then stored electronically in the ‘cloud’ to monitor usage and alarm a local company 
acting as the maintenance service provider in case of a breakdown (Katuva et al., 2016). The 
project aims to move towards an insurance style product whereby water user fees from multiple 
villages are pooled in an account, allowing the funding of costly repairs. In this model, water 
users pay the water user committee treasurer in cash, after which the treasurer deposits the funds 
through mobile payment (M-Pesa) on an account. Automated text messages about the deposits 
                                                          
27 DFID, Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
Chapter 6                     Better The Devil You Know?  
 
139 
 
are expected to increase accountability and transparency and willingness to pay (Koehler et al., 
2015). The Smart Handpump project claims that: “[b]y monitoring the heartbeat of thousands 
of handpumps across Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, it is possible to give millions of 
people access to a reliable and secure water network” (Greeff, 2016 p. 1). Through the data 
generated by the sensors fitted in the handpump, they expect to speed up the repair process 
(Koehler et al., 2015).  
On organisational level, the Smart Handpump project remains loyal to the Water User 
Committee (WUC) as within the CBM model. On governance level, the project introduces a 
‘club good model’28 to address the lack of user payment (Koehler et al., 2015). In the club good 
model users can be excluded from the resource. The number of users are expected to be 
regulated through the use of tariffs, i.e. community members can decide to charge a higher 
monthly water tariff to reduce the number of water users. It remains, however, unclear how user 
payments will be collected and temporarily stored before funds are transmitted to the 
maintenance service provider and, importantly, how free-riding can be prevented.  
The outcomes of the Willingness to Pay survey supports their assumption that water users 
engaged in club good arrangements are more willing to pay for the Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) of the handpump (43% more) than people engaged in common pool resource 
arrangements (Koehler et al., 2015). In addition, an improved service is assumed to translate 
into a willingness to pay (Foster and Hope, 2016). Hence, the project financed the rehabilitation 
of all handpumps in the research area and covered the O&M expenses of the water sources and 
thus exempting users from water user fee payments in the first year of the project. After this 
year, people are expected to value the improved and reliable water service, and are expected to 
pay willingly for the upkeep of the handpumps (Koehler et al., 2015).   
 
 
Innovation 2: Sub-county Water Supply and Sanitation Boards 
 
The ‘Sub-county Water Supply and Sanitation Board’ (SWSSB) is an initiative of the NGO 
IRC under the Triple-S/IRC project and the Ministry of Water and Environment of Uganda, 
and has been piloted in two districts in Uganda since July 2013. The volunteer SWSSBs 
constitute an external body at the sub-county level that provide management support to the 
                                                          
28 Refer to literature Chapter 2.6.1 to read about the different typologies of common goods. 
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Water User Committees (WUCs) in the villages, cluster water facilities and pool funds for 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) at sub-county level. The members of the SWSSB consist 
of technical sub-county staff, WUC members and opinion leaders from the communities (Bey 
et al., 2014; Mirembe, 2014; IRC/Triple-S, 2014; 2014b; 2015; MWE, 2014; Watsisi, 2013).  
On the organisational and village level, the WUC caretaker collects and remits the water user 
fees to the SWSSB (or in the future they may send the funds through mobile money). On the 
governance level, funds are stored at the sub-county. The costs for handpump repair are paid 
directly by the SWSSB. In the event of breakdown, the SWSSB informs the Hand Pump 
Mechanic Association – a public private partnership whereby the government of Uganda 
encourages handpump mechanics to form an association to improve supervision and timely 
supply of spare parts – and pays the association for the repair from the stored community fund. 
If the community lacks the funds for the repair, the board provides a loan to cover the repair 
costs. To this end, the district is expected to transfer additional funds to the sub-county to pay 
for the O&M costs of rural water infrastructure (Bey et al., 2015; Mirembe, 2014; IRC/Triple-
S, 2014b). 
According to the originators of the model, the SWSSB pilot is legitimised as a viable model to 
overcome handpump non-functionality as it is expected to overcome the ineffective WUCs and 
inadequate external support by the sub-county. WUCs are perceived to be ineffective as they 
“… are not able to collect sufficient funds at the community level to cover operations and 
maintenance (O&M) of water facilities. Weak administrative capacity, distrust on the part of 
water users, and unwillingness of users to pay for water are all contributing factors” (IRC, 2014 
p. 1). Improved technical support by the district and the sub-county is expected to improve the 
management of the water sources as they will offer more clarity on roles and responsibilities, 
such as “… guidance on how to raise and manage the user fees” (Mirembe, 2014 p.1). In 
particular the storage and the pooling of funds at the sub-county is expected to improve 
collections as it increases accountability and transparency, and may remove feelings of distrust 
among water users (IRC/Triple-S, 2014b).   
A progress report by Triple-S/IRC (2015 p. 5) reveals that “… the actual application of the 
model on the ground still faces several challenges”. Of the six sub-counties in the pilot project, 
only one sub-county managed to effectively roll out the SWSBB as intended. This success is 
attributed to the leadership quality of the Sub-County Chief and his Health Assistant, and their 
commitment to visit communities and to invest in accountability mechanisms as receipt books 
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and income and expenditure books. According to the 2015 report: “the decision to procure and 
share the accountability tools showed a change from the way WUCs were conducting business 
and inspired WUCs to subscribe to the board” (p.4). In the other sub-counties, failure is 
attributed to lack of political and technical will and leadership and a lack of capacity of the 
SWSSB to fulfil their roles. In addition, WUCs are reported to resist the handover of their 
money to the SWSSB, because: “the WUCs were sceptical of having user fees managed by 
government staff” (p.5).  The report concludes with the recommendation to organise more 
meetings to create leadership buy-in and to build the capacity of the boards. 
 
 
6.3.1  Analysing the Level of Innovation of the Smart Handpump 
Project and the Sub-County Water Supply and Sanitation Boards  
 
So, how do the Smart Handpump project and the SWSSB innovations deviate from the CBM 
model? From the perspective of Bakker’s (2007) resource management categories, the 
innovations are within the institutional framework of the CBM model; promoting community 
control and user payment. On organisational and governance level the innovations do not 
deviate from the CBM model, except from seeking greater transparency and accountability. 
They remain loyal to the CBM framework and introduce additional elements on top of the CBM 
model. This is interesting as both initiatives observe the weak functioning of the CBM model. 
In an academic paper on the Smart Handpump project, Koehler et al. (2015 p.397) legitimise 
the pilot project with: “[c]ommunity management of water services has been widely identified 
as a dominant but failing model in rural water service delivery in Africa (Bannerjee and 
Morella, 2011; Hope, 2014).” Similarly, in a blog about the SWSSB, IRC/Triple-S writes: “[i]n 
Uganda, as in many places, community water management has not worked very well (Watsisi, 
2013 p.1).” 
The Smart Handpump project by the University of Oxford combines the CBM model with a 
new monitoring product. Although seemingly radical, the Smart Handpump project does not 
alter the elements of the CBM model. Instead, it improves the current condition of the 
handpump infrastructure to accustom users to improved service levels and to incite continuous 
user payments for maintaining the same level of service. Remote automated monitoring and 
mobile money may struggle to improve water user collections and community control as these 
technologies do not address the complex social dynamics that arise at water user fee collections 
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as described in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the Smart Handpump project may be difficult to scale 
up. Even if the costs of monitoring technology and retrofitting the pumps are inexpensive 
(Greeff, 2016), improving the service levels of handpumps and bearing the costs of O&M for a 
certain amount of time may prove unmanageable to other implementing actors that have less 
available funds at their disposal.  
The SWSSB initiative aims to improve the O&M of rural handpumps through introducing an 
additional bureaucratic layer on top of the CBM model that is responsible for external support 
services to communities. Although the progress report by Triple-S/IRC provides compelling 
evidence that the successes of the SWSSB are not convincing, hope is placed in capacity 
building (ironically of those that are expected to ‘build capacity’ themselves) and mending 
implementation processes. Remedies that may not be sufficient to improve the day-to-day 
management of rural handpumps and willingness to pay, as also highlighted in the discussion 
of case study Chapter 5.5. 
The chapter proceeds with an overview of the CBM-lite innovation that, unlike the Smart 
Handpump project and the SWSSB initiative, reconfigures the organisational and governance 
arrangements of the CBM model.  
 
 
6.3.2  The CBM-lite Model 
 
The CBM-lite model aims to improve the management and current parlous funding situation 
for O&M of the handpumps, so communities have access to a sustainably managed rural water 
point. The next empirical Chapter 7 will describe the development and implementation process 
of the CBM-lite model in detail. Table 6.4 compares the CBM and CBM-lite model, based on 
Bakker’s (2007) resource management categories and outlines the problem analysis of TWT on 
the CBM model. 
On an organisational level, the CBM-lite model replaces the voluntary WUC with a single 
Water Operator, contracted through a competitive application process, and responsible for the 
O&M of a cluster of village water points for a period of three years. The Water Operator fulfils 
an entrepreneurial and leadership role which may improve execution of O&M tasks: the 
presence of a local leader is found to be more important than the number of people managing a 
water point (Cleaver, 1999) and although van Koppen et al. (2012) warn against elite capture, 
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they demonstrate that most successful rural water schemes are usually operated by the better 
educated and business minded people. According to Foster et al (2015); Oxford/RFL (2014) 
and (Zeug 2011) clustering of water points aids the involvement of entrepreneurs and reduces 
financial risks as it enables economies of scale. As a result of pooling of funds, a water user fee  
of 1,000 UGX per household per month was maintained, out of which the Water Operator and 
caretakers would receive their remuneration. In addition, clustering may increase village-wide 
clarity on payment rules, a challenge found in the case study Chapter 5, and improve efficiency 
and achievability of post-construction support by the local government. Under CBM-lite the 
decisions concerning the rules of operation and sanctions for non-payment are to remain locally 
determined by the community, as under CBM. 
On an governance level, the CBM-lite model looks at incentives, accountability and sanctions. 
The CBM-lite model incentivises the Water Operator with financial remuneration drawn from 
the water user fees to promote a lasting motivation to carry out O&M duties, in other words the 
‘service’ has been formally commodified (see also Harvey, 2008). It is expected that a single 
Water Operator increases lines of accountability and motivation to deliver a reliable service, 
supported by Cooke (2001).  
The CBM-lite model tries to regain trust after the real or perceived previous misuse of collected 
water user fees (Golooba-Mutebi, 2005; Kamruzzaman et al. 2013; Naiga et al. 2015; Quin et 
al. 2011; van den Broek and Brown, 2015; Whittington et al., 2009) by storing the funds in a 
Savings and Credit Cooperative29(SACCO). This is anticipated, as Foster et al (2015) argue, to 
induce willingness to pay as a result of increased accountability and transparency. Funds for 
repairing handpumps can be accessed by the Water Operator through a form stating the costs 
of repair signed by the Hand Pump Mechanic (HPM) and the local leader of the village (referred 
to as LC I).  
The CBM-lite model extends the function of the SACCO through the incorporation of an 
insurance-style product to allow (major) repairs in the event that funds stored in the SACCO 
are not enough to cover such maintenance. The advantage of an insurance for handpumps is 
that breakdown costs can be calculated and projected by using existing data from the WASH 
cost benchmarks (Foster et al., 2015; Burr and Fonseca, 2013). Refer to methodology Chapter 
                                                          
29 In 2006, the government of Uganda capitalised SACCOs in each sub-county to increase access to finance in 
rural areas (Makoba, 2011).  
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4.11 and Table 4.6 for a detailed overview of the calculated repair costs for shallow wells and 
deep boreholes by the Washcost benchmarks (Burr and Fonseca, 2013).  
The Water Trust (TWT) created a contract that stipulated the roles and responsibilities of each 
actor (refer to Appendix 6.2). For the Water Operator, penalties for negligence were included 
(i.e. a fine of 10,000 shillings for a delay of SACCO payment) and space was provided for the 
locally agreed community by-laws dealing with matters as user payment, collection process and 
opening hours.  
The following study in Chapter 7 will describe the development and implementation process of 
the CBM-lite model based on original and rigorous action research, surveys and interviews over 
the course of two years. The case study chapter reflects upon the risk perceptions of key 
stakeholders regarding the CBM-lite innovation that may represent a more controversial model 
than initiatives as the Smart Handpump and SWSSB project because it alters the organisational 
and governance arrangements of the CBM model. An analysis of actors’ risk perception on 
CBM-lite is an opportunity to better understand what people consider to be of value and may 
help explain why innovations in the rural water sector tend to repeat the CBM formula. In order 
to do this, Section 6.4 introduces the relational risk theory (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011), that 
will be used in the discussion of case study Chapter 7 to frame the analysis. 
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Table 6.4 
Comparison Between the CBM and CBM-lite Model on Organisational and Governance Level and Identified Challenges Related to CBM According to The Water 
Trust (Table adapted from Bakker (2007 p. 443)) 
Category  CBM Challenges CBM CBM-lite solutions 
 
Resource 
management 
organisations 
 
Primary 
decision-makers 
 
Leaders and members 
of community 
organisations  
 
 
 
Leaders and members of the community 
 
  
Organisational 
structure  
 
Water User Committee  
 
Unclear leadership/Different rules per water 
source/Difficult to monitor and address 
handpump management with a WUC at each 
water source 
 
Water Operator  is responsible for a cluster of water 
points with a caretaker at each point (salaried) 
 
Resource 
Governance  
 
Accountability 
mechanism 
 
Community norms 
(money kept within 
community by WUC) 
 
Fear of misuse of funds and lack of trust by 
community members 
 
Periodic fixed payments to a micro-credit organisation, 
payment slips and access to the account is granted 
through approval of various signature holders. 
  
Key incentives 
 
Community opinion 
(i.e. non-financial) 
 
Lack of motivation and voluntarism 
 
Water Operator applies for the position (through a 
letter to the local government) and receives, with the 
caretakers, a financial compensation from the water 
user fees resulting from the clustering of water points. 
 
 Key sanctions Social pressure and 
communally agreed 
bye-laws 
Sanctions are not enforced. 
 
Social pressure and communally agreed by-laws 
enforced by Water Operator with LC I. Contract 
stipulate responsibilities and sanctions signed by key 
actors. 
 
 ‘Consumer’ role User and community 
member  
 Customer 
  
Participation of 
‘consumer’ 
 
Collective, bottom-up 
(voluntary attendance 
meetings & 
labour/works) 
 
Poor community participation in voluntary 
works 
 
Collective, bottom-up  
Attendance of meetings, but not public works 
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6.4 A paralysed Sector and The Relational Theory of Risk 
 
The observed perseverance to the CBM model may be sustained due to the very nature of 
innovation that involves risk-taking and unknown outcomes (Vasvári, 2015). Townsend (2013 
p. 24) writes that the public sector often becomes “paralytic” as a result of increased uncertainty 
and attributes its risk averse nature to the associated personal and organisational costs in case 
of failure (see also Stewart and Mackie, 2011). Prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) argues that decision-makers often focus on relative gains and losses and not on absolute 
values. As a result, people often tend to commit to objects they already possess or are inclined 
to overestimate the positive impact of the status quo (Vasvári, 2015). As Hámori (2003, p789 
in Vasvári, 2015 p. 37) writes: “deviation from the status quo is definitely judged by individuals 
to be of risk” (original text in italics). Similarly, and as also identified in Chapter 2.4.4, Douglas 
and Wildavsky (1982 p.93) warn that changes and ideas suggested by the centre are “… those 
best known and closest to existing programmes…”. They suggest that ‘real’ change may only 
come from boundary organisations “as the outsider sees more clearly and renewal comes from 
the margins of society” (p.189).  
Furthermore, diverging risk perceptions of different actors and individuals may influence the 
varying range of (cosmetic) innovations in the rural water sector. For interpreting how and why 
individuals and social groups have different risk perceptions of the same event, this thesis uses 
relational risk theory, developed by Boholm and Corvellec (2011) building on work by 
Hilgartner (1992). The relational theory of risk comprises three elements as depicted in Figure 
6.1. The first component, risk object, is something that is identified as a danger or harm. 
Examples include natural phenomena, manufactured products, behaviour, and in this thesis a 
new innovation in the rural water sector. The risk object is considered in some way and under 
certain circumstances to threaten the second component, the object at risk. The object at risk 
has human value and is linked to loss, vulnerability and the need for protection. This potential 
harm may or may not happen. Central is “the fact that there is no risk unless something of value 
is considered to be at stake” (Corvellec, 2010 p. 145). A relationship of risk (third component) 
must establish that it is the risk object that threatens the object at risk, and explain how and 
possibly why.   
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Figure 6.1  
A relational theory of risk (From Boholm and Corvellec (2011 p. 179)) 
 
[Risk object]                 (Relationship of Risk)                    [Object at risk] 
 
 
 
Interpretation is a key feature of the relational risk theory. Aspects of risk are constructed 
phenomena involving subjective connections made by an observer: “imagined, crafted, and 
established” (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011 p.180). Once identified, the risk object takes on a 
certain independence: it is fluid according to context. The risk object stands open to new 
interpretations and to related matters of risk. This viewpoint corroborates with the observation 
of Cleaver (2012) that Water User Committees (WUCs) (with roles as chairperson, secretary, 
etc.) draw on state-like bureaucracies as noted in the discussion of Chapter 5.5.1. Because 
government officials in Uganda are often perceived as highly corrupt (Transparency 
International, 2015), community members may transpose this perception to the WUC members.  
Nevertheless, as Latour (1996) highlights, risk objects and objects at risk are not fixed, but 
subject to reassessment that may change over time.  
Brown and van den Broek (under review) notice that “[t]he terms used in the theory are both 
clever and confusing: clever because risk and object are transposed underscoring the fluidity of 
risk; confusing because of their close similarity” (p. 6). As with Brown and van den Broek, this 
thesis replaces the terms with risk posing object and threatened object at risk to aid clarity. 
How and why value is manifested in a risk relationship is shaped by a person’s social and 
cultural identity (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011; Dobbie and Brown, 2014; Hilgartner, 1992; 
Slovic, 2001).  Social identity is related to social structure, formal and informal institutions 
(broadly defined as the “rules of the game” (North, 1990 p.3), values and knowledge and belief 
systems (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011 p. 178; Dobbie and Brown, 2014). Cultural identity is 
associated with subjective norms; an insight that was explored by Douglas (1985; 1992) who 
developed cultural theory as a framework to typify social relations to cultural subjective norms 
or worldviews: hierarchists, egalitarians, fatalists and individualists (refer to Figure 6.2). Useful 
within cultural theory is the recognition that in all societies the nature and strength of group ties 
vary: from those with stronger group ties, which may originate from a strongly held belief in 
order, stability, continuity and responsibility or, ties which stem from ideologically driven 
altruism. At the other end of the scale are those with weaker group ties, from those only 
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minimally committed to their community who ‘muddle through’ while burdened with 
unavoidable external forces, through to those who turn risks to business opportunities for 
themselves. There is a danger in rigidly applying such a ‘simplistic’ framework that tends to 
box people in four different categorises and simply links risk with cultural processes alone, as 
critics as Boholm (1996; 2003), Sjöberg (1996) and Forsyth (2003) have noted. Cultural theory 
should therefore be seen as a fluid model whereby people may have a different cultural 
worldview depending on their social context and where neither category is immune to the 
opinion of others (Tansey and O’Riordan, 1999). Boholm (2003) observes that the same 
external phenomenon (risk posing object) can result in widely varying interpretations 
(threatened object at risk) according to the strength and nature of group ties. Thus the same risk 
posing object, e.g. CBM-lite innovation, may be seen to destabilise order, harm a valued 
ideology, present a hurdle to free-riding or as a business opportunity which may possibly 
rebound and impose damage on the entrepreneur, exemplifying the fluidity of the risk posing 
object and threatened object at risk. These differences in members of a community are intrinsic 
to the notion of fluidity of risk, which simply does not come about without different perceptions 
of harm to different valued concepts. The key is in identifying what is held to be of value, and 
how it may be harmed. 
Dobbie and Brown (2014) argue that risk perceptions – being socially and culturally shaped – 
are influenced by attitudes relating to sense of fairness, trust and perceived control. From a 
psychological perspective which highlights the expression of attitude in interactions 
(Prikhodkine and Preston, 2015), an attitude refers to “a favourable or unfavourable evaluative 
reaction toward something or someone, exhibited in one’s beliefs, feelings, or intended 
behaviour” (Myers, 1993 p. 36). Within this viewpoint, attitudes have three different 
components: cognitive (thoughts, beliefs and ideas), affective (feelings of emotions that can 
evoke behaviour) and behavioural (intention to act in a certain way). Equally, Jung (1971 p. 
415) argues that an attitude represents the “readiness of the psyche to act or react in a certain 
way”. As described above, Dobbie and Brown (2014) stress that attitudes are the result of an 
individual’s or group’s social and cultural identity and influence the evaluation of the 
relationship between a risk posing object and a threatened object at risk.  
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 6                     Better The Devil You Know?  
 
149 
 
Figure 6.2 
Worldviews According to Cultural Theory (adapted from Renn (2008 p. 62)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attitudes related to sense of fairness can be either procedural (i.e. the decision-making process) 
or distributive (i.e. distribution of resources and burdens). Definitions of fairness may differ 
between actors as i.e. water practitioners and water users, and both may have a different 
relationship with perceived risk. For an adaptation to succeed it is important that people feel 
confident they can reap the fruits of the new water management arrangements (Forsyth, 2001). 
However, not all people will benefit the same way from an adaptation due to inequitable social 
relations shaped by class, gender, age and ethnicity (Cleaver, 2012). Further, Fischhoff et al. 
(1978) demonstrate the linkage between perceived control of a hazard to risk perception 
whereby an individual is likely to perceive lower risks with a familiar external phenomenon 
(see also Slovic,1992; Gould et al., 1988; Vlek 1996; Boholm 1998; Renn and Rohrmann 2000). 
Lastly, trust is key in the formation of a risk perception (Renn, 2008). For example, people may 
prefer ‘the devil they know’ such as CBM where risks and outcomes are known. Trust can relate 
to individuals and institutions (such as transparency of governance and accountability 
measures) or can relate to the service that requires trust (i.e. water quality). Furthermore, 
knowledge and trust are closely interlinked in relation to risk perception whereby knowledge 
about the risk posing object may result in increased trust and a reduction in perceived risk (Dake 
and Wildavsky, 1990).  
  
Fatalists 
 “Life is a lotter. Risks are out of 
our control; safety is a matter of 
luck.” 
Hierarchists 
 “Risks are acceptable as long as 
institutions have the routines to 
control them” 
Individualists 
 “Risks offer opportunities and 
should be accepted in exchange 
for benefits.” 
Egalitarians 
“Risks should be avoided unless 
they are inevitable to protect the 
public good”  
Acceptance of 
asymmetric rules 
(grid) 
Group 
cohesiveness 
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6.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter introduced an innovation in the sector – CBM-lite - designed by The Water Trust 
(TWT), under my direction as the TWT Programme Manager, to remedy the dearth of collected 
operation and inactivity of the Water User Committees (WUCs). CBM-lite aims to reduce 
handpump downtime by replacing the voluntary WUCs with an incentivised Water Operator to 
instigate the user pays principle, and through an insurance style micro-finance product that 
ensures funds are available for handpump repairs. Unlike contemporary new endeavours to 
improve handpump functionality such as the Smart Handpump project in Kenya and the ‘Sub-
county Water Supply and Sanitation Boards’ (SWSSB) in Uganda, the CBM-lite innovation 
refines organisation and governance arrangements of CBM, but as the rules of operation and 
enforcement of sanctions are communally arranged, remains within the existing institutional 
framework of CBM. Potentially it is an inexpensive and practical but controversial solution for 
rural water sustainability as it deviates from mainstream CBM. Noteworthy, the CBM-lite 
model demonstrates how ideas from mainstream institutionalism were intuitively incorporated 
in the design of the model, such as incentives, formal decision-making processes and rules, 
contractual agreements, drawing on local leaders and building local capacities to perform 
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) duties. 
The next chapter describes and reflects upon the development and implementation process of 
the CBM-lite model. The relational theory of risk will frame the discussion in this chapter. 
Here, the CBM-lite innovation is used as a lens to understand the intransigence in the sector. 
For this purpose, the proceeding Chapter 7 addresses research objective 3: to analyse the risk 
perceptions of community members, and local and national NGOs and government actors 
about the CBM-lite innovation.
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Chapter 7  
The Rise of the CBM-lite Model 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter30 describes and reflects upon the development and implementation process of the 
CBM-lite model; an alternative rural water management model. The CBM-lite model has been 
piloted by The Water Trust (TWT), a local NGO in mid-West Uganda and was the result of 
action research undertaken during my role as the TWT Programme Manager from June 2012 to 
January 2014. This chapter draws upon the findings of the action research during this period. 
For a detailed description about the action research and my individual role, data collection and 
analysis, I refer the reader to methodology Chapter 4. 
This present chapter links back to Chapter 6 that introduced the CBM-lite model. The analysis 
in the previous chapter, based on Karen Bakker’s (2007) three resource management categories 
(institutional, organisational and governance), showed that the CBM-lite model, unlike other 
contemporary initiatives in the rural water sector, deviates from mainstream CBM on both 
organisational and governance level. As a result,  the chapter concluded the CBM-lite model 
may represent a controversial initiative to actors in the rural water sector.  
Therefore, this chapter addresses the third research objective of this thesis and aims to 
understand the risk perceptions of community members, and local and national NGOs 
and government actors about the CBM-lite innovation. The chapter examines the value 
judgements of these various actors on the CBM-lite model and analyses actors’ risk perceptions 
according to the relational theory of risk by Boholm and Corvellec (2011) presented in Chapter 
6 to understand how and why something is considered a risk. This chapter uses the CBM-lite
                                                          
30 This chapter partly draws on the arguments of the paper ‘Better the devil you know? A relational reading of 
risk and innovation in the rural water sector’ by Brown and van den Broek (under review) 
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 model as a lens to understand the risk perceptions of local and national actors in the rural water 
sector on innovating rural water management arrangements. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 describes the motives of TWT to develop an 
alternative rural water management model. Section 7.3 reports on the feasibility study of the 
CBM-lite innovation that included: a financial study (7.3.1), exploring the feasibility of an 
insurance scheme for rural water sources (7.3.2) and, engaging with local stakeholders to elicit 
social acceptance for piloting the CBM-lite model (7.3.3). Section 7.4 describes the 
implementation process of the CBM-lite model in the pilot villages and Section 7.5 proceeds 
with a reflection on community members’ risk perceptions and attitudes at the time the village 
by-laws on resource use were created. Hereafter, Section 7.6 describes the proceedings in the 
CBM-lite pilot villages in the first six months after implementation. The chapter brings the 
empirical reflections of the action research and the relational risk theory (Boholm and 
Corvellec, 2011) together in Section 7.7. Here, the risks perceptions of the various actors about 
the CBM-lite model are discussed in-depth.    
The chapter shows a myriad of conflicting risk perceptions across community members, NGOs 
and local and national government actors with different underlying value judgments. Notably, 
it reveals a discomfort with the ‘user pays’ principle despite being a core element of CBM and 
a preference for the status quo – i.e. mainstream CBM. The chapter demonstrates changing risk 
perceptions among community members nearing the commencement of the CBM-lite model. It 
thereby questions the use of surveys, such as a ‘Willingness to Pay’ (WtP) survey, as a basis 
for rolling out rural water management innovations.  
 
 
7.2 Motives for Developing an Alternative Rural Water 
Management Model 
 
The CBM-lite model emerged as a response to the consensus between staff of The Water Trust 
(TWT) (a local Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) organisation) and Kiryandongo Local 
Government about the nature of handpump failing, largely due to a dearth of funds to pay for 
repairs and inactivity of the Water User Committees (WUCs). The development of an 
alternative water management model started with the observation by staff of the TWT and 
myself (having worked in northern Uganda prior to my station in Masindi) that handpump non-
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functionality and disrepair was a common occurrence, irrespective of location, type of 
handpump, implementer (NGO or government) and, ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. 
According to TWT staff, the rationale for non-payment often circulated around lack of 
accountability and mistrust of the WUC. As a community member in Nyakatugo said: “[t]he 
challenge of the WUC is that they don’t give accountability. That is why we lost trust in them” 
(13 September, 2013). 
The inactivity of the WUCs was often connected to the voluntary nature of their role and the 
hardship upon water user fees collections as community members often appeared unwilling to 
contribute funds to the WUC. As a participant said during a quarterly district meeting: “[t]here 
is no incentive to be part of the WUC” (27 November, 2013). The people that were willing to 
take responsibility for the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of the communal handpump 
were therefore scarce. A local government official in Masindi explained: “[t]hese people need 
to be harsh people, they should not mind if people don't like them” (14 June, 2014).  
Because TWT was small in size (one director and a Board of five members in New York and, 
one Programme Manager heading the field operations with fifteen local staff members) it was 
possible to explore alternatives that deviate from the CBM framework as it lacked the 
bureaucracy often characteristic to international NGOs. The search for an alternative rural water 
management model was supported by the view of other local actors who were of the opinion 
that “… CBM is just a concept” (Programme Manager HEWASA31, 5 November 2013) and 
stated that “[t]he Water User Committees are useless. It is just a matter of policy” (Engineer 
District Water Office Masindi, 14 June 2014). Despite, the support from local actors to explore 
an alternative rural water management structure, concern was raised by a WASH advisor based 
at an international NGO in Kampala who argued that: “… we have to follow the government 
guidelines” (24 November 2013). 
On a weekly basis, the TWT team and I discussed operational progress and brainstormed about 
possible ways to improve the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of water points. One avenue 
proposed was to privatise the ownership of water points to an individual in the community 
through a tendering process to induce the incentive to maintain the infrastructure. It was 
suggested that the individual owning the water point would have a self-interest to collect the 
water user fees as the individual  made a financial contribution (to i.e. the local community to 
fund a local project) to manage the water source. Yet, privatising the management of communal 
                                                          
31 A local WASH NGO in Masindi 
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handpumps was found too controversial for a number of reasons. First, to siphon ownership of 
a communal water source to an individual would collide with the Local Government Act (1997) 
that states communal water points are legally owned by the Ugandan local government. Second, 
conflict could arise about ownership over land and the water infrastructure as communal water 
sources are usually constructed on land owned by an individual from the community. Third, 
local consensus from community members, (local) government and politicians would be 
difficult to gain as a result on the emphasis on user payment and the potential exclusion of 
community members from the water source in case of non-payment by the ‘owner’ of the water 
source.  
The final development of the CBM-lite model was the outcome of the weekly staff meetings 
and numerous interactions and discussions with individual staff members, staff of other NGOs, 
community members, Hand Pump Mechanics (HPMs), local government officials in Masindi 
and Kiryandongo districts and Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) representatives over 
a period of twelve months. Chapter 6.3.2 provides a detailed description of the CBM-lite model. 
The exploration of the feasibility of the CBM-lite model and the engagement of the stakeholders 
happened concurrently before the CBM-lite model was rolled out. 
 
 
7.3  Exploring the Feasibility of CBM-lite 
 
This section describes the feasibility study of the CBM-lite model by The Water Trust (TWT) 
under my direction as the TWT Programme Manager. In total six villages were selected by 
TWT staff to explore the possibility for implementing a pilot study of the CBM-lite model. The 
villages were selected on the basis of non-operational or absent Water User Committees 
(WUCs). With approval of the district, sub-county and village Local Councillors32 (LC), each 
of these villages were mapped by TWT staff to locate the protected water points, open water 
sources, roads and main features of the village. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the 
implementation process of the CBM-lite model. The following sections will discuss each of 
these implementation steps in-depth. 
 
                                                          
32 The lowest of the five locally elected government representatives in the district.  
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Table 7.1 
Summary of the CBM-lite Implementation Steps (Author’s construct) 
Financial Feasibility 
 
Identify water usage of the households and their willingness to pay water user fees. 
Calculate estimated minor and major repair costs through: (1) Identifying type and status village handpumps 
(2) using the WASHcost benchmarks (Burr and Fonseca, 2013) and, (3) the sales of spare parts by TWT in the 
period 2009-2012.  
Calculate financial compensation for the Water Operators. 
 
Feasibility Insurance Scheme 
 
Explore financial status of the SACCO. 
Reach an understanding with the SACCO to function as an insurance scheme. 
Set the interest rate for the credit service. 
 
Engaging Local Stakeholders 
 
Gain government support to pilot the CBM-lite model. 
Conduct ‘Willingness to Participate’ survey amongst targeted pilot communities. 
Share CBM-lite model with other water practitioners. 
 
Implementation of the CBM-lite model 
 
Organise consultation meetings in each targeted pilot community. 
Conduct interviews with applications for the role of Water Operator and facilitate selection process. 
Carry out training for the selected Water Operators on the CBM-lite model. 
Ensure knowledge of roles and responsibilities through the signing of a contract by each actor involved in the 
CBM-lite model. 
Encourage the establishment of village by-laws on resource use. 
 
 
7.3.1  Financial Feasibility 
 
To determine the financial viability of the CBM-lite model, the following three issues were 
worked out: (1)  expected monthly water user fee collections, (2) estimated water system repair 
costs and, (3) payments to the Water Operators. To calculate the user fee collections, TWT staff 
conducted, under my direction, a Willingness to Pay (WtP) survey among all the households in 
the six villages. Refer to Appendix 4.3a for an outline of the WtP survey. The WtP survey was 
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considered important because water user payment would determine the feasibility of CBM-lite. 
In total 1138 households were surveyed of which 98.8 percent (1125 households), said they 
were willing to pay 1,000 UGX on a monthly basis “[a]s long as it is accounted for” (Nyakabette 
II) and “[b]ecause no one in this village cannot afford 1,000 shillings per month” (Kifuruta III). 
Only 13 households indicated they were not willing to pay any funds “[b]ecause there is another 
water source where they charge 5,000 per year” (Nyakatugo), or: “[a]t least on a seasonal basis, 
because there is a time when we do not have money” (Nyakabette II) and, “[i]t is too much for 
me because I am old” (Mpumwe).  
The maintenance and repair costs of the water sources in the villages were calculated through 
various methods to triangulate the findings and increase the reliability of the financial 
projections. First, the WASHcost benchmarks (Burr and Fonseca, 2013) (as presented in 
methodology Chapter 4.11, Table 4.6) were used as a basis to estimate the average minor and 
major repair costs of the Shallow Hand Dug Wells (SHDWs) and deep boreholes. Further, three 
Hand Pump Mechanics (HPMs) visited each village with a TWT staff member to check the 
status and the age of the water infrastructure in the villages. In addition, the repair costs were 
calculated on the basis of the sales of spare parts to the communities by TWT in the period 
between 2009-2012.  
Table 7.2 depicts the outcomes of the financial feasibility study for the three villages initially 
included in the pilot study. The first row shows the expected revenue in each village and 
includes the number of households and the total expected water user collection based on a 
monthly water user fee of 1,000 UGX. The second row in the table demonstrates the estimated 
expenditures. It shows the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs of the water sources over 
a period of three years and indicates the number of water sources in the particular village and 
their expected total minor and major repair costs. The sum of the O&M expenditures is covered 
in the insurance package of the Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) that remits the funds 
in case of a breakdown or maintenance service by the Hand Pump Mechanic (HPM). Based on 
this amount, the community pays an interest rate of 0,5 % per month to the SACCO. The total 
O&M costs include therefore the minor and major repair costs and the interest rate to the 
SACCO. The monthly payment to the SACCO covers 40% of the total monthly water user fee 
collection that enables the reimbursement of the projected O&M costs within a period of three 
years. The remaining 60% of the monthly water user fee collections is destined for the village 
Water Operator and the caretakers. 
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Table 7.2 
Financial Overview of CBM-lite Model in Mpumwe/ Mboira II/ Nyakatugo in Ugandan Shillings (UGX) (Author’s construct) 
Mpumwe   Mboira II 
 
Revenue 
  Nyakatugo  
 Demand (no. of households) 297  Demand  
(no. of households) 
147  Demand 
(no. of households) 
132 
Tariff 1,000   Tariff 1,000   Tariff 1,000  
Total revenue p/m 297,000   Total revenue p/m 147,000   Total revenue p/m 132,000  
 
Estimated O&M costs over a period of 3 years 
O&M minor repairs (633 water points) 1,539,000   O&M minor repairs (3 water points) 513,000   O&M minor repairs (3 water points) 769,500  
O&M major repairs (6 water points) 2,052,000   O&M major repairs (3 water points) 769,500   O&M major repairs (3 water points) 769,500  
Interest rate SACCO (0,5% per month)  646,380   Interest rate SACCO (0,5% per month)  230,850   Interest rate SACCO (0,5% per month)  277,000  
Total costs O&M 4,237,380   Total costs O&M 1,513,350   Total costs O&M 1,816,000  
        
Monthly payment SACCO (40%) 118,000   Monthly payment SACCO (40%) 43,000   Monthly payment SACCO (40%) 50,500  
    
Surplus 
    
Monthly remuneration Water Operator 197,000   Monthly remuneration Water Operator 
 
104,000   Monthly remuneration Water Operator 81,500  
                                                          
33 Mpumwe village counted eight Shallow Hand Dug Wells (SHDWs). Yet, two non-functional local government SHDWs were constructed in a swamp and yielded unsafe 
drinking water. These SHDWs were therefore not included in the CBM-lite pilot project.  
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A water user fee of 1,000 UGX per household per month (the amount advised by the local 
government) did not prove viable in one of the six studied villages due to low population density 
and high number of handpumps. Because TWT staff foresaw that an increase in water user fee 
would lead to discontent among community members, the village was excluded from the pilot 
programme. In the other studied villages, the fee for the Water Operator considerably 
supplemented the average local income of 185,000 UGX (UBOS, 2012) allowing the Water 
Operator to pay a stipend to the caretakers. Further, people unable to pay would not threaten 
the financial feasibility of the model as a non-payment rate of 11.5%34 would still make the 
earnings worthwhile for the Water Operator to conduct the tasks.   
 
 
7.3.2  Feasibility Insurance Scheme 
 
The approval of the Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) to function as an insurance 
scheme was key to the feasibility of the CBM-lite model. Through the ‘Uganda Savings and 
Credit Union Limited35’ (UCSCU) the SACCO in Kigumba town was approached, due to their 
reliable track record, good management and steady financial position.  The SACCO manager 
considered the CBM-lite model as a potential business opportunity: “[i]f this model works, 
other villages and Water Operators will follow” (17 April, 2013). In my role as the TWT 
Programme Manager, I presented the CBM-lite model to the board of the SACCO, the sub-
county and a representative of the district. The SACCO manager and the board agreed to be 
part of a pilot study and felt the risks were low as funds would only be released in case of a 
service and breakdown and it was believed that “[i]t is very unlikely that all handpumps break 
down at once” (SACCO manager, 16 June 2013). It was agreed to charge a monthly interest 
rate of 0,5 percent over the money borrowed for Operation and Maintenance (O&M). Each 
Water Operator was expected to invest in the project by opening a SACCO customer account 
costing 75,000 UGX (USD 26).  
                                                          
34 According to the Ugandan population census of 2013, seven percent of the people in Uganda are classified as 
elderly people (60 years and above) and 4,5 percent of the people in Uganda have a disability. Both are often 
poverty stricken.  
 
35 UCSCO is a national umbrella organisation to supervise and regulate SACCOs in a geographical area. 
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A major concern with storing community funds at a SACCO was however the possibility of 
bankruptcy as multiple SACCOs had collapsed in the past (Friends Consult, 2008). In addition, 
SACCOs operate on a small scale and differ in their quality of services. Due to these concerns, 
I explored the possibility to involve an insurance company rather than a SACCO as insurance 
companies operate at a larger scale and may have sufficient liquid assets and better internal 
accountability mechanisms. The Kigumba Sub-County Chief agreed and argued: “I have seen 
SACCOs closing and people losing their money. With an insurance company you are sure you 
will be compensated” (29 November 2013).  
I approached an insurance company with a branch in Masindi and that was planning to open a 
branch in Kigumba town, Kiryandongo distict.  The Masindi branch Manager was interested to 
explore the possibility to develop an insurance scheme for handpumps in rural areas as it could 
potentially lead to a substantial increase in clientele. Hence, we drafted a possible insurance 
policy that could enable the insurance of handpumps on a large(r) scale. Refer to Appendix 7.1 
for the outline of the draft handpump insurance policy. 
To gauge political support to insure handpumps through an insurance company, we presented 
the idea to the Board of Masindi local government. The response was clear-cut: “we like the 
idea, but without the insurance.” Insurance companies were “…not trust-worthy” (District 
Chairman, 27 November 2013).  The District Chairman continued: “I would never ensure my 
property, if something happened they already would have eaten my money! And, what would 
happen if the handpumps don’t breakdown?” Similarly, the District Water Officer (DWO) of 
Masindi felt that the involvement of an insurance company would be too risky. “In the event 
the Water Operator defaults, what will the insurance company take from him?” (15 November 
2013).   
The Board of the insurance company was at first interested to look at the possibility to insure 
handpumps. However, after eight months of internal consultation the conclusion of the 
management Board was that the company could never insure handpumps as they were not 
willing to ensure against wear and tear and the replacement of spare parts. Moreover, in January 
2015, the Uganda Insurance Regulatory Authority withdrew the license of the company due to 
mismanagement. As such, besides the general prejudices against insurance companies, the 
insurance scheme proved indeed a risky business for the O&M of rural water points.  
 
Chapter 7  The Rise of the CBM-lite Model 
160 
 
7.3.3  Engaging Local Stakeholders  
 
The Water Trust (TWT) verified the appetite to pilot the CBM-lite model with a range of local 
and national actors to elicit social acceptance of the proposed innovation. The actors included 
the local government of Masindi and Kiryandongo district, community members in the targeted 
pilot villages, a range of NGOs and a representative of the Ministry of Water and Environment 
(MWE) at national government level. 
 
 
Local Government: 
 
Despite a shared problem analysis about handpump failure, officials from Masindi and 
Kiryandongo district had different opinions about a possible way forward for addressing 
handpump non-functionality. Refer to context Chapter 3.3.1 and Table 3.1 for a detailed 
overview of the local government structure in Uganda. In Kiryandongo, the District Water 
Officer (DWO) and the Sub-County Chief of Kigumba welcomed a pilot study of the CBM-lite 
model. “This pilot is good as people will feel their money is secure” (Sub-County Chief 
Kigumba, 13 June 2013). The DWO of Kiryandongo expected the CBM-lite model to increase 
handpump functionality as “…this is unlikely to happen with the current [CBM] system” (20 
August 2013).”  Nevertheless, the DWO was worried that politicians could interfere in the pilot: 
“[l]et us hope politicians don’t come in to pay for the community. When something becomes 
political the idea can die out. People always look for ways for avoiding something” (ibid.).  
The DWO of Masindi did not support a pilot of the CBM-lite model. Risk of poor services and 
misuse of funds by the Water Operator were felt too high. “We need guarantees that the Water 
Operator performs and does not eat the money” (DWO Masindi, 12 June, 2013). In response, 
TWT tried to minimise the risk of misuse of funds through: (1) the use of signatures (of the 
Hand Pump Mechanic, Water Operator and LC I) to access the SACCO account, (2) the use of 
a contract (refer to Appendix 6.2) that stipulates the sanctions of misconduct and (3) close 
supervision of the Water Operators by the sub-county and TWT staff. Despite these measures, 
the DWO of Masindi was not convinced misuse of funds could be prevented.  
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Community Members: 
 
To measure public support for a pilot study of the CBM-lite model, a survey was carried out in 
six villages to explore the willingness of individuals to support the roll out of the CBM-lite 
model in their village. This ‘Willingness to Participate’ survey, presented in Appendix 4.3b, 
involved a total of 150 community members of which the majority were female. The six 
potential pilot villages were identified by TWT staff and shared inactive Water User 
Committees (WUCs) and handpumps in disrepair. The ‘Willingness to Participate’ survey was 
designed by the author and carried out by staff of TWT. Refer to methodology Chapter 4  and 
Appendix 4.1 for a detailed description about the selection of respondents and the 
administration and analysis of the surveys. 
TWT staff explained the CBM-lite model to the respondents of the ‘Willingness to Participate’ 
survey and asked participants if they would support: 
1) a single Water Operator from and living in the community to manage all the water 
sources in the village for a period of three years; 
2) the Water Operator to store community funds in a SACCO bank account and to be 
involved in an insurance scheme; 
3) to recompense time of the Water Operator in keeping the water systems running and, 
4) to pay a monthly water user fee of 1,000 UGX.   
Figure 7.1 summarises the responses as percentage of the total respondents agreeing or 
disagreeing with the statements listed.   
 
 
Figure 7.1 
Results Willingness to Participate in CBM-lite Model (N=150) 
 
93.3
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Willing to pay 1,000 UGX
Agrees to have one manager for all village water
points
Agrees that manager stores the funds on the bank
account of the SACCO
Agrees that part of the money collected is the
incentive for the manager
No Yes
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To interpret people’s answers, TWT staff asked respondents why they agreed or disagreed with 
the individual component of the CBM-lite model. What follows is a brief summary of 
respondent’s answers. 
 
 
Water User Payments: 
 
As shown in Figure 7.1, the vast majority of the respondents were positive to implement a pilot 
study of the CBM-lite model in their village. Water user fee payment was considered tolerable 
due to improved transparency and accountability mechanisms and the prospect of well-
maintained community sources as a result of the CBM-lite model. 
 
 
A Single Water Operator: 
 
The use of a single Water Operator for a cluster of water sources raised most of the concern. 
Respondents that agreed to have one Water Operator to manage all the water points in the 
village (81,3%) predominantly reasoned that clear responsibilities, could enhance the 
maintenance of the handpumps and the payments of the water user fees. These respondents 
said: “[h]e will be directly questionable to us” (Mboira II),[i]n case of a problem we know who 
to attack” (Nyakatugo) and, “[i]t's easier by one person” (Mpumwe). According to these 
respondents, a responsible operator could bring about […] “a change from WUCs which are 
always inactive” (Nykabette). 
Motives to not support one Water Operator responsible for all the water points in the village 
(18,7 %)  were expressed as lack of trust, and the fear of misuse of funds and power. For 
example:  “[y]ou cannot trust an individual” (Nyakatugo); “[h]e comes with new laws and stop 
us from accessing water” (Mpumwe) and, “[w]e are not sure if he will give services without 
eating the money” (Mpumwe). Others felt that an individual, in contrast to a group like the 
WUC, would “… take away our powers as water users” (Mpumwe). “Because the person 
managing can be dishonest and exploit people for all those three years” (Kifuruta III). And, 
“[h]e might mismanage the water sources by overcharging” (Mboira II). Another reason to not 
support one Water Operator, despite the use of water source caretakers, was the conviction that 
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one individual could simply not handle the community but needed more people to fulfil the 
tasks of collections and maintenance.  
 
 
Involvement SACCO and Handpump Insurance: 
 
Respondents that agreed with the involvement of the SACCO in storing funds and enabling an 
insurance scheme (87,3%), felt that securing the funds through the SACCO could increase 
willingness to pay because “[m]oney will be kept well” (Mboira II) and  “[e]ven if this person 
has a sick person he/she cannot access the money” (Nyakatugo). Further, most respondents 
liked the insurance package: “[i]n most cases the water source breaks down and the WUC does 
not have money to repair but here the community is assured” (Nyakabette II). Participants that 
questioned the use of the SACCO (12,7%) did not trust the Water Operator to bring the funds 
to the SACCO: “[h]e will misuse the money” (Nyakatugo). Or, did not trust the SACCO: “[i]t 
is not easy to monitor money which is in a bank” (Nyakabette II). 
 
 
Financial Incentive Water Operator: 
 
Respondents in favour of an incentive for the Water Operator from the funds collected (89,3%) 
supported a quid pro quo mode: “[h]e will work hard because he needs a profit as well” 
(Nyakatugo) and  “[h]e will be able to move and monitor all shallow wells and maintain them” 
(Mpumwe). Respondents that did not want to incentivise the Water Operator (10,7%) 
mistrusted a single Water Operator and felt that “[h]e might look at maximising profits and not 
at people getting clean water” (Nyakatugo) or, averse of private interests said: “[t]he 
chairperson WUC can also do that” (Mpumwe). 
The outcomes of the ‘Willingness to Participate’ and the ‘Willingness to Pay’ survey provided 
the justification and the feasibility to roll out a pilot study. Financially, the CBM-lite model 
proved feasible in four pilot villages. The clustering of the village water sources generated 
sufficient funds to cover projected handpump maintenance and repair costs, SACCO interest 
rates and a stipend to the Water Operator and caretakers.   
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5.4.3.1 NGOs at National Level: 
 
At the conceptual stage in August 2013, I shared the rationale and principles of the CBM-lite 
model at a meeting with local and international NGO representatives based in the capital 
Kampala. The problem analysis of CBM-lite was not well received. “I have just visited a village 
last week and the Water User Committee was doing fine,” while another participant stressed 
that “our organisation believes in the strengths of the Water User Committee.”  Although the 
organisations recognised problems with payments of water user fees, they saw the solution in 
“strengthening” the CBM model by “full involvement of the community”, “encouraging”, 
“sensitising” and “building capacity” of people to pay and “changing their mind sets”. A prime 
concern was the emphasis on user payment, potentially harmful to the health of community 
members as they were anticipated to use open and contaminated water points to shun payment. 
Participants could not see “… how the community benefits from this kind of operation”  and 
raised concerns about the attitude of the Water Operators to community members in cases of 
non-payment. Another objection was the use of the SACCO as an insurance company because 
“… they are not an insurance company”. The NGO representatives were worried that 
innovations as CBM-lite could harm the sector due to lack of policy coherence and consistency. 
In sum, scepticism about the model dominated the discussion and responses on the model were 
discouraging. The Director of the Uganda Water and Sanitation Network (UWASNET) 
concluded with the advice: “come back when you have evidence that the model is working.”  
 
 
National Government:  
 
In addition to the NGO meeting, I met with the Director of the Directorate of Water and 
Development (DWD) of the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) to receive feedback 
about the CBM-lite model. Similar to the concern expressed by the NGO representatives, the 
Director viewed the CBM-lite innovation as a potential threat to the CBM framework. He 
stressed: “[w]e have the O&M framework. We are happy about this. I request the NGOs to 
support the Water User Committees. To me it doesn’t matter if you leave. As long as you don’t 
disorganise the framework. The government does not have the flexibility to try out. For us we 
have to get it right the first time” (25 November 2013).  
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7.4 Implementation of the CBM-lite Model 
 
Despite the criticism of the NGOs in Kampala and the Director of DWD about the CBM-lite 
model, four of the six surveyed villages were selected by the District Water Officer (DWO) of 
Kiryandongo and The Water Trust (TWT) to take part in the pilot study. Three villages 
(Mpumwe, Mboira II and Nyakatugo) participated in the CBM-lite pilot from August 2013 and 
one village (Nyakabette II) was enrolled in the programme in October 2014. Refer to context 
Chapter 3.6 for a background description of the pilot villages.  
The pattern of implementation was similar in each village. A consultation meeting was 
organised to discuss the status of village water sources and to present the CBM-lite model. 
Actors that facilitated these meetings were: TWT staff members, the Sub-County Chief, a 
Community Development Officer (CDO) of the sub-county and the SACCO Manager. I 
attended the information meetings about the CBM-lite model in three villages; Mpumwe, 
Mboira II and Nyakatugo. For the sub-county staff and SACCO Manager to attend, TWT 
arranged transport and paid an allowance36. The people were mobilised by the Local Councillor 
(LC) I of the village. On average, a small proportion of the population attended these meetings 
(usually between 50-80 people) out of 279 households 37  in Mpumwe, 147 households in 
Nyakatugo and 132 households in Mboira II. During the meeting, the option to apply for the 
position of Water Operator was brought forward, including the day and time for the selection.  
In every village people applied for the position of Water Operator: three in Mpumwe, eight in 
Mboira II, seven in Nyakatugo and five in Nyakabette II. Each applicant was interviewed by 
the Sub-County Chief, Sub-County CDO, SACCO Manager and a TWT staff member. I 
attended the interview and selection process in three villages (Mpumwe, Nyakatugo and 
Nyakabette II). After the interviews the Water Operator was selected by the community.  
In Mpumwe and Nyakabette II, a group of around fifty community members requested the three 
candidates to pitch why they would be the best Water Operator. After the pitch, the candidates 
were asked to turn their backs to allow people to vote their favourite candidate anonymously. 
Unlike the other villages, people in Nyakabette II selected a lady because “… she ha[d] “proved 
to be trustworthy in her tasks as a caretaker.” Refer to Appendix 7.2 for a short video about the 
selection procedure in Nyakabette II. 
                                                          
36 The Government of Uganda set standard allowance rates for officials. 
37 The average household in Uganda consists of 6-9 members (UBOS, 2014) 
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In Mboira II, only one person stood out from the interviews to become the Water Operator. 
“People were drunk and had no idea what the position involved” (TWT staff member, 1 July 
2013). As a result, the Water Operator was selected by the interviewers with the approval of 
the LC I.  In Nyakatugo, none of the community members turned up to select the Water 
Operator. As a result, the LC I selected the “most trust-worthy” community member for the role 
of Water Operator (4 July 2013). 
In sum, the candidates that were selected were relatively affluent in comparison to other village 
members, successful in business, educated and considered to be reliable and responsible 
individuals. Refer to Appendix 7.3 for a background of the selected Water Operators.  
After the selection in July 2013, TWT and the SACCO organised a two day training event to 
train the Water Operators in finances, the relationship with the SACCO and to clarify roles and 
responsibilities of the different actors involved in the CBM-lite model. Challenges that could 
arise from the management model were discussed and portrayed via role play activities. The 
Water Operators, the Sub-County Chief and the SACCO Manager signed a contract that 
stipulated the mutually agreed services and obligations of each party. Space was left for the by-
laws (locally agreed rules for resource use) to be made in each village (refer to Appendix 6.2 
for a copy of the contract).  
 
 
7.5 Setting the By-Laws and Changing Risk Perceptions 
 
At the time of implementation and the establishment of the village by-laws on resource use, a 
considerable change took place in the risk perceptions of community members. During these 
community meetings facilitated by the Water Operators and, mostly attended by men, the 
foremost concern was payment. The surveys had shown a large support base for the pilot, yet 
in all villages community members argued that: “1,000 UGX is too much for us to pay!” 
(Nyakabette II, 13 June 2014). Although some community members responded that “…a bottle 
of beer costs 3,000 shillings, why not spend 1,000 shilling for water per month? (Nyakabette 
II, 13 June, 2014)” the announcement of monthly water user payments by the Water Operator 
caused commotion, despite agreement to exempt those unable to pay. In Mpumwe, a 
community member stressed: “[y]ou cannot touch where your height cannot reach” (9 August, 
2013). Equally, others argued: “[l]et people pay what they can, either annual, seasonal or 
monthly” (9 August, 2013). Additionally, the need to pay water user fees for a functional 
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handpump was difficult to grasp and led to a dissatisfaction with paying 1,000 shillings: “can 
we not pay 500 shillings per month” (9 August, 2013)? 
Additional risk was perceived by the Water Operators in relation to their social standing as a 
direct result of water user payment and being salaried from user payments. First, the Water 
Operators worried that people would elude payments through i.e. harassing the collectors, 
claiming to be part of another household38 or informally requesting to pay at a later time. 
Resistance to payment, would require strong action from the Water Operator to keep the work 
load within bounds and to ensure the financial viability of CBM-lite. Yet, strong action could 
harm personal wellbeing, reputation and social standing in the community. The female Water 
Operator in Nyakabette II said in her inauguration speech to the community: “I am going to be 
in full support of this project. I don’t want you to charm me because I am hard” (13 June, 2014). 
Second, the Water Operators feared to communicate their earnings to community members, 
although the financial incentive was made clear at the start of the pilot study. In Mpumwe, the 
Water Operator claimed he was volunteering, reasoning afterwards that: “it is very bad to hear 
for community members that I will earn money” (9 August, 2013). 
The Water Operators also feared the former WUC members to disrupt the CBM-lite model. The 
Water Operator in Nyakatugo said: “[t]he Water User Committees are resisting now. They don’t 
want to talk about the money they thought I would dig… so they dodge. They did not come to 
the meetings. They want free access to water” (7 August, 2013). Although, the LC I of 
Nyakatugo claimed that the WUCs could not disrupt the model, the community by-laws were 
the only recourse to defy unwanted behaviour and deter water users from free-riding, see Table 
7.3 for an example of by-laws made in Mpumwe. In Nyakabette II, a community member raised 
a precarious risk: “[a]re there people that can arrest those people that are not willing to pay39?” 
(13 June, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Polygamy is common in this area and adult children frequently live on the same compound as their parents. 
 
39 The Public Health Act requires every household to have access to a sanitary facility. In case households do not 
have a latrine, they can be arrested by the sub-county. Paying for water is not an official by-law in Uganda. 
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Table 7.3  
Community By-laws Mpumwe 
- Confiscate jerry cans after three warnings in one month and in case the owner fails to pay within three 
days, the jerry can will be sold. 
- If anyone is got breaking the padlock a tougher action to the LCI court and then to the police must be 
taken. 
- The water source must open at 7.00 am, close at 1.00 pm, open at 2.00 pm and close at 7.00 pm in the 
evening. 
 
 
7.6  Initial Observations of the CBM-lite Model 
 
After the by-laws for resource use were created during a community meeting in each pilot 
village, CBM-lite commenced in August 2013. The village by-laws were documented in the 
contract that stipulated the responsibilities of each actor (sub-county, SACCO, Water Operator, 
water users) and a copy of the contract was handed over to all parties. To aid water user fee 
collection from the households in the village, TWT provided a copy of the output of the 
Willingness to Pay (WtP) survey to the Water Operators, as it included a comprehensive 
overview of the households in the village stating they were willing to contribute 1,000 UGX.  
During the first months of the pilot study, the Water Operators maintained and repaired non-
functional handpumps in the village. In this period, the Water Operators collected sufficient 
funds to pay the monthly fee to the SACCO (view Appendix 7.4 for a deposit slip of Mpumwe 
at the SACCO). While not every household contributed, a number of households paid for 
several months at once. Although, some community members had reservations about the pilot, 
most people argued they no longer had trust in the Water User Committee (WUC). For example, 
a community member in Nyakatugo said: “The community lost trust in the WUC. The new 
system will cause some change. People were doubting the pilot sometimes but now people are 
seeing a benefit of having a manager. And at the moment there is a sure way of getting the 
pumps repaired (13 September 2013)”.  
At the start of the pilot, repairs were carried out quickly by using the collected funds. “One of 
the handpumps broke down in the morning and in the evening it was repaired (Water Operator 
Nyakatugo, 10 December 2013). In Mpumwe, two previously and long-term broken 
handpumps were repaired after two months of the start of the pilot study. These repairs in 
Mpumwe were possible due to the option of taking a loan at the SACCO (referred to as the 
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handpump insurance scheme). In both Mboira II and Nyakabette II, one handpump was repaired 
soon after the start of the pilot in the village. Refer to Appendix 7.5 and 7.6 for a video of the 
Nyakatugo Water Operator and the Mpumwe Water Operator about their experiences with the 
CBM-lite pilot at the initial phase of the project.  
Optimism about the pilot prevailed among staff of the local NGO and local government officials 
at the sub-county, due to the water user fee payments, the monthly deposits in the SACCO 
account and the ability of the Water Operators to maintain the handpumps and repair previously 
broken handpumps. The sub-county internal security officer (GISO) who was involved in a 
number of community meetings prior to the start of the pilot study, assured at the start of the 
pilot: “The pilot is good as people will feel the money is secure. They have been sensitised, 
were interested and many partners have been involved in this process” (12 August, 2013).  
The Sub-County Chief of Kigumba numerously requested TWT to increase the number of pilot 
villages to ensure more communities would pay for the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of 
their handpumps. He pointed out: “[p]eople are complaining why other community members 
are not paying for water. We want this pilot project also in other villages. Roll this project out 
in other communities and everybody shall pay” (5 November, 2013). Similarly, during a 
quarterly budget meeting at the Kigumba sub-county, the Area Councillors promoted the 
enrolment of the CBM-lite model in all villages within the sub-county (NGO staff member, 10 
December 2013).  
 
 
7.7 Discussing Actors’ Risk Perceptions 
 
The above account described the development and implementation process of the CBM-lite 
model. The chapter ended the narrative after six months the CBM-lite model was implemented. 
Before I continue with the developments in the pilot villages in the proceeding Chapter 8, I now 
turn to research objective three that aims to apprehend actors’ risk perceptions about the 
CBM-lite innovation to gain a deeper understanding why rural water management innovations 
tend to only marginally deviate from the CBM model. This discussion reflects on the case study 
and operationalises the relational theory of risk (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011) presented in 
Chapter 6. 
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Although the CBM-lite model endeavours to improve reliable access to water by addressing 
non-payment and inactivity of the Water User Committee (WUC) in the CBM model, the model 
contains multiple risk objects. The most prominent risk object was a single and paid Water 
Operator, which will be reflected upon in more detail below. This risk object endorses multiple 
threatened objects at risk and allows an explanation how and why innovations in the rural water 
sector pose risks to local and national actors, view Table 7.4 for an overview. The analysis on 
CBM-lite below, simultaneously illustrates the consequences of innovation for the sector as a 
whole. Whereas conceptions of risk are socially and culturally biased it is important to bear in 
mind that the interpretation of risk is equally coloured by the worldview of the analyst.  
Bakker’s (2007) resource management categories are helpful to unravel at what level innovation 
is taking place. CBM-lite reconfigures the organisational and governance arrangements of the 
CBM model but does not alter the institutional level. While a single paid Water Operator for a 
cluster of water sources with ready access to Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds at the 
SACCO replaces the voluntary WUCs, community members remain responsible for the 
development of locally agreed rules for resource use, carry out the sanctions and the handpumps 
are still owned by the community. The CBM-lite model aims to strengthen the water user pays 
principle but fundamentally changes one of the key pillars of CBM by removing voluntary 
collective action. 
Central NGOs in Kampala felt uncomfortable with replacing the WUC with a single Water 
Operator because it threatens the ideology of community management and the strong belief in 
people’s willingness to volunteer for the common good. In their view, management problems 
are the result of weak implementation processes or lack of capacity building. Therefore, the 
problem of non-payment was not a reason to remove the WUC.  
Another threatened object at risk was a deeply held sense of fairness on behalf of the 
community, that the use of a single Water Operator concentrates power into the hands of a 
single person, a risk also shared by Masindi District. Such views are in conflict with the 
emerging interest to ‘professionalise’ rural water management arrangements as discussed in 
Chapter 6.2. Profiting from water however, remains highly contentious (as also highlighted in 
Chapter 2.4.3) as the responses from NGO on a salaried Water Operator in the case study 
demonstrates because the participants feared the Water Operators could deny community 
members access to water. Interventions that consider to commodify the ‘good’ as well the 
‘service’ may therefore meet considerable resistance. 
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Table 7.4    
Summary Effect Single Paid Water Operator (Risk Posing Object) on Threatened Objects at Risk to Local and National Actors in the Rural Water Sector (Author’s 
construct) 
Threatened Object 
at Risk 
Effect of a single paid Water Operator on 
Threatened Object at Risk 
Effect of Threatened Object at Risk on Handpump 
Functionality 
Actors 
Health Water user payment may lead to the use of 
unprotected and contaminated water sources 
No direct effect Central NGOs 
Ideology Removes voluntary collective action; a main 
pillar of CBM 
No direct effect Central NGOs 
Policy coherence CBM-lite deviates from the CBM model No direct effect Central NGOs and central 
government 
Organisational 
reputation 
Uncertainty about the outcomes. Failure may 
cause reputational damage. 
No direct effect Central NGOs/ central 
government/ Masindi local 
government 
Concentration of 
power 
A single Water Operator removes collective 
decision-making and responsibility 
No direct effect Central NGOs/ Masindi local 
government 
Money Loss of  (scarce) household funds  Unwillingness to pay may lead to a deficit of O&M funds Community members 
Uneven distribution 
of wealth  
 
Economic disparity could disrupt social 
relations 
If payment to the Water Operator is perceived to be unfair, 
people may resist to pay, leading to a deficit of O&M funds. 
Community members/ Masindi 
local government 
Elected status and 
benefits 
WUC members removed from their position 
and expected to contribute water user fees 
WUC members may resist the Water Operator and 
implementation of the CBM-lite model 
Former WUC members 
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Although the CBM-lite model did not raise the water user fee, the enforcement of payment due 
to an incentivised Water Operator was perceived to put community members at risk because it 
could push people to use open and contaminated water. This motive of health may shield an 
underlying object at risk: a strongly held belief that water should be for free. As demonstrated 
in the first case study Chapter 5, free-riding appeared the norm under the CBM model. It is 
often communicated by NGOs that communities need to get used to paying for water. Jones 
(2011 p.67) writes for example:“[t]he attitude of [organisation X] is based on a belief that 
traditional rural views on water being ‘free’ can gradually be changed by education until users 
accept the need to contribute to cost recovery”. Yet, the view that water should not be paid for, 
might be sustained by NGOs who themselves object to user payment as also observed by Carter 
et al. (2010) and Quin et al. (2011). The implication is that NGOs may not really agree with the 
user pays principle; ironically a fundamental principle of the CBM model they vividly seem to 
protect.   
Central government and NGOs fear CBM-lite might threaten policy coherence. Innovations 
could create confusion and weaken government policy and control. It is therefore argued that 
experiments cannot be at the cost of CBM. Further, donors have funded CBM for a long period 
and an openly displayed dissatisfaction with CBM could threaten funding streams. This 
sentiment was clearly reflected in a personal email conversation with the Coordinator of an 
international NGO network about the study of ‘van den Broek and Brown’ (2016), on the 
outcomes of the CBM model: “[w]e all know that CBM has limitations, but instead of 
continually beating ourselves up about it, we need to look for positive solutions, otherwise the 
level of investment in rural water supply will continue to be low because donors and 
government will not see it as an area to invest in, and instead focus their efforts on transport, 
energy and health….” (23 December 2015). Criticism directed at the CBM model appears not 
appreciated and the focus on maintaining funding streams may constrain innovation in the rural 
water sector.  
In addition, central government and central NGOs felt little room for experimentation as failure, 
and unexpected consequences may severely damage the actor’s reputation. The fear of taking 
risk, however, has a negative impact on the quality of public policy (Towsend, 2013 p. 24). 
Parsons (2006 p. 6) writes: “[w]hen fear of failure replaces a capacity to experiment and create 
trial and error learning, the result is unlikely to be an artefact that actually works”. The findings 
support thereby also the proposition of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982 p. 189), that the “…centre 
is too constricted in its casing of institutional habits”  and that “no change ever comes from the 
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centre, all innovation comes from without”. This explains the commitment to the status quo as 
the most reliable option to avoid negative consequences. 
Both actors, NGOs and central government, have strong group ties and are committed to the 
CBM model. This may explain why it is unlikely to see radical change from these actors and 
why ideas from the ‘centre’ are “those best known and closest to existing programs” (Douglas 
and Wildavsky, 1982 p.93). As sector wide change is a top down process (Townsend, 2013), 
the sustenance of the status quo is causing an inertia in the sector which implicates the silent 
acceptance of a one third breakdown rate of rural handpumps.  
At the local level, group ties appeared to be looser. Among community members, money was 
the biggest threatened object at risk. Affordability of water user fees is often claimed to be no 
issue (Bey et al., 2015;Chowns, 2014; Fonseca, 2014; Harvey, 2008) and water user fees (1,000 
UGX) were often compared to the costs of a bottle beer (3,000 UGX), representing three times 
the value of a monthly water contribution. However, in rural areas, money remains scarce and 
paying for an open-access handpump may encourage the decision to prioritise other needs. In 
addition, the risk of payment may have been influenced by an underlying risk perception: 
household money being used to pay the Water Operator. A paid Water Operator appeared to 
threaten community’s sense of fairness (Dobbie and Brown, 2014), an attitude shared by 
Masindi District. Community payments to the Water Operator threatens an informal code of 
conduct of even distribution of wealth; a deeply underlying threatened object at risk. Allowing 
a Water Operator to profit in a resource poor context appeared to propel a sense of distributional 
unfairness that could incur jealousy and destabilise community relations, potentially leading to 
a resistance to pay water user fees. This shows the messy web of community relations involving 
informal and formal social norms, with loose group ties at the one hand exemplified by mistrust, 
the lack of willingness to volunteer and strong collective codes of conduct people might fear to 
break at the other hand. Ironically, this may point at an inertia to change at community level 
where any initiative to generate community funds may be resisted and where the risk of lack of 
funds to repair a handpump may be taken for granted.  
Previous WUC members often represent the elite within a community (van Koppen et al., 
2012). Their threatened object at risk was their position and benefits as access to water user 
funds and free access to water were now lost as a result of the CBM-lite model. They expressed 
their dissatisfaction by withholding the community funds from the Water Operators. These 
powerful actors may not automatically accept the new water management arrangements 
induced by TWT and might disrupt the implementation of the model.  
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A central feature of a relational reading of risk, is that a risk object (such as a single paid Water 
Operator in this discussion) can simultaneously be a threatened object at risk and vice versa. 
The community member’s objects at risk, such as money, even distribution of wealth and 
elected status and benefits of the WUC, may become a risk posing object to the Water Operators 
and TWT. The Water Operators viewed their role and the business opportunity at risk. The 
selected Water Operators were successful local entrepreneurs that saw an opportunity in the 
CBM-lite model to supplement their income. Although they shared traits of an individualistic 
worldview, they were not indifferent to public opinion. They recognised the potential difficulty 
of collecting funds and the weak potency of the community by-laws to deter free-riding. The 
failure to collect water user fees would threaten their valued business opportunity. 
Concurrently, their generated financial incentive would come at a price. Social and economic 
disparity is a known source of tension in rural areas and affluent community members are 
expected to support their kin and poorer community members (Ferguson, 1999; Golooba-
Mutebi, 2005; Niehaus, 2001; Pottier, 1988). The Water Operators were already higher 
educated and financially better-off than other community members. Collecting funds from less 
wealthy households and earning a remuneration of the collected funds may therefore be a source 
of conflict that could threaten the social standing of the Water Operator. Equally the 
anthropologist David Maranz (2001 p. 111) observes that people in rural settings are “… afraid 
to accumulate more goods or property than their neighbours and kin, for fear of creating 
jealousy which may lead to reprisals being carried out against them on an occult level”. This 
may explain why the Water Operators pretended there was no remuneration involved.  
The SACCO was viewed as a risk posing object by a number of community members and local 
government officials. There was a lack of understanding how insurance works and that 
continued insurance is required to enable speedy repairs. Paying for something that is not 
broken appeared difficult to grasp and could pose another risk object to CBM-lite. The SACCO 
might also become a threatened object at risk if the Water Operators are not able to pay the 
monthly fee and the SACCO cannot fulfil its services. 
The case study showed a remarkable shift in risk perceptions through the pilot development. 
While the surveys showed almost unanimous support to pilot the model and pay water user 
fees, at implementation stage a different picture emerged. In the meetings there was a growing 
dissatisfaction about payment, which may threaten the viability of CBM-lite. A possible 
explanation for the different results in the surveys might be that all pilot villages had problems 
with their handpumps and the picture of a well-managed handpump may have inflated 
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enthusiasm. Second, a gender element might explain the difference in results. Most of the 
survey respondents were women, who take responsibility for the household and spend their day 
mostly near the home. They might attach value to clean water as they nurse the children and 
are responsible for fetching water, cooking, washing and cleaning. The men on the other hand 
dominated the meetings and may have less experience with the discomfort of a broken 
handpump and collecting water from open or farther away protected sources and may controlled 
family expenditures.  
In sum, at the central level decision makers appeared satisfied with the status quo – CBM – in 
order to protect the human right to water and local community’s health, thereby thwarting 
innovation that may disorganise policy coherence, affect funding streams and threaten 
organisational turf. The interest to protect the CBM model may illustrate their potential 
powerful resistance to initiatives and actors that aim to deviate from the parameters of the CBM 
framework. At the local level, risk perceptions increased during the implementation of the 
model. The perceived risk of payment – to the O&M of the water source and the Water Operator 
– may jeopardise the effectiveness of the CBM-lite model on improving reliable access to water. 
Or the nearer to implementation, the more risk averse one becomes?
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Chapter 8  
The Fall of the CBM-lite Model 
 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter describes and reflects upon the outcomes of the CBM-lite model and enters thereby 
into the fourth and last research objective which is to evaluate the outcomes of the CBM-lite 
model in four pilot villages in mid-west Uganda. 
The insights in this present chapter were the result of a critical case study on the four CBM-lite 
pilot villages. In the period between October 2013 and November 2015, I visited the pilot 
communities at five different points in time (refer to Table 4.1) to observe the developments in 
the pilot villages and to conduct (repeat) interviews with community members and key players 
involved in the implementation of the CBM-lite model. Methodology Chapter 4 and Appendix 
4.1 provide a comprehensive overview of the research approach and data collection and analysis 
methods.   
This chapter evaluates the outcomes of the CBM-lite model against its intended outcomes: 
water user payment, safe storage of water user funds, access to insurance scheme to repair and 
maintain rural water infrastructure, enforcement of locally agreed rules on resource use and 
commitment to operate and maintain the village water sources by the Water Operator and 
caretakers. Section 8.2 evaluates the degree of water user payments and collections in the pilot 
villages. Section 8.3 examines the storage of water user funds at the Savings and Credit 
Cooperative (SACCO) and the use of the SACCO insurance scheme for repairing and 
maintaining the village water sources. Hereafter, Section 8.4 evaluates how the rules on 
resource use were maintained and enforced in the pilot villages. Section 8.5 considers the 
influence of the financial incentive for the water operators and caretakers on their commitment 
to carry out operation and maintenance (O&M) tasks. Section 8.6 recognises that local 
adaptations to the CBM-lite model were made and evaluates their outcome on the level of user
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 payment and the fulfilment of water management tasks. The chapter closes with a discussion 
in Section 8.7 that reflects on the empirical findings and critically evaluates the CBM-lite 
model.  
 
 
8.2 Payment of Water User Fees 
 
This section describes the process of water user payments in the CBM-lite pilot villages. Water 
user payment represented a key element for achieving successful outcomes of the pilot. The 
following account shows, however, that user payments proved problematic and illustrates how 
the difficulty in collecting user funds threatened the viability of the CBM-lite model. Water 
user payments decreased 3-5 months after the pilot commenced. At first, the Water Operators 
wondered: “[f]ew people are paying. People are dodging to pay that money. Why can someone 
not pay 1,000 shilling? (Water Operator Nyakatugo, 10 December, 2013).  
Community members, supported by the Local Councillor (LC) I, asked the Water Operators to 
wait after harvest time before commencing collection of the water user fees as people were 
often short of money prior harvesting. The Water Operators were equally keen to collect funds 
each season (twice a year) because the collections were a time consuming process. “People will 
tell you ‘come tomorrow’, but tomorrow never comes. They will use polite language and say, 
‘please, I don’t have the money, can you come back tomorrow?’ So, what can I do?” (Water 
Operator Mpumwe, 5 November, 2014).  
During a community meeting in Mpumwe, participants agreed to pay after the harvest. A 
number of community members expressed they felt uncomfortable with water user fee 
collections at home. To avoid collections at home, community members agreed to bring the 
funds to the house of the Water Operator or the caretakers. The Savings and Credit Cooperative 
(SACCO) Manager agreed with seasonal payments and argued that as long as people pay the 
time frame of collections would not disrupt the insurance scheme. The District Water Officer 
(DWO) of Kiryandongo however, was very sceptical about the promises of the households: 
“[i]t is a big excuse that people want to wait for the end of the season before they can pay” (20 
June 2013). Also staff of The Water Trust (TWT) doubted whether people were unable to pay.  
“Even someone who drinks five beers a day [each 3,000 UGX] will say he has no money. 
Sometimes people don’t tell the truth” (TWT staff member, 23 March 2015). Indeed, despite 
the promises to pay after the harvest, the majority of the community members did not fulfil their 
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promise: “In August [2014], during the harvest, there was only one person that came to me and 
brought 10,000 shillings. I waited for the others… but nothing happened” (Mpumwe Water 
Operator, 5 November 2014). 
Apart from the start of the scheme where some households did pay for several months at once, 
the Water Operators were not able to endorse seasonal collections nor regular monthly user 
payments. Because the Water Operators needed to build a history of regular payment with the 
SACCO to build a relationship of trust for credit, the SACCO withdrew the insurance scheme 
after a few months the pilot commenced. When affordability was not an issue as shown in the 
outcomes of Willingness to Pay (WtP) survey in the previous chapter, why did people refuse to 
pay water user fees? 
First, the Water Operators and caretakers were subject to suspicion by fellow community 
members who raised concerns about misuse of funds.  During one of my follow-up visits in 
Mboira II in June 2014, the LC I of  Mboira II argued that the non-trusting attitude was a “… 
continuation of wounds of the Water User Committees that used to eat the money” (11 June 
2014). However, the incidents in Mpumwe and Mboira II, described in detail in the following 
sections, illustrate a more complex picture of people’s non-contribution. They show how the 
specific elements of the CBM-lite model (selection process, emphasis on upfront payments, 
clustering of water sources, the incentive for the Water Operator and the use of the SACCO) 
contributed to ambiguity surrounding water source management arrangements including 
perceptions of unfairness, feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment by water users. As the 
following account will show, these emotions shaped people’s attitudes against the CBM-lite 
model.  
The Water Operator in Mboira II was passionate about improving the maintenance of the village 
water sources and zealous to enhance people’s hygiene and sanitation practices. Unlike the 
other Water Operators, he was selected by the LC I of the village and TWT because the other 
applicants for the position were drunk during the interview and did not seem suitable for the 
job (refer to Chapter 7.4). However, during one of my Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in the 
village, community members drew attention to his suitability: “[w]hy is he [the Water Operator] 
always selected for village projects? If the person is elected by the people themselves, then we 
can pay” (community member 5 November 2014).  
Because the Mboira II Water Operator was one of the few educated village members well- 
conversant in English, he was often approached by NGOs, local government or private actors 
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about village and developmental matters. His privileged position may have instigated feelings 
of jealousy and resistance. The Water Operator claimed:“[p]eople don’t want others to develop 
in this village. They are jealous because I have a job and because I am often the point of contact 
in the village for outsiders” (4 November 2014).   
Soon after the Mboira II Water Operator started in his newly acquired position, several rumours 
were spread in the village: he paid his recent wedding from the water user fees and he profited 
from the water sources as he profited his part-time job as tax collector for a local market. The 
rumours of misuse were instigated by a number of primary school teachers in the village that 
often gathered at the local drinking bar in the afternoons. The Water Operator speculated: “[i]f 
one person is affected [by the rumour] he could affect the people he is drinking with and his 
relatives” (5 November 2015).  
A key underlying reason for the opposition directed to the Water Operator was the lack of public 
support for their remuneration, despite the survey results prior to implementation (refer to 
Chapter 7.3 and Figure 7.1). Yet, the financial incentive for the Water Operator was expected 
to induce a continuous commitment to collect funds and maintain the village water sources, 
representing a central component of the CBM-lite model. Although the financial incentive was 
communicated by the staff of TWT at various community meetings, the Water Operator and 
the LC I did not openly disclose the earnings to the water users (as with Mpumwe Water 
Operator, described in Chapter 7.5), resulting in a cloud of ambiguity over the collected revenue 
and deposited funds in the SACCO. 
Further, the type of water source influenced people’s willingness to contribute. Irrespective 
which water source households were using, protected springs or a shallow well fitted with a 
handpump40, households were expected to contribute  a monthly water user fee of 1,000 UGX. 
However, people did not understand why they would pay for a spring because “… that water is 
coming by itself” (FGD Mboira II village 31 March 2015). A community member declared: “I 
can pay money, if there is importance for it. Like you go to the market. You should see what 
you are buying and why you are paying” (FGD 31 March 2015). 
Moreover, most community members that used the spring in Mboira II, did not want to pay for 
the repairs of a handpump they were not using. The feeling of unjust treatment was strengthened 
when the Mboira II Water Operator requested women living near the spring, to clean the 
                                                          
40 Mboira II had one protected spring and two shallow wells fitted with a handpump, of which one was constructed 
by the case study NGO and the other was constructed by the district. 
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surroundings of the water source.  A woman narrated indignantly: “[h]e collected funds but still 
asked the women to clean the spring. That was when we all stopped paying” (community 
member, 5 November 2014).  
The collective non-payment of the people that used the spring caused a village-wide snow-ball 
effect. The households that collected water from the handpumps claimed they were unwilling 
to pay as long the people who used the spring refused to pay.  
In Mpumwe village, people were similarly dissatisfied about the accountability of the Water 
Operator. As the following account from Mpumwe village shows, the clustering of the water 
sources and the financial compensation for the Water Operator obscured transparency and 
increased suspicion. Although the Mpumwe Water Operator was a respected man, (refer to 
Appendix 7.3 for a background about the Water Operators) his popularity did not encompass 
the entire village. In one of the three sub-villages (Kabaranga) his authority was publicly 
contested by the Vice-Chairperson of the Executive Committee of the LC I, who also applied 
for the position of Water Operator, and argued that the Water Operater had “… failed 
completely” (31 June, 2014). He requested that the Mpumwe Water Operator provided 
‘accountability’, and although the Water Operator agreed to organise a community meeting, he 
did not do so.  
In addition, the village Vice-Chairperson was disappointed in the Mpumwe Water Operator 
because he did not repair two non-functional handpumps in the sub-village Kabaranga from the 
first rounds of collections.  Most people in Kabaranga paid the water user fees in the first few 
month of the pilot in the hope their two poorly sited and managed handpumps (constructed by 
the local government and non-functional for more than two years) would be repaired. The water 
sources were sited in a swamp and the water was likely to be polluted (confirmed by the 
anecdotal stories of badly smelling water and seasonal flooding of the handpumps). Due to the 
poor water quality of these sources, the Mpumwe Water Operator did not repair these 
handpumps. Instead, he arranged the repair of two other handpumps in the village (but in 
another sub-village) by the initial funds collected. Cross-subsidisation was however not 
popular. The leaders in Kabaranga were indignant about the use of ‘their’ money for these 
repairs and demanded the repair of their two broken handpumps before they would pay again.  
Another option they considered was the construction of a new water source by TWT. However, 
they were determined that the people in Kabaranga could not cover these costs as they had 
already paid. The leaders of Kabaranga were not receptive to the idea that continuous payments 
could cover the maintenance of the village water sources, including  the construction costs of 
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their desired new water source. They wanted their money back and requested TWT whether 
they could go back to a Water User Committee (WUC) at every source. They argued:“ 
[c]ommittees that collect money is the best” (31 June, 2014) 
A few months later (March 2015), the financial incentive for the Mpumwe Water Operator was 
causing a scandal. The Water Operator had been showing his ‘accountability’ and records from 
the SACCO during a community meeting, and a former WUC member recorded the reported 
collections and expenditures. The Water Operator had not openly disclosed he was earning from 
the collections and the former WUC member ‘found out’ that the Water Operator earned money 
for the work done. Despite the positive responses about paying the Water Operator in the initial 
survey prior implementation (Chapter 7.3, Figure 7.1), the former WUC member openly 
accused the Water Operator of misusing the funds and pledged he wanted to re-establish the 
WUCs.  
Although the lack of transparency and the fear of misuse of funds by the Water Operator 
appeared a major reason for non-payment, the case in Nyakabette II may challenge this 
proposition. In this village, the compensation for the efforts of the Water Operator (a women) 
was openly discussed during a community meeting at the start of the pilot and was set at 20,000 
UGX per month. Despite the clear records of the revenue collected and the money deposited, 
the SACCO Manager disclosed that: “[e]ven in Nyakabette II people think the Manager is 
eating the money” (2 April 2015). 
Other factors that influenced the refusal to contribute water user fees were: lack of attendance 
at community meetings, monitoring, and sanctions, available alternative water sources and, 
unfamiliarity with paying (upfront) water user fees. The following sections elaborate on each 
of these contributing factors for non-payment. The lack of attendance at community meetings 
was a common occurrence in the pilot villages. The LC I of Mboira II claimed he had invited 
everyone for the meetings “[b]ut not everyone comes to the meeting” (31 March, 2015). 
Because not everyone attended community meetings, people were not aware of the 
developments in their village. Some people argued therefore that the pilot project was 
introduced abruptly. “We did not know why the model was introduced” (Mboira II FGD, 31 
March 2015). A lady at the outskirt of the village declared she was not aware of the project: “I 
have never attended any meeting. I am always busy in the garden and preparing food (5 
November 2014).  
Chapter 8  The Fall of the CBM-lite model 
182 
 
The low attendance at community meetings resulted in confusion and misinformation about 
CBM-lite. The use of the SACCO was not known to everyone, leading to rumours in Mboira 
II, that the money was deposited at the sub-county. The idea money was kept by the local 
government increased the fear of money being misused.  
In Mboira II, several community members opposed the model from the start. One argument 
against the introduction of the pilot was the low maintenance of a spring and “… the fact a 
spring cannot break down” (community member, 18 June 2014). In addition, a few (former) 
WUC members of a non-functional handpump resisted the pilot soon after its introduction. 
According to a TWT staff member,  they were not happy to be replaced by a Water Operator: 
“[t]hey [the WUC members] don’t like the project because they are not benefitting anymore” 
(18 June, 2014). Prior to the start of the pilot, a WUC in Mboira II collected water user fees to 
repair the handpump but did not pay the Hand Pump Mechanic (HPM). As a result, they 
infuriated the HPM who dismantled the head of the handpump.  At the time the Mboira II Water 
Operator started, the head of the pump was still removed. The WUC did not handover the 
money to the Water Operator: they either did not have the funds or were disinclined to give it 
to the Water Operator. Because funds from the first round of collections were not sufficient to 
repay the HPM, the Mboira II Water Operator partly used his own money to restore the 
handpump. However, his gesture did not increase public support for his position as a Water 
Operator nor did it affect people’s willingness to pay.  
Further, neither the caretakers nor the Water Operators were constantly at the water point to 
monitor usage and payments. This made it relatively easy for people to surreptitiously collect 
water without paying. A TWT staff member pointed at the difficulty to ensure payments or 
enforce sanctions: “This is water that is open. For him to deny you water he has to be there 
24/7. He has to be there by himself to make sure you don't get the water” (18 June, 2014). In 
Nyakatugo the absence of the Water Operator (he was imprisoned for an alleged murder in 
January 2014) interrupted the payment of water user fees.  This period lasted till July 2014, 
when the LC I of the village initiated the election of a new Water Operator.  
The lack of sanctions or consequences upon non-payment influenced the collective non-
contribution. As a result, the households that did pay, stopped when they noticed others were 
not paying without repercussions as in the CBM model (refer to Chapter 5.4.1.1). A community 
member in Mboira II explained: “[m]ost people refused to pay, so I don’t want to be the only 
one paying” (18 June, 2014).  Occasionally the uneven payments caused conflicts between 
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community members “…especially between women as their income is just low” (community 
member Nyakatugo, 20 June 2014). 
Alternative water sources also hampered the willingness to pay. Despite the clustering of the 
water sources in the village, people could easily access the water sources in neighbouring 
villages or use open ponds (which was not a problem to some households). In Mboira II and 
Mpumwe some households resorted to use water sources in neighbouring villages that did not 
collect water user fees.  In Mpumwe for example, 40 households started to fetch water from a 
neighbouring water source to avoid payments. This affected the revenue and the financial 
incentive for the Water Operator.  In Nyakatugo, a number of households had access to piped 
water but due to power cuts they were forced to regularly use the handpumps in the village. 
Although they paid a minimum of 10,000 UGX per month for their water bills, they were often 
disinclined to pay 1,000 UGX for the communal water source. 
Despite the multiple reasons for non-payment, overall, community members were not used to 
paying water user fees. A community member muttered: “[p]eople were questioning 
themselves, since they came to Mboira, people had not been paying” (5 November, 2014).  The 
lack of payment resulted in a lack of funds to pay for maintenance and in turn increased the 
criticism to the Water Operators. For example,  in Mpumwe, a number of community members 
complained the Water Operator did not maintain their handpump. Likewise, a former WUC 
member was dissatisfied with the work of the Water Operator because he did not repair the 
handpump in his area. During a FGD he said: “[h]is response was: there is no money. We sat 
down and decided we cannot wait for him, we are going to repair the borehole and pay for it. I 
don’t see his importance, because primarily he has failed” (1 April, 2015). 
 
 
8.3 Safe Storage of Funds and Handpump Insurance 
Scheme 
 
The Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) was introduced with the assumption that people 
are willing to pay water user fees if funds are safely stored by the Water Operator. Every month 
the Water Operators were required to deposit a fixed amount in the SACCO account. The 
amount was based on the projected annual maintenance and repair costs of the water sources in 
the village (calculated by The Water Trust (TWT)) and recorded in the contract. In addition, 
the SACCO served as an insurance scheme to guarantee handpump repairs could be carried out 
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quickly in case savings for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) would be inadequate to cover 
the repair costs.  
Despite the strict follow-up on monthly payments of the Water Operators by the SACCO 
Manager, payments drastically reduced after a few months the pilot started and decreased or 
(temporarily) stopped in December 2013 or January 201441. Figures 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 depict 
the deposits at the SACCO for handpump O&M in each pilot village.  
Figure 8.1 shows that only Mpumwe village used the SACCO insurance scheme. This money 
was used to repair two non-functional handpumps (of which one had been non-functional for 
several months). The SACCO did not sanction further lines of credit to the Water Operators 
because they no longer had a track record of making deposits. In other words, it was too risky 
for the SACCO to continue with the insurance scheme service. In Nyakatugo (Figure 8.2), 
payment stopped between January – July 2014 because the Water Operator was imprisoned. In 
July 2014 a new Water Operator was elected. Even though Mpumwe, for example, managed to 
deposit the required amount at the beginning of the pilot programme, these deposits proved not 
an indication that all households were paying; rather some households preferred to pay several 
months at once (see Appendix 8.1 for a picture of the Mpumwe accounts). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
41 With the exception of Nyakabette II because this village was included in the pilot study in July 2014. 
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Figure 8.1 
Mpumwe O&M Funds (Source: Kigumba SACCO accounts) 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2  
Nyakatugo O&M Funds (Source: Kigumba SACCO accounts) 
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Figure 8.3 
Mboira II O&M Funds (Source: Kigumba SACCO accounts) 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 
Nyakabette II O&M Funds (Source: Kigumba SACCO accounts) 
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8.3.1 Safe Storage of Funds   
 
Attention now turns towards another key element of the CBM-lite model: the assumption that 
safe storage of funds would lead to increased willingness to pay and ready funds for handpump 
maintenance and repair. The Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) was involved to ensure 
funds were safely stored and to prevent misuse of water user fees for personal gain. Despite the 
efforts of TWT to improve checks and balances in the storage of funds and the procedure of 
multiple signatures for withdrawing funds, the use of the SACCO did not guarantee 
transparency with the collection of funds.  
At the level of money collection – a  responsibility shared by the Water Operator and the 
caretakers – the use of receipts upon paying the water user fee, did not remove cases and 
suspicion of embezzlement. All the Water Operators reported cases of misuse of funds by the 
caretakers. The Nyakatugo Water Operator said: “[s]ome of them, when they collect small 
money, like 3,000 UGX, they use it and don’t pay back. […] There is no solution. Changing is 
not good because you might bring in someone who is worse (7 November 2014). 
In Nyakabette II, the female Water Operator organised a community meeting to discuss the 
misappropriation of water user fees by one of the caretakers. In the village, a handpump broke 
down and needed to be repaired. The caretaker collected 73,000 UGX (USD 20) but refused to 
give the funds to the Water Operator to repair the handpump. The caretaker was angry about 
his received compensation of 10,000 UGX (USD 2,70)  for his services because he had expected 
a well-paid remuneration from the Water Operator. He claimed he had worked full-time to 
collect the funds and to keep the water sources in the village clean. He harboured strong feelings 
of resentment to the Water Operator as: “[s]he told me I would get good money” and  felt his 
compensation was “… too low” (3 April 2015). 
In the meeting, the community members and a representative of the sub-county (invited by the 
Water Operator) proposed to give each caretaker ten percent of the collected water user fees as 
the pilot study did not prescribe how much the caretakers would earn. Nevertheless, this 
proposal did not satisfy the caretaker: “[f]or ten percent I cannot work!” Despite the caretaker’s 
complaints and threats towards the Water Operator (“I will beat you up”), the community 
members resolved he had to give back the remaining balance to the Water Operator. Ultimately, 
the caretaker confessed he could not return the funds as he had already used the money. He, 
changed his fierce attitude and proposed to work for free for the coming months. Not all 
community members were receptive to this idea as they rather wanted him to resign. However, 
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the meeting concluded with the verdict that he could stay as after all, “… previous Water User 
Committee members have misused money in the past and even you, mister Chairman [LC I]!” 
(community member, 3 April 2015). 
 
 
8.4 Enforcement of Formal Rules 
 
This section reflects on the process of rule enforcement in the CBM-lite pilot villages. In each 
pilot village, by-laws had been created and documented. Enforcement of the by-laws proved 
difficult in each village. Just as it was difficult to keep track of who had paid and had not paid, 
it was a challenge to keep track on who needed to be ‘sanctioned’ for non-payment and what 
level of sanction was required. Clearly, when the majority free-rides it becomes impossible to 
sanction everyone. Nevertheless, the enforcement of the by-laws was precarious in the first 
place because confrontational behaviour was generally perceived as inappropriate. The Water 
Operator in Mpumwe explained: “[m]e and the caretaker we will talk politely to the person. I 
always advise them [the caretakers] not to exchange words” (6 November 2014). A community 
member in Nyakatugo pragmatically remarked the by-laws were merely used to intimidate the 
water users. “[t]here has only been a threat: you cannot access the water. But Mzee42 [caretaker] 
is old and weak and cannot stop someone from fetching water” (30 October 2014).  
The request to pay water user fees, let alone to enforce sanctions upon non-payment, could 
threaten the social standing and reputation of the Water Operators and the caretakers. For 
example, the Mboira II Water Operator decided to draft a letter to non-paying community 
members to request them to pay the arrears of the last months. However, people misunderstood 
his communication: “[w]e thought he had hiked the price to access the water source from 1,000 
to 5,000 shillings” (community member Mboira II, 5 November 2014). In combination with the 
grievances described in Section 8.2, the letter caused considerable tension towards the Water 
Operator and his family:  “[p]arents had sent their children to my home. They threw stones at 
me and bullied my children at school. They threatened me that they would beat me up” (Mboira 
II Water Operator, 5 November 2014).  
When I visited Mboira II in November 2014, the Water Operator was disheartened about the 
responses of the people in the village. He assured me that: “[i]f I implement the by-laws, people 
                                                          
42 Swahili for ‘old person or elder’. 
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would hate me and you cannot ask for favours anymore. Once you do this, you create enmity. 
My children can be at risk. My son has already been beaten by fellow class mates (5 November 
2014).” The LC I of the village said he wanted to resolve the problems and said he would 
organise a meeting with the elders “… to rectify the situation” (5 November 2014). 
A few months later, TWT closed the pilot in in Mboira II. Without the knowledge or consent 
of the LC I,  community members (of which primary school teachers and former Water User 
Committee (WUC) members) wrote a letter to the Resident District Commissioner (RDC)43 
requesting him to stop the pilot project in the village In January 2015. The RDC – who was 
aware of the pilot and frequently interacted with the staff of TWT– contacted TWT about the 
letter and organised a community meeting in Mboira II. Due to the lack of public support for 
the pilot and the criticism expressed to the Water Operator, the RDC requested TWT to stop 
the pilot and revert to CBM. The withdrawal of the pilot removed the tensions and the abuse to 
the Mboira II Water Operator but no alternative management structure was proposed or 
implemented. Yet, the Water Operator was relieved and recalled: “[d]uring that time people’s 
attitude completely changed towards me and the children. They saw me as someone who 
wanted money from them” (31 March 2015).  
The maltreatment of the rule enforcer (the Water Operators and caretakers) also occurred in 
other villages. The Mpumwe Water Operator pointed out: “[p]eople forget they are the 
defaulter. If the caretaker confiscates a jerry can people will start planning at this caretaker (6 
November 2015)”.  In particular, the enforcement of payment (let alone sanctions) on friends 
and relatives appeared difficult and tended to be avoided. “One of the caretakers is an Alur, and 
most people in this part of the village are Alur. Therefore if people plead [not to pay] it is hard 
for him to stop them from fetching water (Water Operator Nyakatugo 28 October 2014)”. 
The Sub-County Chief of Kigumba advised the Mpumwe Water Operator to report the 
defaulters to the local government. However, this was not a viable option for the Water 
Operator: 
“That person has his family and friends behind him. But now, me and the relatives will 
remain a problem. The sub-county will come and go away, the police will come and go 
away, but I am the one who remains in the community” (6 November 2014). 
The Water Operators did not have the power to enforce the locally agreed rules, but neither did 
the LC I or the sub-county really assist the Water Operators in enforcing rules on resource use. 
                                                          
43 The RDC represents the president and the government in the District (Local Government Act, 1997) 
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According to the Water Operators and TWT staff, reasons for the lack of support by the LC I 
was either simply due to their regular absence, fear of losing popular support, or indifference. 
Support from the sub-county was equally absent, despite the contractual agreements. The sub-
county lacked the funds, manpower and transport to visit the villages and, to respond to the 
challenges raised by TWT or the Water Operators. As described in the first case study Chapter 
5 on the outcomes of the CBM model, the Sub-County Chief and the Sub-County Community 
Development Officer (CDO) did visit the pilot villages if TWT arranged transport and paid 
their daily allowance. The Water Operators frequently expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
lack of external support, as well as the negative impact of politicians on sustainable rural water 
management. The Mboira II Water Operator recalled: “[w]e have a politician from the district 
living in our village but he only paid water user fees once. Instead of supporting they 
[politicians] say: people have refused” (5 November 2014). 
Furthermore, the number of follow-up visits by TWT in the pilot villages decreased after a few 
months of implementation. After my departure as the Programme Manager in January 2014, 
little priority was given by the organisation to follow-up and to oversee elements of the pilot 
project, refelcting a change in priorities of the new Programme Manager and head office 
agendas. The Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) Manager exclaimed “After you left, 
nothing happened.” (14 June, 2014). Staff members of TWT pointed at competing agendas 
within the organisation:   
“A pilot is like an egg. You can move it anywhere and you can break it. You can even 
decide to make it hard and to make it better. Unfortunately, management priorities have 
not been with the pilot” (TWT staff member, 7 November 2014).  
The reason for the lack of monitoring was the heavy work load and the focus on the construction 
of new water sources. The pressure to find new villages to construct water sources was high. 
But despite the recognition that: “… we cannot keep on constructing new water sources if the 
old ones are not sustained” (TWT staff member, 12 November 2015) the pilot ceased to be a 
priority. 
In sum, due to the challenges to enforce sanctions “[p]eople don’t expect the Water Operator to 
enforce the bye-laws (Community member Mpumwe November 2014).” Treating by-laws as 
“…just paper” was common practice as “[e]ven on sub-county level they are not enforced 
(TWT staff member, 30 October 2014).” 
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8.5 Commitment of the Water Operators and Caretakers 
 
The engagement of the caretakers and the Water Operators drastically reduced during the course 
of the pilot. Their waning interest was related to the lack of user payment as described above, 
and harassments upon collection and, as a result, the limited earnings to compensate their 
efforts. Most of the caretakers and the Water Operators received threats from water users and 
emotions as dissatisfaction and fear influenced their level of engagement. For example, threats 
of witchcraft, usually expressed by women, were perceived as frightening and menacing. 
“These women are dangerous and if they want, they can seriously harm you” (community 
member Nyakatugo, 23 March, 2014). The abuse, resulted in a lack of resolve to enforce 
payments and the financial stipend (dependent on the amount collected) was not a reason to 
persist. The following caretakers in Nyakatugo and Mpumwe said: 
“People are quarrelling when they pay. Somebody can injure you and will say it is a 
wizard. I fear, that is why we take things slowly” (Nyakatugo, 6 November 2014).  
 “I report to [the Water Operator] if people are not paying and then it is up to him because 
I have told him: ‘people have not paid’. Let him go to the LC I and they see the way 
forward” (Mpumwe, 20 June 2014). 
The female Water Operator in Nyakabette II was discouraged because of the reluctance of 
households to pay, accusations of embezzlement and, the aggressive behaviour of the caretaker 
who demanded more financial compensation (refer to Section 8.3.1). She commented that “the 
work is bad” (3 April 2015).  
As water user fee payments dramatically decreased after a few months and as there was only a 
11,5% non-payment allowance factored into the CBM-lite model (refer to Chapter 7.3.1), the 
financial incentive for both the Water Operators and the caretakers decreased. None of the 
Water Operators received the stipend that was calculated by TWT based on the WtP survey. 
The Water Operator in Mpumwe sighed: The whole week they [the caretakers] just got 1,000 
shillings. I tell them to keep it” (5 November 2014). During the course of the pilot, TWT staff 
observed the Water Operators started to reduce their efforts in fulfilling their duties. A TWT 
staff member commented: “[t]he fact that people are not paying has frustrated them. It has 
demoralised the Water Operators and the caretakers. Now they put little time in it (23 March 
2015)”.  
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Furthermore, the earnings generated from the pilot were little in comparison to their other 
income streams. The additional income from the pilot did not impact on the livelihoods of the 
Water Operators and hence the purpose of the incentive (to generate a continuous engagement) 
was lost.  
 
 
8.6 Evolution of the CBM-lite Model 
 
In Nyakatugo, the management model changed after the Water Operator was imprisoned. 
During a community meeting about the future management of the village water sources, 
community members elected a new Water Operator. In the meeting, it was decided that every 
water source would have a Water User Committee (WUC) with a lean composition of three 
members per water source. These were the former WUC chairperson, the landowner and the 
caretaker. The caretaker collected the funds and the chairperson called the meetings and was 
responsible for the mobilisation of the community members. “The landowner doesn’t do any 
work. It is just to make him feel good” (Water Operator Nyakatugo, 6 November 2014). 
According to the newly elected Water Operator, water users are more confident to pay water 
user fees to a WUC. He argued:“ [p]eople did not trust the previous Manager. I thought bringing 
in some of the former WUC members would create more trust” (6 November 2014).  
Furthermore, the Water Operator told the community and me that neither he, nor the caretakers 
were compensated for their efforts. However, his accounts showed a deficit between the 
generated revenue and the deposits in the Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO). When I 
asked him how this was possible he said: “[p]eople don’t like to hear that you earn something 
from their contributions” (2  April, 2015).  
During my last visit in Nyakatugo (April 2015) I held a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with 
the LC I of the village, the Water Operators, the caretakers and other WUC members. They told 
me a handpump recently broke down and that the funds at the SACCO were insufficient to 
cover the repair costs. The LC I of the village decided therefore to subsidise the repair costs. 
“If there is no money in the SACCO, what are we going to do? When you are a father, you top 
up to make that pump continue” (2 April 2015). 
Despite the community’s adaptation of the CBM-lite model to local structures and familiar 
arrangements, problems with the management of the water sources persisted and were 
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vigorously discussed: difficulties with collections of water user fees (from water users, friends 
and relatives), people using open water sources, low attendance at meetings, misuse of funds, 
unclear accountability, and limited engagement and compensation for Water Operator and 
caretakers. One of the caretakers gave it a last try and asked: “[i]f possible, when there is a 
breakdown, can the government or The Water Trust come and repair it for us?”  Before I could 
reply, he was firmly corrected by the LC I of the village who said: “[i]t is rubbish that we cannot 
pay 1,000 shillings. Even God did not create us for free.” 
 
 
8.7 Evaluating the Outcomes of CBM-lite  
 
The fourth and last objective of this thesis was to evaluate the outcomes of the CBM-lite 
model in four pilot villages. This discussion considers the literature review material from 
Chapters 2 and 6 and the original observations from the case studies presented in Chapter 5 and 
7 and this present Chapter 8.  
Although the CBM-lite model attempted to serve as a local solution to overcome non-payment 
of water user fees and inactivity of the Water User Committees (WUCs) by designing an 
improved water resources management model and institutions geared towards the local context, 
the adaptive management regime and resultant crafted institutions did not lead to improved 
management practices and reliable access to water. This study lends therefore support to critical 
institutional scholarship about the difficulty of designing ‘the right formula’. Despite the efforts 
of The Water Trust (TWT) to adopt local practices into appropriate management arrangements, 
the CBM-lite model did not encompass the “acceptable ways of doing things” (Cleaver, 2012 
p. 34) such as paying upfront water user fees and endorsing a financial incentive to the Water 
Operator. The expectation that the CBM-lite model would be able to overcome practices of 
non-payment, misappropriation of public funds and non-enforcement of rules through a 
combination of safe storage of funds at a Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO), improved 
checks and balances and intrinsically motivated and financially incentivised Water Operators 
and caretakers, was perhaps overly optimistic. As signalled in the analysis of actor’s risk 
perceptions in the previous chapter, the mutually agreed formal rules about resource use could 
not reverse the familiarity with paying for repair costs after handpump breakdown, the informal 
understanding that people supplement inadequate pay and the high transaction costs upon rule 
enforcement. The relational reading of risk (Boholm and Corvellec, 2011) actually showed that 
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the CBM-lite model was already dead in the water before implementation, predicting the 
“tenacious survival ability” (North, 1990 p.45) of informal norms and collective codes of 
conduct. Hence, the relational theory of risk can be used as a powerful tool to predict and 
understand the underlying forces that guide processes of institutional bricolage and shape rural 
water management practices. 
The discussion proceeds as follows: Section 8.7.1 discusses the failure of mainstream 
institutional approaches to improve user payments and water management practices within the 
CBM framework. Section 8.7.2 explains the failure of the CBM-lite model to endorse user 
payment and effective management on the basis of three key concepts: (1) habitus, (2) 
authoritative power, and (3) worldviews. The last section of this chapter, 8.7.3, discusses the 
outcomes of processes of institutional bricolage in the pilot villages and its potential policy 
implications.  
 
 
8.7.1 Remedies for Effective Rural Water Management Arrangements 
 
Mainstream institutional approaches and recommendations from practitioner literature to 
improve collections of user funds and handpump Operation and Maintenance (O&M) practices 
did not bring about the desired effects in the pilot study. Here, I will present nine explanations. 
First, capacity building and sensitisation efforts by The Water Trust (TWT) and the local 
government, as hypothesised by Ostrom (2005) and Mantzavinos (2001) in Chapter 2.4.2, did 
not lead to the adoption of new norms to enhance the sustainability of the village water sources.  
Second, efforts to adjust elements of the CBM-lite model during the course of the pilot such as 
reducing the time path of collections (per month to every season) and increasing transparency 
(amount of payment to Water Operator and caretakers) did equally not improve the 
sustainability status of the handpumps.  
Third, while the use of incentives to manage the water source is expected to increase sustainable 
rural water services (Harvey, 2008), the provision of a financial incentive for the Water 
Operators upon collections – of whom most were selected because of their trustworthy 
reputation – was not sufficient to incur a long-term commitment to execute O&M 
responsibilities.  
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Fourth, the idea that banking the funds in a SACCO account would prevent misuse of funds, 
improve feelings of trust and willingness to pay as hypothesised for example by Carter and 
Kidega (2013) did not materialise. Misuse of funds was still possible at collections (even with 
the use of receipts) and multiple cases of (suspected) embezzlement by the caretakers were 
reported by the Water Operators and community members. Equally the promise of a handpump 
insurance scheme upon steady payments and the prospect of reliable water services did not 
improve people’s willingness to contribute and did not prove viable if dependent on people’s 
willingness to pay. As Fonseca et al (2013 p.24) write: “[e]ven if it is rational and more cost-
efficient to save money to prevent future breakdowns, both users and service providers would 
rather use existing funds for immediate needs and deal with breakdown expenses in the future 
when they occur.” 
Fifth, the clustering of village water points to enable economies of scale as explored by Foster 
et al. (2015); Oxford/RFL (2014) and Zeug (2011) proved complicated due to different feelings 
and attitudes towards ‘place’ and ‘space’ among community members and the ‘outsider’ NGO 
TWT. Whereas TWT demarcated the pilot along geographical borders and the span of control 
of the Local Councillor (LC) I, people identified their sense of belonging to their home sub-
village controlled by local elites, either locally elected councillors or clan or tribal authorities. 
Hence, subsidising the repair costs of a handpump in another sub-village instigated feelings of 
unfairness and prompted vocal resistance by powerful agents. A possible implication could be 
to lower the scale of clustering from village level to sub-village level. However, different types 
of village water infrastructure also thwarted the clustering of village water sources and user 
payment. The protected spring in Mboira II consumed less expenses on maintenance and repair 
than the handpumps in the village. As a result, they were disinclined to contribute user funds or 
subsidise the more expensive water systems in the village.  
Sixth, community meetings and the mutual creation of formal rules did not lead to the 
Habermasian ideal of consensus and cooperation. Close social relations engendered the ‘dark 
side’ of social capital (Portes and Landolt, 1996) as also observed in Chapter 5.4.3 on the 
outcomes of the CBM model; they sustained free-riding and impeded the enforcement of formal 
rules. Hence the use of contractual agreements that stipulated rules on resource use proved 
worthless. Non-compliance to formal rules was received with a certain level of equanimity and 
excuses for non-payment and misappropriation of funds became ‘normalised’, comparable with 
nonpayer behaviour for company water bills in South Africa as demonstrated by Brown (2008).  
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Seventh, while monitoring is deemed important for sustainable resource use (Agrawal and 
Goyal, 2001; Ostrom, 1990; Lejano and de Castro, 2014), full-time monitoring proved 
unfeasible in reality due to the need to cultivate one’s lands and the simple impracticality to 
monitor a water point 24 hours a day. The District Water Officer (DWO) of Masindi proved 
right when he suggested the workload for the water operators would be too great as described 
in Chapter 7.3.3. Hence, people could collect water unseen. Further (and eighth), the 
geographical locations of the water sources and the availability of multiple water sources 
around village borders as also observed in the first empirical study (Chapter 5) influenced non-
payment. While the reviewed literature assumes water resources to reflect Common Pool 
Resources (CPRs) – rivalrous in nature and involving the difficulty to exclude outsiders – water 
resources in the case study area were rather non-rivalrous and non-excludable: representing the 
characteristics of a public good. As noted in Chapter 5, community members did not eschew 
from using open and contaminated water sources and in the pilot villages, a number of 
households collected water from protected sources outside the village to avoid user payment. 
Hence, the lack of loyalty and assumed sense of ownership to maintain a particular handpump 
in an area with alternative water sources may not be surprising as also observed by Jones (2011), 
Madrigal et al. (2011), Parry-Jones et al. (2001), Schouten and Moriarty (2003) and, Parry-
Jones et al. (2001). Recognising the type of ‘good’ one deals with is vital to understand 
processes of institutional bricolage and is important for devising effective boundary conditions 
and remedies for improving sustainable resource management. When we consider that the CBM 
framework departs from the view that water resources reflect CPRs, it may actually not be 
surprising that these remedies do not effectively address collective action problems within 
public goods. When we treat public goods according to CPR theory they may in reality be 
wearing ‘the wrong trousers’ to paraphrase Wallace and Gromit44 when managed according to 
principles of the CBM model.  
Lastly, the CPR rule to exclude upon non-payment remains a morally impossible option due to 
the human right to water and, as Olson (1971) predicts, the inability to exclude households from 
collecting water following non-payment resulted in a snowball effect and the reluctance by 
others to contribute. Yet, while the human right to water seems essential to ascertain that people 
meet (at least) their basic access to water, it is equally important to draft the right conditions for 
sustainable rural water management on which the human right to water rests.   
                                                          
44 ‘The Wrong Trousers’ is a 1993 animated movie by Nick Park featuring the characters Wallace and Gromit 
who are well-known British icons.  
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8.7.2 Habitus, Authoritative Power and Worldviews  
 
 
Habitus 
 
Non-payment, (suspected) misappropriation of funds and the lack of rule enforcement may be 
explained through the concept of ‘habitus’ of Bourdieu (1989; 1990). Collective financial 
contributions for the upkeep of the water infrastructure were not accustomed, despite the shift 
in the 1990s from state-led service provision to Community Based Management (CBM), 
demanding user payments and community control, as also Chapter 5 on the outcomes of CBM 
and van den Broek and Brown (2015) illustrate. The preference to pay the water user fees after 
breakdown may serve a logical function due to widespread commandeering of public funds for 
personal gain, both on village level and in other social fields such as at government agencies 
(Persson et al., 2012). The deposits of water user fees in the SACCO and the use of receipts 
upon payment could therefore not prevent and remove the suspicion of misuse of funds by the 
collectors.  
 
 
Authoritative Power 
 
The request to pay water user fees by the Water Operators, let alone the enforcement of 
sanctions upon non-payment, proved difficult for three key reasons. First, a number of former 
Water User Committee (WUC) members significantly influenced the course of the pilot project. 
The former WUC members were often part of the local elite and represented powerful agents. 
The implementation of the CBM-lite model, embodied by the Water Operator, implicated a loss 
of status and (access to) finances. As the risk perceptions in Chapter 7 predicted, the WUC 
members were unsatisfied with the CBM-lite model. In Mboira II village, the former WUC 
members networked with respected and influential school teachers to maintain their self-interest 
and enhance their powerful position. Together they deliberately subverted the pilots by 
disseminating false information about the Water Operator to sabotage the pilot project. This 
finding supports Feeny’s (1988 p. 186) notion that “… political and economic costs and benefits 
to the ruling elites are a key to explaining the nature and scope of change”. Logical agents of 
change such as the politicians (i.e. in Mboira II) and local leaders (Adams, 2001; Feeny, 1988; 
Wegerich, 2001) were not actively engaged in altering deeply ingrained informal rules of non-
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contributions and misappropriation of funds, and may potentially have feared high transaction 
costs, such as loss of public support, with supporting the pilot. Other authors such as (Quin et 
al., 2011) have related lack of user payments within the CBM to the role of Ugandan politicians 
who tend to advise against user payments. The emphasis on user payments within the CBM-
lite model may have strengthened this sentiment.  
The lack of rule adherence was also observed at local government level.  Despite the contractual 
agreements at the start of the pilot project, the critical case study demonstrated the lack of rule 
enforcement and post-construction support at the local government level, as also documented 
by Barnes et al. (2014), Baumann and Furey (2013), Carter et al. (1999; 2010), Harvey and 
Reed (2006), Lockwood (2004), Moriarty et al. (2013), Schouten and Moriarty (2003).  Besides, 
the erratic execution of policy regulations by the local government may have influenced public 
opinion that formal rules are an analogy for Putnam’s (1993 p. 17) “writing on water”. The fact 
local rules are rarely enforced, may shed more light on community member’s risk perception 
of paying the water user fees, described in Chapter 7. As long the enforcement of rules is 
dependent on by-laws (i.e. formal rules) and the actions of local individuals, payment may 
remain a risk as misconduct (both misuse of funds and free-riding by others) cannot be 
effectively prevented and punished. 
A second reason for the difficulty to enforce discipline upon non-payment was because the 
enforcement of by-laws was seen as confrontational and socially inacceptable behaviour; 
similar to the findings of Cleaver (2002) in Zimbabwe.  Authoritative power and respect was 
obtained by those who could politely convince community members to contribute. However, 
these methods did not guarantee compliance with payment rules as explained above. 
Furthermore (and third), the financial incentive to the already well-to-do Water Operators 
hampered the collection process. In his study in South Africa, Golooba-Mutebi (2005) writes 
that community members expect affluent community members to support poorer households 
and family members. Yet, when well-off community members fail to meet such expectations, 
feelings of jealousy and resentment may become a threat to individuals and family members 
(Ferguson, 1999; Niehaus, 2001; 2013; Pottier, 1988).  In the pilot villages, these emotions 
were expressed in extortions of witchcraft; a cosmological understanding that influenced every 
day practices. 
 
 
Chapter 8  The Fall of the CBM-lite model 
199 
 
Worldviews 
 
Research on witchcraft in Africa by Niehaus (2001: 2001b; 2013), shows that the accusations 
of witchcraft thrives in villages that experience labour migration and the break-up of the 
extended family; a similar trend was observed in the pilot area. Niehaus argues that in such 
contexts, threats of witchcraft are less risky as they do not damage close family relationships. 
The Water Operators in Mpumwe and Mboira II were not born in the village. Their outsider 
status may therefore have allowed the expression of threats and harassments.  
A fundamental notion within the cosmological worldview is that aspects as health and wealth 
are limited goods. A successful  person is assumed to have profited at someone else’s expense 
(Cleaver, 2012). The fact that the well-to-do Water Operators profited from collecting water 
user fees, was consequently perceived as anti-social and unfair. Threats of witchcraft and other 
harassments directed at the Water Operator could therefore be seen as efforts to restore equality, 
as noted by Offiong (1991). This also brings to mind the Scandinavian concept of the Janteloven 
(the Law of Jante) by the Danish author Aksel Sandemose (1899-1965) where people learn to 
refrain from feeling or acting superior from others, or behave differently than others, and fear 
individualism. This may represent the real threatened value and object at risk, rather than money 
per se. On the one hand there is evidence of loose group ties demonstrated by the lack of 
willingness to volunteer and mistrust, yet at the same time community members are bound by 
a collective code of conduct they fear to break.  These self-defeating behaviour patterns resulted 
in withholding payment, led to handpump breakdown and inconvenience and possibly sickness 
rather than seeing the Water Operator profit. Further, threats of witchcraft were expressed by 
women. This provides an interesting element to processes of institutional change, whereby 
women play a powerful role in correcting socially ‘wrong’ behaviour, as also observed by 
Dolan (2002), showing their ability to exercise agency and influence to alter formally agreed 
rules, even though they may not have actively participated in formal decision-making processes, 
as i.e. community meetings (Chabal, 2009). 
The finding that threats of witchcraft and verbal harassments were directed at the rule enforcer 
are surprising; Douglas (1987) and Cleaver (2012) found that informal norms caused free-riders 
to be indebted with “disease and death” (Douglas 1987, p. 74). In the pilot villages, informal 
sanctions were directed at the rule infringers and free-riders got off scot-free. The enticement 
of a financial incentive could not compensate the Water Operators for the high transaction costs 
upon enforcement of water user fees. To protect their social standing, Water Operators did not 
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disclose their earnings to the community and rested with the situation community members 
were unwilling to contribute, despite the almost unanimous willingness to pay prior 
implementation of the CBM-lite model. Paradoxically, the very reason to elect the Water 
Operators – their entrepreneurial qualities and assumed authoritative power – was turned 
against them and the threats they recived rendered them inept at public endorsing the CMB-lite 
model. 
 
 
8.7.3 Outcomes of Institutional Bricolage 
 
‘Organic’ institutional bricolage similarly failed to generate adequate Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) funds. In Nyakatugo, the water management arrangements evolved to a 
mixture of elements from CBM, CBM-lite and specific local preferences. Despite the attempts 
of community members to familiarise rural water management arrangements, institutional 
bricolage did not improve the prospect of sustainable rural water supply: non-payment, 
ambiguity over the financial incentives and lack of funds for O&M were still the order of the 
day. Scott and Meyer (1994 p.2) remind us that “visible structures and routines that make 
organisations are direct reflections and effects of rules and structures built into wider 
environments”. The locally adapted and organically created water management arrangements 
in Nyakatugo may show us the inertia to changing management structures and the consequent 
acceptance of unreliable access to water from a particular source. 
Overall the CBM-lite pilot failed for a host of reasons compounded by the lack of external 
support and regulation by the sub-county and the shifiting priorities of The Water Trust (TWT). 
The demise of the pilot and the departure of the Programme Manager who was profoundly 
engaged with the pilot project, happened almost concurrently and corresponds with the 
perspective of Garforth and Usher (1997):  “… the degree of uptake and impact are basically 
linked to the quality of project management.” Although the lack of supervision and ability to 
redirect and evaluate elements of the CBM-lite model are critical to the rapid collapse of the 
pilot, ultimately, the general equanimity to non-payment in conjunction with the high 
transaction costs to enforce rules due to powerful collective codes of conduct, bring us back to 
the risky rural water management practices of today and described in the first empirical Chapter 
5. In the end, the outcomes of CBM, CBM-lite and organic processes of institutional bricolage 
were similar and did not guarantee reliable access to water. Moreover, the critical case study on 
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the CBM-lite pilot teaches us that when the outcomes of rural water management innovations 
are dependent on upfront user payments and the ability of community members to enforce rules 
on resource use, such models may lead to non-management, leaving the functionality of the 
water infrastructure fatalistically controlled by the Gods. Therefore, initiatives as that of the 
‘Smart Handpump’ project by the University of Oxford and the ‘Sub-County Water Supply and 
Sanitation Boards’ (SWSSB) of IRC/Triple-S and the Ugandan Ministry of Water and 
Environment (MWE) discussed in Chapter 6, are unlikely to lead to effective management 
regimes and long-term reliable access to water as they are based on willingness to pay and 
human rule enforcement. 
 
Thus, when universal access to clean water is the objective and when the user pays principle 
remains the dominant paradigm, should the rural water sector consider taking community 
control out of the equation? 
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Chapter 9  
Why Community Based Management 
Thwarts Reliable Access to Water and 
Why Rural Water Management 
Innovations Maintain the Status Quo 
 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
This final chapter answers the research objectives and overall aim of the thesis. The chapter 
draws the study to a conclusion by stressing key findings that feed back into the literature and 
make recommendations for policy and practice.  
This research has culminated into two key findings: 1) the failure to successfully reconcile 
the user pays principle and community control and, 2) sectoral inertia and reluctance to 
move away from the CBM model amongst actors at all levels in the rural water sector. 
This chapter now seeks to consider the implications of the thesis’s key findings for debates on 
handpump management in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries and future approaches to 
sustainable rural water management. The chapter begins with a background of the study in 
Section 9.2 before it summarises the thesis’s key contributions in Section 9.3. The proceeding 
Sections 9.4 and 9.5 discuss the key findings in relation to the research objectives of this thesis. 
Section 9.4. addresses the failure to successfully reconcile the user pays principle and 
community control. The section highlights that reforms within the parameters of the CBM 
model will not be sufficient to guarantee both user payment and community control. The key 
themes addressed in this section are the role of informal norms and power relations, ‘the 
typology of rural groundwater ‘good’’ and the human right to water in ensuring sustainable 
management outcomes. Section 9.5. addresses the inertia in the rural water sector to deviate 
from the CBM model. The section concludes that handpump non-functionality resembles a 
‘wicked problem’.
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The chapter closes with the implications of this study on policy, future rural water management 
innovations and research in Section 9.6.  
 
 
9.2 Background to the Study 
 
This thesis has studied how handpumps in rural Uganda can be sustainably managed in terms 
of finance and management. To date, sustainable rural water management in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) countries is expected to be secured through the Community Based Management 
(CBM) model. In the CBM model, water users are expected to pay for system upgrades, 
rehabilitation and expansion expenditures and maintenance costs (Burr and Fonseca, 2013). A 
Water User Committee (WUC) is responsible for the collections and the Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) of the water source and the members are required to invest their time to 
keep the system running. At any one time, however, an estimated one out of three handpumps 
is non-functional across rural SSA (Baumann, 2006; Oxford/RFL, 2014; RWSN, 2010). The 
high loss of infrastructure reflects high-sunken costs by governments and the donor community, 
and is threatening people’s health, livelihoods and the human right to water which is intensified 
by growing population rates and the detrimental effects of climate change. 
In response to an increasing body of literature showing the failings of the CBM model to secure 
handpump sustainability (i.e. Chowns, 2014; Cleaver, 1999; 2002; 2012; Fonseca, 2014; Jones, 
2011), this thesis has aimed to critically evaluate the challenges of the Community Based 
Management (CBM) model and alternative approaches for sustainable rural water 
management. As such, the objectives of the thesis were to: 
1. Examine the underlying ideologies and theoretical underpinnings of the CBM model; 
 
2. Evaluate the outcomes of 100 community based managed water sources in mid-west 
Uganda. 
 
3. Analyse the risk perceptions of community members, NGO staffs, and local and national 
government officials about the introduction of an alternative rural water management 
model – referred to as CBM-lite. 
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4. Evaluate the outcomes of the CBM-lite model in four pilot villages in mid-west Uganda. 
 
The study was conducted in mid-west Uganda in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts and is 
rooted in an iterative research strategy whereby data collection and hands-on experience was 
alternated with insights from ‘mainstream’ and ‘critical institutionalism’ to understand and 
interpret the outcomes of community based managed handpumps (refer to methodology 
Chapter 4 for a detailed overview of the research methods). The study was built upon action 
research in conjunction with a cross-sectional and a critical case study design. It adopted a 
mixed-method approach which included rigorous ethnographic fieldwork, interviews and 
surveys covering the period August 2012 to November 2015. The research was established 
through close collaboration with a local Ugandan NGO ‘The Water Trust’ (TWT) and Masindi 
and Kiryandongo local government.  
The study has been divided into two separate parts. The first part of this study investigated the 
outcomes of the CBM model in mid-west Uganda. The second part of the study, investigated 
an alternative rural water management model, referred to as CBM-lite. This local niche 
innovation was co-developed by the author who was the Programme Manager of TWT from 
June 2012 until January 2014.  
 
 
9.3 Summary of the Thesis’s Key Contributions 
 
This thesis has made an original contribution to the handpump sustainability debate and the 
growing geography of water literature by demonstrating that non-functionality of handpumps, 
and the precarious status of many, cannot be blamed solely on poor technology or siting of 
wells but is fundamentally related to the institutional framework of the Community Based 
Management (CBM) model that attempts to mesh the commodification of water with 
community control amid the messy complex reality of rural environments. The thesis has 
contributed to the increasing body of evidence that the problem of handpump non-functionality 
is related to the CBM model, specifically the dearth of user funds to pay for maintenance costs 
(Burr and Fonseca, 2013; Fonseca et al., 2013; Jones, 2011; Kalulu et al., 2012; Peter and 
Nkambule, 2012) and the inactivity of a management body or a Water User Committee (WUC) 
to organise community meetings, collect user funds, carry out Operation and Maintenance 
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(O&M) tasks, organise handpump repairs and maintain proper hygiene and sanitation practices 
near the water source (Carter et al., 2010; Mugumya, 2013; Naiga et al., 2015).  
Through various examples in the thesis, this study has advanced insights into why 
recommendations for improvement that fall within the CBM model will struggle to succeed. 
This has been illustrated by evaluating both the current CBM policy and an alternative rural 
water management model –the ‘CBM-lite’ model. The CBM-lite model attempted to overcome 
the dearth of user funds and inactivity of the WUCs by reconfiguring the organisational and 
governance arrangements of the CBM model. However, being confined within the institutional 
framework of the CBM model, the CBM-lite innovation did not transcend the current risk of 
handpump failure. The study lends therefore support to a growing critical institutional 
scholarship that questions the effectiveness of initiatives that aim to design “the right formula” 
(Golooba-Mutebi, 2012 p. 430) for sustainable resource use (Cleaver, 2012; Cleaver and de 
Koning, 2015; Chowns, 2014; de Koning, 2011)  
In contrast to the recommendations of Hassenforder et al. (2015) Jones (2011) and Cleaver 
(2002), to connect rural water management interventions to “existing socially embedded 
arrangements” (Jones, 2011 p. 68), this study has shown that such approaches of facilitating 
‘institutional bricolage’ continue to maintain the risky ‘hit-and-miss’ strategy characteristic of 
the current CBM policy. It has demonstrated that the management of handpumps in such 
processes remains dependent on the particular mix of community members having the 
willingness and ability to take an active role in managing the groundwater source. Hence, when 
organisational and governance arrangements cannot be effectively designed and when 
processes of institutional bricolage maintain the status quo of a one third handpump failure rate, 
the rural water sector may need to explore potential rural water management arrangements that 
substantially deviate away from CBM and consider other actors for the management of rural 
water sources as shown in Table 6.1.  
While trial and error learning may accumulate meaningful information about what strategies 
may improve sustainable rural water management, the study, however, demonstrated in Chapter 
6 that contemporary innovations that aim to improve management failings such as the ‘Smart 
Handpump’ project by the University of Oxford and the ‘Sub-county Water Supply and 
Sanitation Boards’ (SWSSB) by IRC-Triple-S, do not move away from CBM. The thesis has 
made a considerable contribution to knowledge by applying a relational reading of risk (Boholm 
and Corvellec, 2011) on actors’ risk perceptions to unravel why there has been little reform in 
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the rural water sector: an area of research that has been under recognised in the rural water 
literature. The analysis has shown one of the clearest dilemmas in this thesis: a rural water 
sector resistant to radical change due to aversion to risk, conflicting diagnose of problems and 
consequent solutions and, CBM as a means, counterintuitively, to avoid the user pays principle.  
The conclusion proceeds with a synthesis of the key findings of this thesis: 1) inability to 
successfully reconcile the user pays principle and community control and, 2) sectoral inertia 
and reluctance to move away from the CBM model amongst actors at all levels in the rural 
water sector. The following Sections (9.4 and 9.5) link the key findings to the thesis’ research 
objectives.  
 
 
9.4 CBM is a Blueprint for Breakdown 
 
The chief purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate conceptually and empirically that 
problems arise from the neo-liberal user pays principle and grassroots approaches merged 
within in the Community Based Management (CBM) model. As noted in Chapter 245 that 
addressed the first research objective and critically examined the underlying ideologies and 
theoretical underpinnings of the CBM model, the neo-liberal arm of the CBM model assumes 
that upfront contributions towards the construction of the water source result into feelings of 
ownership and a commitment to pay for the upkeep of the system whereas the grassroots arm 
holds romantic views about ‘the community’, claims that  local institutions can be designed and 
believes in the corrective leverage of participatory approaches to build social capital and 
enhance collective action. This study has argued against such ‘orthodox science’ where 
environmental science and politics are coproduced (Forsyth, 2003) and that has endless lists of 
requirements to ensure communities can sustainably manage their natural resources. As Blaikie 
(2006 p. 1949) writes: “… it leaves policy makers with the task of finding a needle in a haystack, 
where the haystack itself has far from clear outlines.” 
Chapter 546 addressed the second research objective of this study and empirically evaluated the 
outcomes of the CBM model across 100 water sources in Masindi and Kiryandongo districts in 
                                                          
45 Parts of the arguments in this chapter are based upon: 
Van den Broek. M.A., and Brown.J., 2015. Blueprint for breakdown? Community Based Management of rural 
groundwater in Uganda. Geoforum 67, 51-63. (Published) 
 
46 This chapter is based upon the case study presented in: 
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mid-west Uganda. The case study demonstrated the failings of the CBM model to ensure both 
user payment and community control and argued that user payment ultimately undermined the 
CBM model. Although the established water user fee rates were claimed to be affordable by 
the majority, water users were reluctant to pay. Only at 3% of the studied water sources Water 
User Committees (WUCs) had been able to secure sufficient funds for O&M (as per the 
guidelines of the WASHCost benchmarks of Burr and Fonseca (2013)). The collection of funds 
reverberated resistance by water users as they feared WUCs could misuse the funds for personal 
gain: a fear that was expressed in the analogy that WUC members were ‘eating the money’ and 
seemed to be rooted in the wider social-political context of Uganda where corruption has 
penetrated into all layers of society.  
As a result, the collections of water user fees threatened to destabilise close social relationships 
and WUC members had no authority to enforce locally agreed sanctions to deter free-riding. 
Mistrust towards WUC members over money, often justified, had in many cases undermined 
collective action. WUC members often discontinued collections and tended to abandon their 
management roles as they did not want to subject themselves to abuse. Those few individuals 
that did remain committed to their management function often felt they were entitled to be 
compensated for their efforts and endurance. Although sometimes formally agreed upon by the 
water users, the commodification of the (previously voluntary) service undermined the CBM 
model.  
Theoretical Chapter 6, 47 explored contemporary rural water management innovations and 
introduced the CBM-lite model; the central focus in the remainder of this thesis. The CBM-lite 
model drew upon recommendations from practitioner literature to improve handpump 
management outcomes and was designed to overcome practices of non-payment, 
misappropriation of public funds and inactivity of the WUCs in the CBM model. CBM-lite 
seeked to restructure resource governance and reconfigured the organisation of rural water 
management within the existing institutional framework that promotes the user pays principle 
and communal ownership. 
In the CBM-lite model a user-paid Water Operator, supported by a caretaker for each water 
source, is selected by the community with the involvement of the local government through a 
                                                          
Van den Broek. M.A., and Brown.J., 2015. Blueprint for breakdown? Community Based Management of rural 
groundwater in Uganda. Geoforum 67, 51-63. (Published) 
47 Some of the arguments presented in this chapter draw upon: 
Brown, J., and van den Broek, M.A., Better the devil you know? A relational reading of risk and innovation in 
the rural water sector’ (under review with The Geographical Journal). 
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competitive application process and assumes responsibility for Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M) of a cluster of village water points serving a term of three years. The collected 
community funds are ‘banked’ with a local Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) that 
provides an insurance-style product, which, with checks and balances, grants the operator 
access to funds for even major repairs. The Water Operator pays a fixed fee per agreed period 
to the SACCO based on estimated costs of maintenance and repair. Roles, responsibilities and 
sanctions are formalised in a contract signed by all key stakeholders.  
Empirical Chapter 8 addressed the fourth research objective of this thesis and critically 
evaluated the outcomes of the CBM-lite model in four pilot villages in Kiryandongo district. 
The case study on CBM-lite demonstrated that similar problems emerged as in the CBM model 
described in the empirical findings of Chapter 5. Banking the funds and an insurance against 
handpump breakdown, a financial incentive for the Water Operator and clustering the water 
sources did neither improve user payment nor improve community control. Instead, the 
emphasis on user payment and the provision of a user paid financial incentive to the Water 
Operators caused considerable tensions in the village. Innovators must therefore be wary of 
placing too much faith in surveys in general, and willingness to pay surveys in particular, as a 
foundation for rolling out an innovation. Although Swyngedouw (2006 p.4) argues that 
“[p]roviding safe and clean water to communities is not exactly rocket science” guaranteeing 
user payment and community control prove complex for a number of reasons.   
First, this thesis has shown that informal norms and power relations prevented user payments 
and obstructed community control. Although the majority of the community members claimed 
a water user fee of 1,000 UGX was affordable, non-payment appeared the norm and the mindset 
that access should be for free – as in the state-led era – largely persists into the present time 
(Jones, 2011; Quin et al., 2011; Whittington et al., 2009; Fritz and Menocal, 2006; Woolcock 
and Pritchett, 2004). The resistance to the CBM-lite model by the majority of the community 
members was therefore unlikely rooted in a desire to return to the CBM model, but originated 
from a reluctance to the institutional framework of the ‘user pays’ paradigm that is easily 
circumvented in the CBM model.  
Another source of resistance in the CBM-lite model was the financial incentive for the Water 
Operator upon water user fee collections. Although community members were disinclined to 
volunteer and felt they needed recompense for their efforts as demonstrated in case study 
Chapter 5, formalising user paid financial compensations disagreed with informal codes of 
conduct that value patron relationships and prescribe equal distributions of wealth (Ferguson, 
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1999; Golooba-Mutebi, 2005; Niehaus, 2001; 2013; Pottier, 1988).  Similar to the situation in 
the CBM model, public support for the village Water Operators faded due to open accusations 
from powerful individuals in the village that claimed the Water Operators were ‘eating the 
money’ and failed to provide ‘accountability’. These rumours engendered a downward spiral 
of suspicion and provoked community members against those in charge of the management of 
the water source. The suspected financial incentive for the Water Operators (similar to the 
WUCs, the Water Operators feared to openly admit they were earning from the collections) 
instigated feelings of jealousy and of being unfairly treated.  In all four pilot villages, these 
feelings were discharged through threatening and abusing the Water Operators and the 
caretakers: actions that served the ultimate goal of non-payment. In sum, community members 
rather withheld payment, leading to handpump breakdown and inconvenience and possibly 
sickness from the use of surface water rather than seeing a Water Operator profit, even though 
payment to the Water Operators was formally agreed upon and despite the fact that the surveys 
conducted by TWT showed community members’ support to the CBM-lite pilot project. The 
social repercussions for maintaining the village water sources outweighed the financial 
compensation of the Water Operators and caused them to abandon their tasks.  
Innovators must be aware that the expressed calls for ‘accountability’ are no indication that 
financial transparency and measures to prevent misuse of funds are likely to result in a 
willingness to pay. Even when there is no opportunity for misuse of funds, the informal norm 
is that water should not be paid for, and the lack of understanding why money should be paid 
before handpump breakdown, will continue to supersede locally agreed formal rules (i.e. paying 
the Water Operators) on resource use, as suggested by Cleaver (2012). As long as community 
members are in charge of correcting such informal norms of non-payment by enforcing locally 
agreed bye-laws on close friends, family and close social relationships, they are fighting a losing 
battle as breaking such norms have proved to be costly to the rule enforcer. The insurmountable 
task of the Water Operators to deter free-riding and enforce locally agreed sanctions has been 
well-illustrated in the following quote by one of the Water Operators: [upon rule enforcement] 
“… me and the relatives will remain [to have] a problem. The sub-county will come and go 
away, the police will come and go away, but I am the one who remains in the community” (6 
November 2014). 
Second, this study adopted a geographical perspective and highlights the importance for 
academics studying the significance of place and the outcomes of natural resource management 
to consider the nature of the resource dealt with. While CBM is based on Common Pool 
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Resource (CPR) theory as discussed in Chapter 2, this thesis has demonstrated that the water 
sources in the case studies did not reflect CPRs (rivalrous in nature and difficult to exclude 
outsiders). Water was abundantly available and people did not eschew from taking water from 
unsafe open water sources. The water sources in the case study area, rather, resembled a public 
good wherein people’s access to water was not dependent on that particular resource. As 
suggested by Mancur Olson (1965), public goods are prone to the free-riders problem.  
Third, and as discussed throughout this thesis, the water sources in the case study failed to meet 
the minimal requirements for sustainable CPR management as set out by Ostrom (1990) such 
as clear boundaries of the resource. Clear boundaries imply that users (more specifically free-
riders and ‘wrong-doers’) can be excluded from the resource. However, water is a special case, 
or as Bakker (2003) argues an ‘uncooperative commodity’ due to the human right to water. As 
a result, the user pays principle has proved difficult to enforce because refusing access to water 
is perceived as morally and ethically wrong. An ironic state of affairs, as at the same time a 
dearth of user funds threatens the long-term functionality of the water system and ultimately 
the human right to water.  
The thesis has demonstrated that reforms within the CBM model do not offer any guarantee for 
improved outcomes and do not overcome the central failings of willingness to pay and 
community control. Tweaking participatory processes, technological innovations and external 
support are therefore unlikely to enhance rural water management outcomes. Neither will 
interventions that improve financial accountability, or cluster handpumps to pool community 
funds for handpump repairs, resolve the difficulty for community members to both control the 
management of the water sources and ensure user payments. Until user payment and community 
control are merged, the sixth post-2015 Sustainable Development Goal of universal access to 
clean water will remain an illusion, as the CBM model has turned out to be a blueprint for 
breakdown.  
While experimenting with alternative rural water management arrangements may seem 
imperative, the second key finding of this thesis indicates limited appetite amongst actors in the 
rural water sector to move away from CBM.  
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9.5 Better the Devil You Know? 
 
Even though alternatives to Community Based Management (CBM) have been developed to 
improve handpump functionality, Chapter 6 has demonstrated that they remain within the 
parameters of the CBM model. Through Karen Bakker’s (2007) resource management 
categories it was shown that such new endeavours rather build upon the CBM model through 
introducing additional elements such as a technological innovation or a bureaucratic layer to 
support communities in managing their water sources. The third research objective served as a 
lens to understand the lack of reform in the rural water sector by analysing actor’s risk 
perceptions on the CBM-lite innovation.  
The thesis has made an important contribution to knowledge by demonstrating that innovations 
that deviate too far from CBM represent a possible risk to strongly held values. It has shown 
that the CBM framework acts as a tanker; that irrespective of the risks it entails it may be 
challenging to turn around. The relational theory of risk of Boholm and Corvellec (2011) 
provided a conceptual framework to unravel how ‘risk posing objects’ could potentially 
threaten underlying values and has proved helpful in explaining why and how innovations in 
the rural water sector pose risks to local and national actors. 
As Chapter 7 has demonstrated, which describes and reflects upon the development and 
implementation process of the CBM-lite model, the seemingly rational changes within the 
model caused a host of perceived risks to a wide range of stakeholders represented in this study; 
NGO staffs, local and national government officials and community members. The most 
prominent ‘risk posing object’ was a single and paid Water Operator. A salaried Water Operator 
proved highly contentious and NGO officials feared that Water Operators could deny 
community members access to water to prevent free-riding. The human right to water appeared 
to override the user pays principle in the mind-set of many NGO officials. The emphasis on 
user payment in the CBM-lite model made the model contentious to central NGO custodians. 
While user payment is key to the CBM model and the long-term functionality of rural 
handpumps, the analysis revealed a low level of support for the user pays principle.  
The persistence of the CBM model may therefore be explained by the fact that payment is easily 
circumvented in the CBM model. In addition, and as described in the literature Chapter 2, North 
(1990) may explain the institutional invariance when he wrote: “…. [when] organisations owe 
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their existence to the institutional matrix, they will be an ongoing interest group to assure the 
perpetuation of that institutional frame structure – thus assuring path dependence (p.6).  
Communities shared the low level of support for the user pays principle and felt that a user paid 
Water Operator offended their sense of fairness. Although it was claimed that ‘voluntarism was 
dead’, paying the Water Operator disagreed with social and cultural norms; inertia to change 
was also evident at the local level.  
In sum, a relational reading of risk demonstrated that for many stakeholders the known risks of 
CBM may be preferable to potential harm to ideology, policy coherence, organisational 
reputation, and social and cultural norms. The relational theory of risk has therefore proved 
powerful in predicting the outcomes of the CBM-lite model and essentially showed that the 
CBM-lite was already ‘dead in the water’ before implementation. Yet, simultaneously and 
ironically, it is the institutional CBM framework – user payment and community control – that   
essentially runs counter to what community members and various WASH stakeholders value. 
The sum of this thesis is a ‘classic wicked problem’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973). As noted 
throughout, actors disagree on the root causes of handpump failure and consequently how to 
solve it. Furthermore, solutions may not be agreeable due to competing and strongly held values 
such as efficiency, equity and social justice (Ludwig, 2001). They may lead to undesirable and 
unexpected side-effects and, balancing functionality, social wellbeing and the environment may 
prove difficult to achieve (Franks and Cleaver, 2009). A key feature of wicked problems is that 
easy and technological ‘fixes’ do not suffice (Balint et al., 2012) and that there is no single 
solution to address handpump non-functionality. Inevitably, inertia may be the outcome.  
 
 
9.6. Engendering Evidence-Based Policy Making 
 
This thesis has moved beyond critiquing the Community Based Management (CBM) model 
and aims to start setting a research agenda that explores viable and empirically grounded rural 
water management alternatives outside the CBM framework (van den Broek and Brown, 2015 
p. 26).  Ultimately, to have a chance to achieve the sixth post-Sustainable Development Goal 
and to adapt to changing rural environments, the rural water sector needs to embrace 
experimentation to enhance learning and to devise appropriate strategies for improving 
handpump sustainability. As highlighted by the human right to water, the provision of water is 
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the responsibility of the state (de Albuquerque, 2014). While capital repair of rural water 
services financed by governments and the international community may be preferable to some 
(Franceys et al., 2016; Swyngedouw, 2006), there is no evidence that these actors are willing 
to take on such a responsibility. As long as states and donors are not committed to fund the 
maintenance of rural water systems, the user pays principle persists and rural communities will 
need to pay for the recurrent costs of their water systems. As community control does not 
guarantee user payments and will therefore continue to threaten reliable access to clean water, 
alternative strategies outside the CBM model may need to be explored.   
As described in Chapter 2, recent debates in the rural water sector signal an increasing interest 
to introduce market mechanisms in the supply of rural water services – illustrated by the 
increasing calls to ‘professionalise’ CBM (Moriarty et al., 2013; Smits et al., 2010). However, 
endeavours to alter water users from service providers to clients and replace voluntarism with 
a paid service provider responsible for the O&M of the water service, have been targeted at 
rural growth centres and more complex water technologies such as piped water systems. To 
date, CBM is predominantly viewed as the best water management model in rural villages that 
use simple handpump technologies. This thesis has clearly argued against the romantic 
perception that rural communities are able to effectively control the management of their 
handpumps and are willing to pay for its upkeep. The findings of the thesis implicate that 
debates on professionalising rural water services may need to be extended to rural areas and 
water sources fitted with a handpump. After all, 82% of the Ugandan population lives in a rural 
area (World Bank, 2016).  
The CBM-lite model that has been studied in this thesis resembles a possible reading of 
professionalising the management of handpumps in rural villages. The results of the CBM-lite 
model may prove helpful for innovators aiming to improve the outcomes of rural water 
management arrangements. First, the impression from extensive fieldwork is that there is no 
evidence that communities actually want full citizen control (Golooba-mutebi, 2005). The study 
showed that a financial incentive for a Water Operator may not be sufficient to engender user 
fee collections and execution of maintenance tasks due to social repercussions. Second, the 
findings support Olson’s (1965) suggestion that a ‘special devise’ may be needed when 
exclusion of free-riders is too costly for the rule enforcer. The study shows that Olson (1965 
p.2) may have been right when he wrote: “… unless there is coercion or some other special 
devise to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will 
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not act to achieve their common group interest”. Indeed, to guarantee user payment more 
draconian measures may be required such as pre-payment technologies. 
Professionalising the management of handpumps and moving away from CBM may, however, 
be difficult to achieve due to poor road networks in rural areas, potential low-returns on 
investment in scarcely populated areas and low-purchasing power of rural villagers (Koestler 
et al., 2010). In addition, the application of a ‘special devise’ may not only threaten the human 
right to water but also pose an additional financial burden. After all, the technology and 
retrofitting the handpumps need to be paid for by someone.  
A special case is a recent proposed project by the French handpump manufacturer Hydro 
Vergnet, that aims to remove community control and use a pre-payment water system (Barbotte 
and Guillemin, 2016). Their initiative – coined as the ‘UDUMA project’ that potentially will 
be co-funded by the Dutch government – aims to commodify both the management of the 
service and the water (the ‘good’) of rural handpumps (in CBM, communities only pay for spare 
parts and labour costs of the mechanic). In the ‘Hydro Vergnet model’, a private Water Operator 
is responsible for the distribution of water. Water users pay for water use (around USD 1 per 
m3), regulated through the use of ‘smart handpumps’, fitted with a water meter and monitoring 
technology that transmits usage data to a cloud. An independent body is responsible for the 
maintenance and repair of the handpumps and are paid a set rate per pump. The project 
hypothesizes that water users are willing to pay for a good and reliable service and can afford 
the projected costs of water (Barbotte and Guillemin, 2016).  
The proposed Hydro Vergnet project may suggest Friedrich Hayek (1944) might be justified 
when he wrote: “… most people still believe that it must be possible to find some Middle Way 
between ‘atomistic competition’ and central direction. […] Yet mere common sense proves a 
treacherous guide. […] Planning and competition can be combined only by planning for 
competition, but not by planning against competition” (p. 31). However, a research agenda that 
studies the impact of rural water management innovations must consider that the move towards 
privatisation in rural water service delivery may, just as the CBM model, represent an initiative 
of its era. European countries have increasingly shifted their domestic and foreign policies to 
the political right and economic decline combined with increasing public discontent about 
foreign aid has progressively channelled hope towards he private sector to address societal 
problems (Akkerman et al., 2016). As a result, scientists need to be wary of producing yet 
another ‘science-policy’ such as CBM where policies may shape environmental science and in 
turn reinforce a political project (see Forsyth, 2003).  
Chapter 9  Conclusion 
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Furthermore, the perspective of handpump non-functionality as a wicked problem may guide 
the research agenda. Researchers must acknowledge the underlying values that shape rural 
water management innovations and may need to debate whether interventions that remove 
community control to enforce user payments are yet another move that reinforce deep structures 
of injustice and inequality. Potentially challenging is the low purchasing power of community 
members that may cause people to resort to open and contaminated water sources to avoid user 
payments. Indeed, human rights activists may recite urban water privatisation efforts that failed 
to guarantee ‘access to clean water for all’ (Bakker, 2007; Finger and Allouche, 2002; Johnstone 
and Wood, 2003; Laurie and Marvin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 2005). Further, as Chapter 8 has 
shown, communities may become a powerful source of resistance for the successful 
implementation of water management reforms that require user payments. Compulsory water 
user payment may lead to strong feelings of being treated unjustly and may lead to self-
defeating behaviour patterns such as vandalising water infrastructure to avoid user payments. 
This thesis supports Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982 p.189) suggestion that “no change ever 
comes from the centre” and has shown the sector’s strong commitment to the status quo. To 
avoid the deadlock in the sector, a new social science community may need to investigate and 
share innovations that come from “the margins of society” recognising that management 
strategies may be context specific. The accumulation of empirically grounded research will feed 
evidence-based policy making which ultimately may acknowledge the risks CBM entails.  
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Appendix 2.1 – Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the 
commons (adapted from Agrawal )2001 p.1659)) 
 
 
1. Resource system characteristics 
(i) Small size  
(ii) Well-defined boundaries  
(iii) Low levels of mobility 
(iv) Possibilities of storage of benefits from the resource 
(v) Predictability 
 
2. Group characteristics 
(i) Small size  
(ii) Clearly defined boundaries  
(iii) Shared norms  
(iv) Past successful experiences—social capital  
(v) Appropriate leadership—young, familiar with changing external environments, 
connected to local traditional elite  
(vi) Interdependence among group members  
(vii) Heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of identities and interests  
(viii) Low levels of poverty 
 
1. and 2. Relationship between resource system characteristics and group characteristics 
(i) Overlap between user group residential location and resource location  
(ii) High levels of dependence by group members on resource system  
(iii) Fairness in allocation of benefits from common resources  
(iv) Low levels of user demand 
(v) Gradual change in levels of demand 
 
3. Institutional arrangements 
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(i) Rules are simple and easy to understand  
(ii) Locally devised access and management rules  
(iii) Ease in enforcement of rules  
(iv) Graduated sanctions  
(v) Availability of low cost adjudication 
(vi) Accountability of monitors and other officials to users  
 
1. and 3. Relationship between resource system and institutional arrangements 
(i) Match restrictions on harvests to regeneration of resources  
 
4. External environment 
(i) Technology: 
 (a) Low cost exclusion technology  
 (b) Time for adaptation to new technologies related to the commons 
(ii) Low levels of articulation with external markets 
(iii) Gradual change in articulation with external markets 
(iv) State: 
 (a) Central governments should not undermine local authority  
 (b) Supportive external sanctioning institutions = 
 (c) Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate local users for conservation activities  
 (d) Nested levels of appropriation, provision, enforcement, governance  
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Appendix 2.2 – Building Blocks for Sustainable Rural Water 
Management (Smits and Lockwood (2015 p. 2)). 
 
 
Professionalisation of community management  
Community management entities supported to move away from voluntary arrangements towards more 
professional service provision that is embedded in local and national policy, and legal and regulatory 
frameworks 
Recognition and promotion of alternative service provider options  
A range of management options beyond community management, such as self-supply and public-private 
partnerships, formally recognised in sector policy and supported 
Monitoring service delivery and sustainability 
Monitoring systems track indicators of infrastructure functionality, service provider performance, and levels of 
service delivered against nationally agreed norms and standards 
Harmonisation and coordination  
Improved harmonisation and coordination among donors and government, and alignment of all actors (both 
government and non-government) with national policies and systems 
Support to service providers  
Structured system of direct (post-construction) support provided to back up and monitor community 
management entities and other service providers 
Capacity support to local government  
Ongoing capacity support provided to service authorities (typically local governments) to enable them to fulfil 
their role (planning, monitoring, regulation, etc.) in sustaining rural water services 
Learning and adaptive management  
Learning and knowledge management supported at national and decentralised levels to enable the sector to 
adapt based on experience 
Asset management  
Systematic planning, inventory updates, and financial forecasting for assets carried out, and asset ownership 
clearly defined 
Regulation of rural services and service providers  
Regulation of the service delivered and service provider performance through mechanisms appropriate for small 
rural operators 
Financing to cover all life-cycle costs 
 Financial frameworks account for all life-cycle costs, especially major capital maintenance, support to service 
authorities and service providers, monitoring and regulation 
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Appendix 3.1 – Graphical Image of the Consallen and India Mark II 
handpumps 
 
 
Consallen Handpump      India Mark II Handpump 
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Appendix 4.1 – Breakdown of Research Methods per Research Design and Research Objective 
 
 
Research 
method 
 Sample Purpose & Rationale 
 
Cross-Sectional Research Design – Research Objective 2 
 
Semi-structured 
interviews at 
micro-level 
 In all, 30 semi-structued interviews 
were conducted with WUC members 
and community users from 18 water 
sources in 15 villages. Of this sample, 
7 water sources concerned local 
government constructed water sources 
and 11 water sources were constructed 
by TWT. 
Questions were directed at personal, village and water source level to 
unravel the water management processes in the community. The 
interviewees were asked about their household composition, 
livelihood strategies and levels of education. People reflected on 
community relations and involvement in social and public activities. 
On water source level, questions were directed at their involvement 
with the construction phase, satisfaction with the water point; roles 
and responsibilities of the WUC; the payment process of water user 
fees and O&M collection, implementation of graduated sanctions and 
suggestions for improvement of O&M. 
Semi-structured 
interviews at 
meso-level 
 Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with seven staff members 
of TWT, as well as five technical 
government officials from both sub-
county and district level: (1) District 
Water Officer Kiryandongo; (2) 
TWT and local government officials were asked about the 
implementation process of a rural water point and to reflect on their 
experiences of post-construction follow-up support, the O&M of 
rural water points and potential way forwards.  
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Assistant Engineer Kiryandongo; (3) 
Assistant Engineer Masindi; (4) Sub-
county chief Kigumba; and (5) 
Community Development Officer 
Kigumba sub-county.  
 
Focus group 
Discussions 
 Seven Focus Group Discussions were 
held with a mixture of community 
members and WUC representatives. In 
total 40 community members were 
included in these group interviews of 
which 12 women and 28 men. 
Between 4-8 people participated in 
these discussions. 
During these focus group discussions community members were 
asked about their satisfaction with the water point; roles and 
responsibilities of the WUC; the payment process of water user fees 
and O&M collection, implementation of graduated sanctions and 
suggestions for improvement of O&M. 
Surveys  Two surveys have been conducted 
concerning TWT constructed water 
points.  
 
The first survey included  WUC 
members at  84 water sources.   
 
 
 
To gain insight in the available funds for O&M at water source level. 
The survey included information and evidence of O&M fund 
collection and WUC activities. 
 The second survey, termed ‘the Water 
User survey’ concerned water users at 
thirteen water sources in thirteen 
different villages with a total of 195 
respondents. In each village, an 
average of 15 households were 
To gain insight about payment patterns and water use. The survey 
asked respondents about: age; gender; sources of water used by the 
household; payment of water user fee and how often; and willingness 
to pay for a reliable water service. 
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randomly selected. The main criteria 
for selection was that they used water 
from the selected TWT source. 
Documents and 
records 
 Of the 18 examined water sources, 13 
WUCs possessed an accounting book 
that showed who attended public 
meetings and which households paid 
water user fees in which month.  
To examine the procedures of water user fee payment per water 
source. 
 
Action research: Research Objective 3 
 
Participant 
observation 
 I participated in the feasibility study 
and implementation process of the 
CBM-lite model (August 2012-
January 2014). 
 
I attended the information meetings 
about CBM-lite in three villages 
(Mpumwe, Mboira and Nyakatugo) in 
May-June 2013. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To observe the interactions between community members and to gain 
an insight in the challenges community members experience in 
managing their water sources and people’s willingness to participate 
in the pilot project. 
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 I attended the application and selection 
process of the Water Operators in 
three villages (Mpumwe, Nyakatugo 
and Nyakabette) in July 2013. 
 
To understand the reasons of the Water Operator to apply, to witness 
the selection process and to understand the reasons for the selection 
of the Water Operator. 
 I attended the establishment of the 
bye-laws on resource use in two 
community meetings (Mpumwe in 
August 2013 and Nyakabette in 
November 2014). 
To observe the interactions between community members. 
 I attended the two day training for the 
Water Operators of Mpumwe, Mboira 
and Nyakatugo that was organised by 
TWT in August 2013. 
To observe the interactions between the Water Operators and to 
understand the reasons of their application, their understanding of the 
pilot project and their risk and reward perceptions about the 
implications of the CBM-lite model on personal, water management 
and village level.  
 I organised a meeting with the 
political Board of Masindi District 
about the CBM-lite pilot in November 
2013.  
To observe the attitudes of the Board members towards insurance 
and to explore their interest in exploring the use of insurance against 
wear and tear of handpumps.  
 I was invited to present the CBM-lite 
model to national and international 
NGOs (members of the Uganda Water 
and Sanitation NGO Network 
(UWASNET)) in Kampala in August 
2013. 
 
To share insights about the challenges of rural water management, to 
present the CBM-lite model and to understand the problem analyses 
of the NGO representatives on handpump non-functionality. 
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The following participants were 
present: 
1) Communication and 
Documentation Officer – 
UWASNET 
2) Executive Director – 
UWASNET 
3) Planning Monitoring and 
Evaluation advisor Uganda 
WASH alliance – ICCO 
4) Programme Officer – 
Austrian  Development 
Agency  
5) Programme Officer WASH – 
ZOA 
6)  Programme Officer WASH – 
Link  to Progress 
Focus group 
discussion 
 One focus group discussion was 
carried out in December 2013 with the 
Water Operators of three CBM-lite 
pilot villages. 
To reflect on the CBM-lite model, maintenance of the handpump, 
repair process, storage of funds, challenges and suggestions for 
improvement.  
Semi-structured 
interviews at 
meso and 
macro-level 
 In total, 11 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted and included the 
following actors: 
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the Manager of the Savings and Credit 
Cooperative (SACCO) in Kigumba 
To gain insight about the funds available at the SACCO, willingness 
to participate in the pilot and capacity to monitor the transfer of user 
fees of the Water Operators to the SACCO. 
 Local government officials: (1) 
District Water Officer Kiryandongo; 
(2) District Water Officer Masindi (3) 
Assistant Engineer Masindi; (4) Sub-
county chief Kigumba; and (5) 
Community Development Officer 
Kigumba sub-county. 
To understand their perceptions about the CBM model on handpump 
functionality. During these interviews I explained the CBM-lite 
model and asked their feedback. 
 Representative of an insurance 
company with a branch in Masindi 
(Leads insurance)  
To gain an understanding about the possibilities of insuring 
handpumps against breakdown. 
 Representatives of three NGOs:  
1) Sector lead for the WASH 
sector at SNV (Kampala) 
2) Programme advisor at ZOA 
(Kampala) 
3) Project Manager at 
HEWASA  (WASH NGO in 
Masindi) 
To understand the problem analyses of these NGOs on handpump 
breakdown and to discuss the CBM-lite model. 
  the Director of the Directorate of 
Water Development at national 
government level. 
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Surveys  A feasibility study was carried out that 
consisted of two surveys undertaken 
by staff of TWT and that were 
designed by me (view Appendix 4.3).  
 
First, a ‘Willingness to Participate’ 
survey was conducted amongst 150 
household across six villages in 
Kigumba sub-county, Kiryandongo 
district.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
To reflect on changes made in the CBM-lite model in comparison to 
CBM and to give their opinion about the different elements in the 
CBM-lite model.  
 Second, a ‘Willingness to Pay’ survey 
was conducted amongst all 1,138 
households in the six selected villages 
in the feasibility study.  
To gain an insight whether people are prepared to pay 1,000 UGX for 
accessing the water source.  
 
Critical Case Study –Research Objective 4 
Semi-structured 
interviews at 
micro-level 
 In total 36 semi-structured interviews 
have been conducted in the case study 
villages 
To reflect on the works of the Water Operator, caretakers, the 
maintenance and repairs of the water sources, user payments and 
collection strategies, community relations, challenges and 
suggestions for improvement.  
Semi-structured 
interviews at 
meso-level 
 Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with TWT staff, the 
Manager of the SACCO, the local 
government and NGOs. 
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 Repeat interviews were conducted 
with four Community Development 
Officers (CDOs) of TWT that were 
heavily engaged in the pilot study. 
To reflect on the processes in the pilot villages, discuss challenges 
and ways forward. 
 Repeat interviews were conducted 
with three technical government 
officials from both sub-county and 
district level: (1) District Water 
Officer Kiryandongo; (2) Assistant 
Engineer Masindi and; (3) Sub-county 
chief Kigumba. 
 
To reflect on the processes in the pilot villages, discuss challenges 
and ways forward. 
 Repeat interviews were conducted 
with the Manager of the SACCO in 
Kigumba. 
To reflect on the processes in the pilot villages, discuss challenges 
and ways forward 
Focus group 
discussions 
 Four focus group discussions were 
undertaken in the case study villages 
with in total 29 participants (26 males 
and 3 females). 
To reflect on the works of the Water Operator, caretakers, the 
maintenance and repairs of the water sources, user payments and 
collection strategies, community relations, challenges and 
suggestions for improvement. 
Documents and 
records 
 The accounts and receipt books of the 
Water Operators and the payment slips 
at the SACCO were examined. 
To verify the anecdotal data about user collections and repairs. 
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Participant 
observations 
 Participated in two community 
meetings about the selection of the 
Water Operator in Nyakabette and the 
payment to a caretaker in the same 
village. 
To observe community interactions. 
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Appendix 4.2 – Surveys Cross Sectional Research Design 
 
 
4.2A) Water User Committee Survey 
 
Name Surveyer:________________________ 
Village:    Parish:     Sub/county: 
District: 
 
1. Number of active Water User Committee members: 
 
2. Number of males and females in the Water User Committee: 
 
3. Water User Committee account balance: 
 
4. Last repair and expenditures: 
 
 
4.2B) Water User Survey 
 
Name Surveyer:________________________ 
Village:    Parish:     Sub/county: 
Name Household:  Sex Interviewee: M/F 
1. What kind of water do you currently use? 
Traditional open water source/shallow well/Borehole/protected spring 
 
2. Do you pay water user fee? 
Yes/No 
 
3. How much do you pay? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. How often do you pay water user fee? 
Monthly/Quarterly/Annual/Seasonal/Irregular/Other_________________________ 
 
5. How do you feel the water user committee is managing the water source?  
Please indicate on a scale from 1 to 5: 
 
1  2  3  4   5 
Poor  Fair  good  very good  Excellent 
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Why? 
a) The water user committee is very effective: they collect water user fee, they keep the money safe and they 
use the money for repair and maintenance of the water source. 
b) The water user committee only collects money when repair needs to be done 
c) The water user committee misuses the money 
d) The water user committee does not carry out any work 
e) Other:________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. How many people of the Water User Committee are active? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. How much would you be willing to pay if the water sources in your village are managed well and 
immediately repaired when necessary? 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
When would you like to pay the Water User Fee? 
 Per: Month/quarter/year/season/other:_______________________________ 
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Appendix 4.3 – Surveys Action Research 
 
 
4.3A) Willingness to Pay Survey  
 
Why a Pilot Project? 
To ensure that villages can pay for repairs and maintenance of their water sources TWT and the local government are 
starting a pilot project. Currently, there are many challenges with Water User Committees. In many villages the 
committees are not operational or not operational enough. In the end, there is no money to pay for repairs; e.g. due to 
misuse of water user fees or due to the fact that Water User Committees do not collect funds from the community. 
And what happens? The water source is broken and people have to fetch from an open source or walk further to the 
next borehole.  
 
How does it work? 
One person from within the village manages the water sources of the entire village. This person is selected by the local 
government and TWT through an interview process. This person collects water user fees from all households that use 
a borehole or a shallow well. The fee is: 1,000 UGX per month.   
From the start the Water Operator receives a loan from the micro credit organization. This money is only used for 
repair and maintenance of the water sources. Every month the Water Operator pays back the loan. The loan is repaid 
through the water user fee he/she receives from the community. 
 A part of the water user fee people pay, is profit for the water source manager. In return the Water Operator ensures 
that: the water source is clean, there is a fence, and that the water source is functional throughout the year. The Water 
Operator manages the water source for 3 years. After this period other people can apply and a new Water Operator 
will be selected by the local government. 
 
The Study - What we need 
General: 
- Number of households within the village (LC1) 
- Number of Water Sources within the village (LC1) – including open water sources 
- Map of the village. If there is no map, ask if the village leadership can draw a map. The map identifies the 
water sources (borehole U2 pump, Shallow well U2 pump, Consallen pump, open water source), the 
households and the roads. 
 
Household Level: 
- Which water source(s) does the household use for drinking? 
o Open water source 
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o Protected Spring 
o Borehole U2 pump (identify which borehole if there are more than 1 in the community) 
o Shallow Well U2 Pump (identify which shallow well with U2 pump if there are more than 1) 
o Consallen (identify which Consallen if there are more than 1 in the community) 
- Does the household use water from an open source? If so, how many months per year? 
- Is the household prepared to pay 1,000 UGX per month in return for continuous O&M of the water source? 
 
Village:_____________________________                                                                                                                       
        
No. Name Household Which water source(s) does the 
HH use for drinking? 
Does the HH use 
drinking water 
from an open 
water source? If 
yes, how many 
months per year? 
Is the HH 
prepared to pay 
1,000 UGX per 
month in return 
for 100% 
functionality? 
  
 
 
 
   
 
 
4.3 b) Willingness to Participate Survey  
 
Village:      Sub-County: 
Name Household:  
 
1. What kind of water do you currently use? 
Traditional Water Source / Shallow Well / Borehole / spring 
 
2. Currently, do you pay for using the water? 
Yes/No 
If yes, how much do you pay? 
 
If yes, how often do you pay? (per month, per quarter, per year, irregular) 
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3. Would you be willing to pay 1,000 shilling every month for using clean drinking water? 
Yes/No 
If not, why? 
 
One of the major problems with boreholes/shallow wells is that they break down at one point and that the water source 
is not being repaired. In many times it is difficult for a Water User Committee that is working on a voluntary basis ,to 
maintain and repair the borehole. The result is that nobody can fetch water from that water source anymore. 
Therefore, the following concept has been developed. 
I. By means of interviews, 1 skilled person (man/women) from and living in the village is selected to manage 
the village water sources  for a few years (around 3 year). 
II. In order to manage  the village water sources, the person puts an X amount of money on a bank account. 
This money is secured in the account and can only be used when the pump breaks down.  This will provide 
the community the security that when the water source breaks down it can be immediately repaired. 
III. The person who manages the water source collects a monthly water user fee of 1,000 from every household. 
Part of this money compensates the Water Operator and the caretaker for the time invested in operating and 
maintaining the village water sources.  
IV. A contract is made with the community and the local government to ensure that the Water Operator  cannot 
increase the water fee. He/She is not able to access the bank account for personal gain. If the manager of the 
water source is not performing he/she will be replaced. 
4. Do you like to have 1 skilled person from the village to manage the water source for a given number 
of years? (around 3 years) 
Yes/No 
Why? 
 
 
5. Would you allow 1 skilled person in the village to manage the water source in return that he/she puts 
an X amount of money on a bank account for maintenance and repair?  
Yes/No 
Why? 
 
6. Would you agree that this person asks 1,000 shilling a month from every household in return that the 
water source is maintained well and will not break down? 
Yes/No 
Why? 
 272 
 
Appendix 4.4 – Ethical Approval of the Study & Form UPR16 Research 
Ethics Review Checklist 
 
 
 
 
 
Marije van den Broek 
Department of Geography 
Date: 18th October 2014 
 
FAVOURABLE OPINION WITH MINOR AMENDMENTS/CONDITIONS 
 
Protocol Title: Sustainable Rural Water Management; a case study in Uganda. 
SFEC 2014 - 060, VAN DEN BROEK, 
 
Date Reviewed: 17th October 2014 
 
Dear Marije, 
 
Thank you for submitting your application for ethical review. The proposal was reviewed by the Science Faculty 
Ethics Committee in September and early October 2014. 
 
You have provided a very full account of your proposals which contain relevant considerations and contingencies to 
address areas of potential sensitivity that you identify. I am pleased to inform you that your application has been given 
a favourable opinion subject to minor amendments/conditions (listed below) by the Science Faculty Ethics Committee: 
 
1) It is important that identify yourself to participants clearly as a University of Portsmouth researcher and explain 
that your past NGO role by which some may know you does not apply to this research; 
 
2) Please pay close attention to your considerations outlined in respect of recruiting participants (see Section 4.3 of 
your protocol document). In particular, it is important to recruit and interview women in a setting in which they can 
express their views freely. I know that you discuss this in Section 4.3, but our review is identifying this as being 
especially important; 
 
3) Some important considerations are included within your supervisors’ peer review statement. Whilst we accept that 
you have incorporated them within your documentation it is important to continue to keep these points in mind during 
your work in the field. Do not hesitate to contact your supervisor for guidance should you encounter uncertainties 
whilst in the field; 
 
4) I recommend that you consider adding an opportunity on the consent form for participants to consent to their 
interview being recorded; 
 
5) Point number 4 on your consent form could appear worrying to participants. Could there be a case for altering it to 
“regulatory authorities with legal authority in Britain?” This is up to you since you may not think that this statement 
is a problem; should only be an issue should the translator and the participant know each other – please be 
Faculty of Science 
University of Portsmouth 
St Michael’s Building 
White Swan Road 
PORTSMOUTH 
PO1 2DT 
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aware of this possibility; 
 
7) Please ensure that you comply with the University's Overseas Travel Policy and be aware of the University’s 
Field Work guidance http://www.port.ac.uk/special/overseastravel/ 
http://www.port.ac.uk/departments/services/humanresources/healthandsafety/atoz/fieldwork/ 
 
8) In annexe 3 Semi‐structured interviews there are: (a) a number of undefined abbreviations e.g. SACCO, LCI and 
MFI and (b) inconsistences in the use of scales for certain questions e.g. poor to excellent is used in one question and 
poor to exceptional in others. Please can you ensure that participants understand any abbreviations used. Please amend 
your scales to ensure consistency; Items 1‐3 and 7 are reminders while the others are minor items to address. You do 
not need to respond back to me on these points unless you specifically wish to as they are intended for your guidance. 
Please notify us in the future of any substantial amendments that may be required. On completion of the study please 
send the SFEC a final study report. 
 
All of the reviewers were complimentary about your proposed research and wish you good luck with the study. 
 
Dr Malcolm Bray 
Geography Dept. Science Faculty Ethics Committee 
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Appendix 6.1 – Sources on the Smart Handpump project and the Sub-
County Water Supply and Sanitation Boards. 
 
 
Smart Handpump Project – University of Oxford 
 
World Wide Web: 
 
University of Oxford press release, 2 July 20115. 
http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2015-07-02-%E2%80%98smart-handpumps%E2%80%99-bring-reliable-water-service-
rural-africa 
 
University of Oxford press release, 2 July 2015.  
http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2015-07-02-rcuk-highlights-oxfords-innovative-smart-handpumps-project 
 
Government UK, press release, 8 June 2012. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/water-smart-hand-pumps-send-texts-if-they-break 
 
Unicef, 22 March 2016. 
http://www.unicefstories.org/2016/03/22/can-a-rural-handpump-tell-you-its-not-well/ 
 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), March 2016. 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/news-events-and-publications/impact-case-studies/secure-water-supply-with-smart-hand-
pumps/ 
 
Reports: 
 
Foster, T., Hope, R., Thomson, P., 2015. Insuring against rural water risks. Evidence from Kwale, Kenya. Water 
Programme, Working Paper 3, Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford University, UK. 
 
 
Academic journals: 
 
Thomson, P., Hope, R., Foster, T., 2012. GSM-enables remote monitoring of rural handpumps: a proof-of-concept 
study. Journal of Hydroinformatics. 14 (4) 829 839; DOI: 10.2166/ hydro. 2012.183 
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Koehler, J., Thomson, P., Hope, R., 2015. Pump-Priming Payments for Sustainable Water Services in Rural Africa. 
World Development. Doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.05.020 
 
Media: 
 
The Guardian. 22 March 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2016/mar/22/how-do-you-solve-a-
problem-like-a-broken-water-pump 
 
BBC news, 8 June 2012.  
http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-18358766 
 
The Telegraph, 25 July 2016. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationpicturegalleries/11750796/Ten-groundbreaking-university-research-
projects.html?frame=3381417 
 
 
Sub-County Water Supply and Sanitation Boards by IRC/Triple-S and the  
Ugandan Ministry of Water and Enviroment. 
 
World Wide Web: 
 
IRCWASH, 6 September, 2014 
http://www.ircwash.org/news/experiment-overview-0 
 
Water Services that Last (Triple-S website: date unknown) 
http://www.waterservicesthatlast.org/experiments/uganda_experiments/adopting_sub_county_model_to_improve_o
perations_and_maintenance 
 
Water Services that Last press release (Triple-S website: date unknown) 
http://www.waterservicesthatlast.org/media/publications/sub_county_water_boards_handbook 
 
Conference Papers: 
 
Kiwanuka, J., Sentumbwe, A., 2015. Effectiveness of the community based maintenance system for rural water 
supplies in Uganda. 38th WEDC conference, Loughborough University, UK, 2015. Briefing paper 2111. 
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Mirembe, L., 2014. Sub-County Water Supply and Sanitation Boards: a mreo effective approach to community-
based management. 37th WEDC International Conference, Hanoi, Vietnam. Sustainable Water and Sanitation 
Services for All in a Fast Changing World. Briefing Paper 2071, 1-7. 
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Appendix 6.2 – Service Contract CBM-lite 
 
 
This contract for Water Source Manager is made effective as of   _________(date) by and between 
________________(Name)__________________________(Title)  of Kigumba Sub-county in Kiryandongo 
District AND __________________________________(Name)____________________________(Title) of 
__________________________ Microfinance organization in__________________(place) AND 
________________________________(Name) in____________________________(village) 
AND______________________(Name village representative) ____________________(Title) 
of________________(village).  
 
1. SERVICES WATER SOURCE MANAGER 
Beginning on____________________(date) and ending on________________ 
(date),____________________________(name) will provide to__________________(village) the following 
services (collectively the “Services”): 
The water source manager maintains and repairs _____________________ (number) hand in pumps in 
_____________________________________(village). 
 
The water source manager maintains the hand pump 
 
- The hand pump and the surroundings are clean and free of waste  
- The water source has a fence that protects animals from approaching the water source 
- The water source has a soak pit 
 
The water source repairs the hand pump 
 
- Every four month a Hand Pump Mechanic services the pump for preventative maintenance. 
- The entrepreneur calls the Hand Pump Mechanic within 24 hours when the hand pump needs repair. 
- The entrepreneur purchases the spare parts necessary for the repair. 
 
2. SERVICES MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATION 
 
The Microfinance organization provides a loan for maintenance and repair to the Water Source Manager 
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- The Microfinance organization in___________________(Location) shall provide a loan 
of________________________ UGX for_________________(number) hand pumps in 
_____________________(village) to the Water Source Manager. The interest rate is 0.5% per month. 
The total loan for a period of 3 years including interest is:___________________ UGX. 
 
- The loan will stay in the account of the microfinance organization and will not be given directly to the 
Water Source Manager. 
 
- The microfinance organization shall monitor whether funds are needed for repair by checking the hand 
pump on the ground.   
 
- The microfinance organization shall provide the requested funds (within the total loan amount) to the 
Water Source Manager in case funds are needed for maintenance and repair. The microfinance 
organization can only accept to pay the Water Source Manager when the ‘Maintenance & Repair form’ 
has been filled in by all involved parties.  
 
3. SERVICES SUB-COUNTY 
 
- The Sub-county monitors the services provided by the Water Source Manager to ________________ 
(village). 
 
- Community members in ___________________(village) can contact the sub-county chief on 
____________________(telephone number) in case the Water Source Manager does not provide the 
agreed services. 
 
- The Sub-county monitors the payment of 1,000 UGX by every household for using water from a hand 
pump in __________________(village). 
 
- The Water Source manager can contact the sub-county on_________________________(telephone 
number) in case a household fails to pay the monthly water user fee of 1,000 UGX. 
 
4. PAYMENT WATER SOURCE MANAGER TO MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATION 
The Water Source Manager shall pay the Microfinance organization in 
___________________________(Location)_________________UGX per __________________(i.e. 
month/quarter) to recover the loan including interest for a period of 3 years. 
If the Water Source Manager fails to pay the monthly payment of_________________UGX per _____________, 
the Microfinance organization shall charge the Water Source Manager a fine of 10,000 UGX. After 2 months of late 
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payment the microfinance organization shall seek legal remedies and will report the water source manager to the 
police.  
 
5. PAYMENT COMMUNITY TO WATER SOURCE MANAGER 
The households in ____________________________(village) shall pay 1,000 UGX per month to the Water Source 
Manager for using water from a hand pump in ____________________________(village). 
If a household fails to pay the monthly payment of 1,000 UGX for using water from a hand pump, the following 
community bye-laws shall be imposed on the household: 
__________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
After 2 months of late payment, the household will be excluded from using water from a hand pump in the village. 
6. TERM  
The Contract will expire automatically on _________________________(Date). 
7. WARRANTY WATER SOURCE MANAGER 
The Water Source Manager shall provide its services and meet its obligations under this contract in a timely and 
workmanlike manner, using knowledge and recommendations for performing the services 
in_________________________’s Community. 
8. WARRANTY MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATION 
The Microfinance Organization shall provide its services and meet its obligations under this contract in a timely and 
workmanlike manner, using knowledge and recommendations for performing the services 
in_______________________’s Community. 
9. WARRANTY SUB-COUNTY 
The Sub-county shall provide its services and meet its obligations under this contract in a timely and workmanlike 
manner, using knowledge and recommendations for performing the services in___________________________’s 
Community. 
10. DEFAULT 
The occurrence of any of the following shall constitute a material default under this Contract: 
a. The failure to make a payment (both community and Water Source Manager) when due 
b. The insolvency or bankruptcy by either party 
c. The failure to deliver the Services as described in the Contract. 
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11. REMEDIES 
If a party defaults by failing to substantially perform any provision, term or condition of this Contract,(including 
without limitation the failure to make a monetary payment when due), the other party may terminate the Contract by 
providing written notice to the defaulting party. This notice shall describe with sufficient detail the nature of the 
default. The party receiving this notice shall have________days from the effective date of such notice to cure the 
default(s). The failure to cure the default(s) within such time period shall result in automatic termination of this 
contract. 
12. ENTIRE AGREEMENT 
This contract contains the entire agreement of the parties. There are no other promises or conditions in any other 
agreement, whether written or oral. This contract supersedes any prior written or oral agreements between the 
parties.  
13. AMENDMENT 
This contract may be modified or amended in writing by mutual agreement between the parties, if the writing is 
signed obligated under the amendment of the agreement.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Agreement to be executed by their duly authorized 
representatives as of the date first above written.  
Representative Service recipient: 
Name:______________________________________________________________ 
Signature:___________________________________________________________ 
Service Provider/Water Source Manager 
Name:______________________________________________________________ 
Signature:___________________________________________________________ 
Service Provider/SACCO (Microfinance organization) 
Name:______________________________________________________________ 
Signature:___________________________________________________________ 
Service Provider/Sub-County Kigumba 
Name:______________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature:___________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 7.1 – Draft of Handpump Insurance Agreement 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
Leads Insurance Limited 
Plot No 52 Kampala Road Tel: 256-414-253283/4/5, 0312-263980, 
0752-253283 
King Fahd Plaza                                                           Fax: 256-414-253286 
P.O. Box 26191, Kampala                                            E-mail: leads@utlonline.co.ug 
 
18th November 2013 
        
INSURANCE AGREEMENT FOR WATER SOURCES 
 
We are glad to introduce to you Leads Insurance Limited as one of the leading Insurance players in the market. We 
are licensed by the Insurance Regulatory Authority to operate as an Insurance Company handling non – life business. 
Our offices are conveniently located in the prestigious King Fahad Plaza, Kampala Road. 
 
Leads Insurance Limited is in the market mainly to address inconsistencies among some of the existing players with 
regard to settlement of genuine claims. We observe there is a missing link between customers and players in the 
industry. We are therefore here to instil a sense of trust among the insuring public. Our philosophy at LEADS is to 
ensure that our customers get the “worth” of their money, more especially in the event of genuine losses. We 
are therefore set to operate as a model player company aimed at raising standards for which all others should emulate, 
hence improving the image of the industry. In order to comply with this philosophy, the company has attracted well-
trained and experienced personnel to man the organisation 
 
We are proud of being one of the highly Capitalised Companies in the market, with an asset base of over, UGX 
6,000,000,000/= exceeding by far the statutory. This is reinforced further by the strong reinsurance support we have 
arranged on our behalf by the world’s renowned reinsurance broker by the names of J.B BODA. 
 
SERVICE DELIVERY POLICY  
Leads Insurance Limited provides a service delivery policy to ensure villages against loss, breakdown and 
maintenance costs of their water sources. This is expected to be done through designing community insurance 
sensitive policy which will on assumption call on the local leadership (the government) to exempt the village to pay 
taxes (VAT) which increase the premium that the community cannot afford.  It is based on this assumption that the 
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18% VAT on water in this current budget of FY 2014 and others to come should not apply to loss, maintenance and 
repair costs of water sources in rural villages in this particular model.  
 
 
ALL RISKS POLICY 
  
This is an all risks cover offering protection to the insured village___________against the risk of loss, maintenance 
and breakdown costs for the water sources in the village.  
The village ______________ has _______(number) of hand pump(s) and ______(number) protected spring(s).  
he insurance company interprets policies as follows: 
a) Loss: This is intended to mean loss or theft of spare parts from a water source but not arising out of 
negligence from the concerned parties.  
b) Maintenance costs: This is intended to mean routine service of the water source by a qualified Hand Pump 
Mechanic; this includes costs of maintenance and labour costs of the Hand Pump Mechanic. Fencing of the 
water source is not part of the policy. Routine community meetings are not part of this policy.  
c) Damage and Breakdown: This is intended to mean replacement of spare parts of water sources due damage 
or breakdown of the particular spare part. It does not involve capital investments, i.e. constructing a new 
water source due to for example poor water quality/bad siting of the water source/water source drying up. 
 
PAYMENTS 
The premium shall be calculated annually at a rate of 7% of the current value of the water sources in the village. 
This will be followed by adding the stamp duty of 35,000 UGX currently and a sticker fee of 6,000 UGX. This will 
form the total monthly premium to be charged of the village. 
The current value of the water sources in the village is:__________________UGX  
The water source manager _________________(name) pays________________UGX on behalf of the 
______________village on a monthly basis to Leads Insurance Limited.  
 
The first premium is paid in advance of 1 month by the water source manager on behalf of the village and the 
contract becomes effective in the second month. The first premium is paid in the month of______________  2013 
and the contract becomes effective from the month of__________ 2014 until the month of________________20__. 
 
The other payments will follow promptly on a monthly basis. 
Monthly payments will be done by the water source manager to Leads Insurance Limited either through the agency 
office in Masindi Town or directly deposited into the insurers’ bank account to be specified. 
 
Bank details: 
----------------------------- 
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We, the undersigned having read and interpreted the intention of this model in the interest of service delivery to the 
village, here attest our signatures and seal in agreement of the same. 
 
------------------------(Signature)    ----------------------(Date) 
GIDUDU JAMES FRED 
UNDERWRITING MANAGER 
 
LEADS INSURANCE LIMITED 
 
------------------------(Signature)    ----------------------(Date) 
Water Source Manager  
for and on behalf of___________village 
 
IN WITNESS OF 
------------------------(Signature)    ----------------------(Date) 
Masindi District Water Office 
 
------------------------(Signature)    ----------------------(Date) 
Local Council Chair person I  
_____________village 
 
ANNEX 
In this contract the parties involved in this model have been fully identified and given their due responsibilities. It 
also spells out the remedies or checks and balances attached to either party in case of non-compliance. It is as 
follows: 
Partners:   
- District Water Office/Sub-county 
- Insurance Company  
- The village (LC1) 
- Water Source Manager 
- SACCO 
- HPM 
 
District Water Office  
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- Identifies water sources and calculates potential costs for maintenance and repair of water sources in the 
village (LC1 village) together with the HPM 
- Conducts household surveys to get a register of all households in the village/willingness to pay water user 
fee 
- Holds village meetings to inform community about the model 
- Conducts interviews with applicants for water source manager 
- Monitors work done by water source manager 
- Monitors payments done by water source manager (by information received of the insurance company) 
- Verifies the need for repairs and maintenance within 48 hours after receipt of insurance company 
- Resolves conflicts in the village concerning management water sources 
- Monitors work done by insurance company 
- Approves the bye-laws made by the village into ordinances and ensure enforcement 
 
Insurance Company 
- Designs suitable policy to ensure water sustainability in the village 
- Monitors monthly payments insurance fee water source manager 
- Ensures compliance payments by water source manager 
- Communicates with the water department on monthly payment by water source manager 
- Communicates with the water department if payment is delayed by water source manager 
- Informs water department about the repairs quoted by the manager within 24 hours after receipt of repair 
and maintenance form 
- Investigates needs for repair and maintenance on the ground within 48 hours after confirmation from water 
department 
- Liaises with SACCO to ascertain finance position of the village 
- Reports to water department and copy to the manager the insurance overview (what has been spend so far) 
on quarterly basis 
- Trains water source manager in entrepreneurship/basic accounting 
 
SACCO 
- Opens a savings account in the name of the village 
- Receives deposits from water source manager on behalf of the village 
- Registers the households that have contributed each month 
- Provides transactions slips to the water source manager for accountability towards village and keeps a 
duplicate copy 
- Allows one withdrawal per month to the insurance company 
- Informs insurance company of the monthly transactions before being effected 
- Provides a monthly statement of each village with names of all contributing households to the insurance 
company and the water department 
 
Water Source Manager 
- The hand pump and the surroundings are clean and free of waste  
- The water source has a fence that protects animals from approaching the water source 
- The water source has a soak pit 
- The Hand Pump Mechanic routinely services the pump for preventative maintenance 
- Informs the Hand Pump Mechanic within 24 hours when the hand pump needs repair 
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- Informs insurance company of the defects of the water source by providing the maintenance and repair 
form. 
(Insurance company notifies district of received maintenance and repair form. The district verifies and 
contacts insurance company about the need for repairs. Then the insurance company investigates the need 
for repairs on the ground and provides the funds if needed.) 
- Repairs the water source within 7 days. 
- Collects monthly water user fees from all user households 
- Deposits the water user fee on a monthly basis on the village savings account  
- Transfers monthly insurance fee from the village account to the insurance company 
- Organizes community feedback meetings to show accountability of water user fees every two month. 
- Draws up (preventative) maintenance action plans and their timeframe. The work plan should reflect the 
priorities of the village 
 
Village 
- Pays agreed monthly water user fee 
- Selects the water manager 
- Selects 1 village representative to be the SACCO co-signatory  
- Reports any abnormalities about the water sources to the water source manager 
- In case abnormalities are not resolved, the community reports to line local government representatives. 
- Forms part of the procurement and disposal of spare parts 
- Makes bye-laws for payment water user fee and can question with evidence the actions of the water 
manager  
- Participates in village meetings and forms part of the resolutions 
 
HPM 
- Routine checks and maintenance of water sources 
- Repairs water sources 
- Is part of the procurement of spare parts to identify the right spare parts 
 
We, the undersigned having read and interpreted the intention of this model in the interest of service delivery to the 
village, here attest our signatures and seal in agreement of the same. 
 
------------------------(Signature)    ----------------------(Date) 
GIDUDU JAMES FRED 
UNDERWRITING MANAGER 
 
LEADS INSURANCE LIMITED 
------------------------(Signature)    ----------------------(Date) 
Water Source Manager  
for and on behalf of___________village 
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IN WITNESS OF 
------------------------(Signature)    ----------------------(Date) 
Masindi District Water Office 
 
------------------------(Signature)    ----------------------(Date) 
Local Council Chair person I  
_____________village 
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Appendix 7.2 – Video Selection Water Operator in Nykabette 
 
 
Click on the address to view:  
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8Tq7TWzBc3ucU84MFgwZmd5Zlk 
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Appendix 7.3 – Introduction Water Operators in the CBM-lite Pilot 
Villages 
 
 
Mboira Water Operator 
The selected Water Operator in Mboira was an affluent and educated man (up to senior level 4) with 10 children (of 
which 7 lived at his home) and a newly wedded wife. He lived in the village for over 20 years, and was born in a 
nearby village. He was friendly with the LC I of the village but the majority of his friends lived in neighbouring 
villages. He owned three acres of land, where he planted cash crops such as sunflower and tomatoes. Every season he 
earned around four million shillings from his produce. His wife sold fish at the market and earned around 200,000 
shillings per month. His main income was generated from his work for an Indian company (Mukwano) where he 
mobilised farmers to grow sunflower. For this work, he received an annual commission of approximately 15 million 
shillings. In addition, he acquired a contract of the local government to collect monthly fees at a market where 
merchants pay for their running stalls, yet the income of this undertaking was disappointing and so far he had not 
retrieved an income from this undertaking. Thus on average, the household’s annual income was 26 million shillings 
(US$ 7,703) which sharply contrasts with the estimated regional annual household income of 2,2 million shillings, 
and where 21.4 percent of the population is projected to live below the poverty line of US$1 per person per day (UBOS 
2012a).  
 
 
Mpumwe Water Operator 
The selected Water Operator in Mpumwe was an educated and popular man. He was the local councillor of his sub-
village (Mpumwe consists of three sub-villages) and a small-scale, but successful business man. He owned six oxen 
who he regularly rented out for people to plough their land. He further owned twelve acres of land where he mostly 
grew cash crops such as sunflower and maize. He further owned a milling machine to produce maize flour. He bought 
maize from other farmers to process it into flour and sold it to middle-men or people could use his milling machine, 
paying per bag of maize. Prior to his career as a business man, he was a secondary school teacher. Like a number of 
other households in the village, he originally came from east Uganda (Mbale) where his first wife and three children 
still resided and whom he occasionally visited. In 1996, he left his home area due to violent cattle raiding by the 
Karamojong (a tribe in eastern Uganda48) and the opportunity to get free and fertile land in mid-west Uganda. He 
                                                          
48 For more information on the Karamajong and livestock raiding I refer to: Agade, K.M., 2010. Complexities of 
livestock raiding in Karamoja. Nomadic Peoples, 14 (2), 87–105.  
Mirzeler, M.,  and Young, C., 2000. Pastoral Politics in the Northeast Periphery in Uganda: AK-47 as change agent. 
Journal of Modern African Studies 38 (3), 407-30. 
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acquired a second wife in Mpumwe but they did not live together. She stayed in the centre of Mpumwe village and 
they also had three children, who were regularly at the Water Operator’s home.  
 
 
Nyakatugo Water Operator 
The selected Water Operator in Nyakatugo left school at senior two and owned a cell phone repair shop in Kigumba. 
He originally came from northern Uganda and migrated to Nyakatugo when he was still a young child. He did not 
own land in Nyakatugo and therefore his earnings were acquired from the shop. He had two wives and four children. 
One wife stayed with him in Nyakatugo.  
 
 
Nyakabette Water Operator 
The Nyakabette Water Operator was the only female Water Operator in the pilot study. She previously fulfilled the 
role of a caretaker at one of the water sources in the village. She originally came from a nearby village and was married 
to a man from Nyakabette with whom she had four children. She was a local business woman and traded in second 
hand clothes, selling her goods at the nearby market places. 
 291 
 
Appendix 7.4 – Example Deposit Slip Mpumwe at the SACCO 
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Appendix 7.5 – Experiences Nyakatugo Water Operator About the Pilot 
Project 
 
 
Click on the address to view: 
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8Tq7TWzBc3uLXVkR1ZUbzBSbTg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 293 
 
Appendix 7.6 – Experiences Mpumwe Water Operator About the Pilot 
Project 
 
 
Click on the address to view:  
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8Tq7TWzBc3uWG5PRGs3T0xXd0E 
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Appendix 8.1 – Example Page Mpumwe Accounts 
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CURRICULUM VITAE MARIJE VAN DEN BROEK 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal Details 
 
Name    : Marthe Antoinette van den Broek (Marije)  
Date of Birth  : 20 March 1985 
Nationality  : Dutch   
 
Education 
 
10/2013 – (01/2017)  University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom 
   Department of Geography  
Position: PhD candidate 
   Project: Sustainable water resources management in sub-Saharan Africa 
Grounded in work experience in the WASH sector in Uganda, this research analyses the 
factors contributing to handpump failure and explores alternative rural water management 
models. 
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01/2010 – 01/2011 Radboud University, the Netherlands 
Post-graduate Advanced Master of International Development  
The course combines work experience with a broad understanding of critical development 
theories/issues and the processes involved in policy development and project implementation. 
 
09/2007 – 11/2008 Utrecht University, the Netherlands 
Human Geography 
MSc International Development Studies 
Analysis of development policy in three different themes: sustainable development, 
governance and the interaction between globalization and local/regional strategies.  
 
09/2003 – 08/2006 Utrecht University 
BA Cultural Anthropology 
Minor in International Development Studies.  
 
Relevant Work Experience 
 
01/2014 –  University of Portsmouth (UK) – University of Amsterdam 
Guest lecturer development theories and groundwater management  
 
06/2012 –01/2014 The Water Trust, Masindi, Uganda 
Position: Programme Manager  
Based in mid-west Uganda of a US based Water and Sanitation Organisation. Leading a 
team of 15 field staff.  In charge of: Development water and sanitation programme, 
Logistics, Communication, Human Resources and Finance.  
 
03/2011 – 03/2012 ZOA refugee care, Pader, northern Uganda 
Position: Assistant Programme Manager and Manager Water, Sanitation and Hygiene.  
Co-managed the following programmes: Agriculture (UN based project on farmer field 
schools), Agro-business development, Education and Employment opportunities.  
 
01/2010 – 03/2011 Investing in Children and their Societies (ICS), Amersfoort, the Netherlands 
Position: Programme Officer 
Advanced the concept of ‘social business’ through action research in Kenya.  Developed a 
curriculum on Social Business, Civic Driven Change and Social Return on Investment for staff 
of ICS in the Netherlands, Africa and Asia. 
 
08/2008 – 12/2009   PAX, Utrecht, the Netherlands 
Position: Programme Officer 
Organised seminars on peace and justice as well as philosophical master classes on the causes 
and effects of conflict in Africa, Asia and Europe. Organised events and facilitated exp osure 
visits to Israel and the Palestinian areas.  
 
09/2009 – 12/2009  Co2Operate, Utrecht, Netherlands 
Conducted a market study on natural rubber. 
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Research & Consultancy 
 
02/2017   Research on suitable rural water management models, Uganda, Gomba distric t 
Scoping study on merits and demerits of implementing alternative rural water management 
models for the NGO the Water Compass 
 
05/2010 & 09/2010 Post-graduate research on social business, Kenya 
Conducted research on the concept of social business in collaboration with Context and 
Stichting het Groene Woudt in rural Kenya. 
 
02/2008 – 07/2008 MSc research and internship on inclusive business at SNV, Laos 
Studied the impact of a Swedish and Indian industrial tree plantation company on local 
community’s livelihoods. On the basis of the inclusive business model, recommendations were 
made to SNV for possible cooperation to increase local livelihood strategies.  
 
03/2007 – 07/2007 Research ‘Leonard Cheshire Disability’, Ethiopia 
Conducted research on the impact of the rehabilitation programme on the social lives of children 
with a physical disability.  
 
01/2006 – 05/2006 BA research, South Africa 
Anthropological fieldwork on the integration of children with an intellectual disability in Hiv/Aids 
education campaigns.  
 
Publications 
 
Van den Broek, M.A., and Brown J., 2015. Blueprint for Breakdown? Community Based Management of 
Rural Ground Water in Uganda. Geoforum  
 
Brown J., and van den Broek, M.A., 2017. Better the devil you know? The Geographical Journal  
(under review) 
 
 
 
